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À Pierre Rat (1921 – 2010)
Scientifique et Grand-père
Qui a toujours su attiser notre curiosité sur le monde qui nous entoure.
Extrait de La chenille et le papillon
“La chenille marche, si l'on peut dire, d'un pas d'arpenteuse, avec ses trois paires de courtes pattes 
aidées par des ventouses que porte l'abdomen. Le papillon va, d'un vol léger, d'une fleur à l'autre. 
Comment a-t-il appris ? Sa mémoire de papillon a-t-elle gardé un souvenir de sa vie de chenille ? En 
tout cas, on ne voit pas comment cela aurait pu lui apprendre à voler ! […] Comment a pu se former 
cet extraordinaire logiciel, imprimé dans le patrimoine génétique du papillon, pour qu'un scénario si  
compliqué puisse se dérouler ?”
Pierre Rat - Goutte de Sciences n°37 – 18 mai 1998
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Cognitive, perceptual and motor bases 
for the acquisition of tool use in infants
 Abstract
Tool use is the ability to act on an object with another object. In human infants, this ability 
develops toward the end of the second year of life. Despite a recent resurgence of interest in the study 
of tool-use learning in infancy, very little is known about the developmental steps in this learning or 
the  underlying mechanisms.  The present  thesis  presents a  series of  investigations on the age and 
conditions under which infants learn to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach object.
In a first cross-sectional study (Paper 1), based on a preliminary study on 5 infants followed 
longitudinally from 12 to 20 months of age (Appendices 2 and 3), infants aged 14 to 22 months were 
tested  on  a  task  involving  the  use  of  a  rake-like  tool  to  retrieve  an  out-of-reach  toy.  Infants' 
performance across variations in the spatial relationship between the rake and the toy was explored. 
The results showed that infants as young as 14 months of age succeeded spontaneously when the toy 
was initially placed against the rake or at least lay in the shortest trajectory between the rake and the 
infant. When the toy was placed at some distance from the rake, outside its shortest trajectory, infants 
only succeeded spontaneously at the task around 18 to 22 months of age. Likewise, when an adult 
demonstrated how to use the rake in the same spatial conditions, infants showed sensitivity to the 
demonstration only starting at 18 months of age. In a follow up of this study, a finer analysis of the 
data was conducted, which yielded insight on the age at which infants start to plan their action when 
using a  tool  (Paper 2).  This analysis  showed that  before 18 months of age,  infants were mostly 
influenced by their  manual  preference toward the right hand when grasping the tool.  In contrast,  
starting 18 months, infants were more likely to vary the hand they used for grasping according to the  
toy's position in relation to the tool (right or left). These results show that infants who are in the phase 
of acquiring tool use are better able to anticipate the action than younger infants.
One observation from these  first  cross-sectional  and longitudinal  studies  was of  particular 
interest. When the toy was attached to the rake, all infants were spontaneously able to successfully 
retrieve the toy starting at  12 months of age.  This suggests that at  this age,  infants have already 
acquired  the  notion  of  composite  objects.  In  a  complementary  study,  a  significant  change  was 
observed between 6 and 9 months of age in the understanding of the notion of spatial connectedness 
between objects. Starting at 8 months of age, infants befan to show visual anticipation toward the 
distal part of the composite object when grasping its proximal part. Thus, 8-month-old infants use the 
notion of connectedness when acting on composite objects. This is in line with results from previous 
studies showing that around 10-12 months infants pull a string to which an out-of-reach object is  
attached before trying to grasp the object. However, in a pilot study where 16-month-old infants were 
presented a choice of several strings, only one of which was connected to the out-of-reach object, 
infants did not systematically choose the connected string. This led us to an investigation of why, at 16  
months, infants do not use the notion of connectedness between objects in order to solve this task 
(Paper 3). To do so a study was conducted comparing infants' performance on the multiple strings 
task (action condition) with their looking behaviours at the same multiple-string scene when an adult 
solved  the  task  in  front  of  them  (vision  condition).  The  results  showed  that  only  infants  who 
succeeded at the task themselves were able to visually anticipate which string the adult had to pull in 
order to retrieve  the object.  Additionally,  the results  showed that lack of inhibitory control partly 
explains infants' failure at the task.
A final study investigated why, in the previous studies, infants did not learn to use a tool by 
observation before 18 months of age. This result is surprising given the fact that infants can learn 
complex actions by observation before this age. One apparent possibility was that infants did not 
understand the demonstrator's intention, and thus did not perceive the function of the tool as they were 
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not able to anticipate the action of the demonstrator. To test this hypothesis, a study was conducted on 
16-month-old  infants  to  investigate  whether  presenting  elements  indicating  the  demonstrator's 
intention would help infants learn to use a tool by observation before 18 months (Paper 4). Infants 
who saw the demonstrator explicitly show her intention to obtain the toy before demonstrating the 
target action showed enhanced performance after demonstration.
In conclusion, several mechanisms whose development is likely to influence the emergence of 
infants' capacity to use a tool are proposed, and in particular inhibitory control and action planning 
processes, as well as observational learning.
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Bases cognitives, perceptuelles et motrices
de l’utilisation d’outils chez le très jeune enfant
 Résumé 
(voir Annexe 4 pour un résumé extensif en français)
L'utilisation d'outils est définie comme la capacité d'agir sur un objet par l'intermédiaire d'un 
autre objet. On sait que cette capacité se met en place vers la fin de la seconde année de vie chez  
l'enfant. Malgré un intérêt grandissant pour l'étude de l'apprentissage de l'utilisation d'outils, les étapes 
ainsi que les mécanismes sous-jacents de cet apprentissage restent très peu connus. Dans ce travail de 
thèse,  nous avons cherché à savoir à partir de quel âge et dans quelles conditions le jeune enfant  
apprend à utiliser un outil pour rapprocher un objet hors de portée.
Dans une première étude transversale, inspirée d'une étude préliminaire longitudinale sur 5 
enfants entre 12 et 20 mois (Annexes 2 et 3), nous avons testé des bébés âgés de 14 à 22 mois sur une 
tâche d'utilisation d'un râteau pour approcher un jouet hors de portée (Article 1). Plusieurs conditions 
de relations spatiales entre le râteau et le jouet ont été comparées. Les résultats ont montré que les 
premiers succès spontanés apparaissent dès 14 mois lorsque le jouet est initialement placé contre le 
râteau ou dans sa trajectoire. Lorsque le jouet est placé à distance du râteau sur la table, les premières 
réussites  spontanées  n'apparaissent  qu'entre  18  et  22  mois.  De  même  lorsqu'un  adulte  fait  la 
démonstration de cette condition,  l'enfant n'est sensible à la démonstration qu'à partir de 18 mois. 
Dans la continuité de cette  étude, une analyse plus fine des données nous a permis de mettre  en 
évidence l'âge à partir duquel les enfants planifient leur action pour utiliser un outil (Article 2). Nous 
avons ainsi pu mettre en évidence qu'avant 18 mois, les enfants sont principalement influencés par 
leur préférence pour la main droite lorsqu'ils prennent le râteau. Au contraire, les enfants plus âgés ont 
plutôt tendance à varier la main utilisée en fonction de la position du jouet par rapport au râteau. Ces 
résultats mettent en évidence une meilleure anticipation de l'action et de son résultat chez les enfants  
en phase d'acquisition de la capacité à utiliser un outil.
Une observation faite lors de ces premières études transversale et longitudinale a retenu notre 
attention. En effet, lorsque le jouet était fixé directement sur le râteau, tous les enfants étaient capables 
de  le  récupérer dès  12  mois. Cela  suggère  que  l'enfant  a  acquis  dès  12  mois  la  notion  d'objet 
composite. Lors d'une étude complémentaire, nous avons observé un changement significatif de la 
connaissance de la notion de connexion entre objets entre 6 et 8 mois. À partir de 8 mois, on observe 
une anticipation visuelle vers la partie distale d'un objet composite lors de la prise de sa partie proche, 
montrant que l'enfant comprend qu'il peut agir sur la partie proche d'un objet composite pour atteindre 
la partie hors de portée de cet objet. A 8 mois l'enfant utilise donc la notion de connexion lorsqu'il  
interagit avec des objets composites. De même, on sait que dès 10-12 mois, lorsqu'un objet hors de 
portée est attaché à l'extrémité d'une ficelle à portée de sa main, un enfant tire sur la ficelle avant de 
chercher à prendre l'objet. Pourtant, lorsque dans une étude pilote nous avons présenté à des enfants 
de 16 mois un choix de plusieurs ficelles dont une seule était  connectée à l'objet,  les enfants ne 
choisissaient pas systématiquement la ficelle connectée. Nous avons cherché à savoir pourquoi même 
à 16 mois,  l'enfant  n'utilise  pas  cette  notion de  connexion entre  objets  pour  résoudre cette  tâche 
(Article 3). Pour cela, nous avons réalisé une étude comparant les performances des enfants à cette 
tâche  (condition  action)  avec  leurs  comportements  visuels  vis-à-vis  de  la  scène  lorsqu'un  adulte 
résolvait  la  tâche  devant  eux (condition  vision).  Les  résultats  montrent  que  seuls  les  enfants  qui 
réussissent à choisir la bonne ficelle, sont également capables d'anticiper visuellement quelle ficelle 
doit être tirée. De plus, nos résultats montrent que les difficultés de certains enfants à résoudre cette  
tâche est en partie due à une capacité plus faible d'inhiber une action chez ces enfants que chez les 
enfants qui réussissent la tâche.
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Enfin, nous avons cherché à savoir pourquoi les enfants n'ont pas appris à utiliser l'outil par 
observation avant l'âge de 18 mois dans nos études. Ce résultat est surprenant puisqu'un enfant est  
capable d'imiter des actions complexes bien avant cet âge. Une hypothèse possible est que les enfants,  
ne comprenant pas l’intention de l’expérimentateur, n’ont pas perçu le rôle de l’outil par manque 
d’anticipation de l’action de l’adulte. Nous avons donc mené une étude sur des enfants de 16 mois, 
afin  de vérifier  si  l'ajout  d'éléments  montrant  l'intention du démonstrateur  avant la  démonstration 
aidait les enfants à apprendre par observation à utiliser un outil (Article 4). Les résultats montrent en 
effet que seuls les enfants à qui le démonstrateur a signifié son intention d'obtenir l'objet avant la  
démonstration améliorent leur performance après la démonstration.
En  conclusion,  nous  proposons  plusieurs  mécanismes  susceptibles  d'être  impliqués  dans 
l'émergence  de  la  capacité  à  utiliser  un  outil  chez  le  jeune  enfant,  notamment  des  processus  de 
contrôle inhibiteur, de planification de l'action et d'apprentissage par observation.
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1
General Introduction
 General Introduction
In her recent review of the development of problem solving in young children, Rachel 
Keen defined tool use as “a royal road to the study of problem solving” (Keen, 2011, p.2).  
Indeed,  human tool  use has been considered as evidence of  'humanique'  cognitive ability 
(Vaesen, 2012, p.  203),  tightly linked with other cognitive capacities,  such as high social 
intelligence and learning, grammatical language and enhanced causal reasoning (see Vaesen, 
2012, for an extended comparative review). It has been closely linked to human biological 
and cultural evolution (e.g., Ambrose, 2001), and has long been used as a classic measure of 
intelligence, not only in humans but also in a comparative perspective on diverse species such 
as  great  apes,  monkeys  and  birds  (e.g.,  Köhler,  1925;  Visalberghi  &  Limongelli,  1994; 
Lefebvre,  Nicolakakis  &  Boire,  2002).  Tool  use  has  also  been  highlighted  as  being 
particularly adapted to offering insight into the interactions among perception, cognition and 
action (Barrett, Davis & Needham, 2007; although see e.g., Emery & Clayton, 2009 for a 
different view).
Despite the importance of tool use however, in her review Keen stressed the fact that  
the study of the mechanisms leading to the development of this capacity has nevertheless been  
neglected over the last decades. In particular, she insisted on the need for more systematic 
studies  to  identify  the  cognitive  processes  which  lead  to  the  learning of  skills  related  to 
problem solving related skills. As described in the review of the literature below (Chapter 2), 
we even lack descriptive knowledge about the fundamental steps in the development of tool 
use.
The general aim of the present thesis is to contribute to the body of knowledge on the 
developmental bases of tool use processes in infancy. Our aim was to fill gaps in the literature 
in two ways. First, we conducted systematic studies on the bases of the development of tool 
use  during  the  second  year  of  life.  Second,  we  designed  experiments  focusing  on  the 
prerequisites of tool use, and on the role of observational learning in the acquisition of this 
ability.  Finally,  we  tried  to  infer  some  of  the  mechanisms  that  may  be  involved  in  this 
development. 
2
General Introduction
This manuscript begins with two theoretical sections. The first chapter is an overview 
of definitions of tool use in human and non-human animals. The second chapter focuses on 
development in human infants. It is organized into four main parts: (1) a review on the first 
developmental steps toward tool use, (2) a description of the main experimental work on tool 
use in infancy, (3) a presentation of the different perspectives on the emergence of tool use 
and (4) a summary of what is currently missing in the study of the emergence of tool use in 
infancy, and the outlines of the experimental work presented in this thesis.
Note to readers
The present dissertation is article-based. Chapters 1 and 2 present the theoretical framework 
for the topic of the thesis.  Chapters 3 to 5 present the experimental work that I conducted 
during the thesis. Each study is presented in form of a paper that has either already been 
published or has been submitted to international peer-reviewed journals.
It is important to note that only papers on the studies in which I was integrally involved (that 
is, from the beginning of the experiment to the final interpretation of the data) have been 
incorporated into the body of the thesis. In total, four papers were included: two published 
papers as main author (Chap. 3); one submitted paper as main author (Chap. 4); and one 
published paper as second author, but in which my participation was equal to that of the first 
author, R. Esseily (Chap. 5).
Two other experiments related to the present thesis, but in which I was only involved for a 
part of the process, are briefly described at the beginning of Chapters 3 and 4 (see section 3.1 
and section 4.1). The papers related to these experiments have been included as appendices to 
the thesis and not as chapters. My contributions to each of the four main papers and to the two 
additional studies (along with those of the other authors) are described in a separate section 
for each experiment.
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Chapter 1. Definitions and functions of tool use
 1.  Definition of tool use
Tool use is a widespread ability in both human and non-human animals. This type of 
behaviour can take extremely varied forms such as cracking nuts with stones, using sticks to 
reach for inaccessible food or to scratch oneself, or transporting food into recipients. This 
diversity in the actions which are considered as tool use, raises the question of how the term is 
to be defined. As Bentley-Condit and Smith (2010) pointed out in their extensive catalog of 
animal tool use, the definition of tool use is controversial, and many definitions have been 
proposed over the last decades. One of the most cited definitions in behavioural research is  
the one offered by Beck (1980) in his work on tool use in non-human animals: he describes 
tool use as “the external employment of an unattached environmental object to alter more 
efficiently the form, position, or condition of another object, another organism, or the user 
itself when the user holds or carries the tool during or just prior to use and is responsible for  
the proper and effective orientation of the tool” (p.10). This precise definition particularly 
emphasizes the need for the tool to be detached from the environment (i.e., neither attached to 
the environment, nor to the goal object or organism), excluding for example the use of a 
support  to  retrieve  an  out-of-reach object  that  is  standing on the  support, thus  not  being 
detached  from the  goal  object  in  the  sens  of  his  definition.  In  his  definition,  Beck  also 
included 'social tool use,' which is defined as the manipulation of another individual —instead 
of an external object— to attain a desired goal. As soon as infants begin to point, by 11-12 
months of age (Carpenter, Nagell & Tomasello, 1998), they are able to use this gesture as a 
'tool,'  either  to  share  their  attention  to  an  interesting  object  or  situation  with  someone 
('declarative  pointing'),  or  to  get  the  other  person  do  something  for  them,  and  more 
particularly to bring something into reach ('imperative pointing' Bates, Camaioni & Volterra, 
1975). Since Beck's proposal of this general definition of tool use, various modifications have 
been proposed. Some authors formulated stricter definitions, by excluding 'social  tool use' 
from their behavioural categories (e.g., Bentley-Condit & Smith, 2010; St. Amant & Horton, 
2008). Other authors in contrast have broaden the definition, including, for example, nest-
building as tool use, even though it does not involve users dynamically holding a tool in their 
hands (e.g., Fruth & Hohmann, in McGrew, Marchant & Nishida, 1996, p.226).
The tool use tasks presented in this work are based on Beck's definition. As it is one of 
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the most widespread definitions in behavioural research on human and non-human animal 
tool use, this allows us intra- and interspecies comparisons with animal and human infant 
studies. Similarly to Bentley-Condit and Smith (2010) and St. Amant and Horton (2008), we 
were not directly interested in social tool use per se, as the subjects we tested were expected 
to find a way to attain the goal by themselves, without calling on external help from an adult.  
However, social behaviours, such as pointing toward the goal, were quantified in some of the 
analyses. In addition,  other social  aspects of tool use such as learning by observation are 
present in our work, because we consider that the social learning of tool use is determinant of  
the emergence of such behaviours. This aspect is further discussed in Chapters 2, 3 and 5.
 2. Functions of tool use
Even in Beck's framework, tool use actions are diverse in terms of both means and 
functions. In this section, we present an overview of the main functions of tool use that have 
been isolated by ethologists, which describe tool use by both human and non-human animals. 
Beck isolated four main functions of tool use: extension of reach, amplification of mechanical 
force, amplification of aggressive or antagonistic behaviours, and collection and transport of 
liquids and small solids. Other reviews of animal tool use (e.g.,  Bentley-Condit & Smith, 
2010; Tomasello & Call, 2007), have specified two additional categories of functions for tool 
use. These categories are body maintenance and the protection of one's own body parts. The 
following  description  of  these  six  functions  is  illustrated  by  some  examples  of  tool  use 
expressed in humans and in non-human animals in their natural environment. However, these 
few examples do not represent an exhaustive catalog of animal tool use.
 2.1. Extension of reach
This first category occurs in situations where a stick-like object (such as a rod, a rake 
or a hook) helps its user retrieve an object that is positioned out of its reach. This function of  
extending the body corresponds to the definition of tool use given by Nabeshima, Kuniyoshi 
and Lungarella (2006, p.2), as “the ability possessed by humans and other animals … to use 
different tools to manipulate objects, and hence 'move beyond' the limits set on their action 
space by the length of their  limbs or the type of their  end-effectors”.  This behaviour has 
mainly been observed in humans and non-human primates (see Tomasello & Call, 1997 for a 
review), but also in some birds such as corvids and some species of parrots, and occasionally 
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in other species (see Bentley-Condit & Smith 2010 for an extensive catalog). This definition 
of 'extension of reach' includes situations where the goal is out of reach, either because it is 
too far, or because it is inserted in a small cavity that prevents the individual from grasping it  
directly with its limb. Chimpanzees (Pan trogolodytes) for example, insert twigs into holes in 
termite mounds, to fish for termites (Tomasello & Call, 1997; McGrew, 1992). In the same 
way, New Caledonian crows (Corvus moneduloides) use twigs to extract insect larvae from 
tree holes in their natural environment (Hunt, 1996, Fig. 1 left). Other forms of 'extension of 
reach' arise when a stick-like tool is used either to attain an out-of-reach part of the body, or to 
test depth in an aquatic environment (see Breuer,  Ndoundou-Hockemba, & Fishlock, 2005, 
for an example in an individual from the species Gorilla gorilla, Fig. 1 right).
Figure 1. Left: New Caledonian crow using a twig-tool to retrieve food from inside a dead 
tree (Picture from Michael Sibley, University of Auckland); Right: Gorilla using a branch to 
test depth of water (Photograph taken from Breuer et al., PLOS Biology, 2005).
 2.2. Amplification of mechanical force 
Hammering is a widespread example of tool use action wherein the mechanical force 
of  the  user  is  amplified.  This  action  is  not  reserved  to  humans,  as  some  animals,  and 
especially primates, have been observed for example to crack nuts by placing the nut on a 
stone (used as an anvil), and cracking it with a second piece of stone used as a hammer (e.g., 
Inoue-Nakamura and Matsuzawa, 1997). This kind of behaviour has even been shown to be 
performed with highly skilful strategies comparable to those of humans (e.g., Fragaszy et al.,  
2013, for an example with capuchin monkeys, Sapajus libidinosus).
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 2.3. Amplification of aggressive or antagonistic behaviours
The use of external objects as weapons makes it possible to augment aggressive or 
antagonistic behaviours. Humans are not the only species to use weapons to threaten and 
attack:  non-human primates have aslo been shown to brandish or throw sticks and stones 
during fighting situations (e.g.,  Goodall,  1986). Other animals have also been observed to 
exhibit this type of tool use behaviour (see Bentley-Conditt 2010). For example, elephants 
have  been  reported  to  roll  objects  toward  smaller  animals  to  threaten  them  (Chevalier-
Skolnikoff & Liska, 1993).
 2.4. Collection and transport of liquids and small solids
This type of tool use involves containing and/or transporting liquids or small solids, as 
well as absorbing liquids with sponge-like objects. In everyday life, humans regularly use 
dozens of such tools, such as bottles, plastic containers and boxes, plastic bags and backpacks, 
etc. In humans, the tool usually first used by infants is the spoon, which allows them to feed 
properly with liquid food such as applesauce. This tool is also considered as to extend the 
reach when being held in the hand (see Chapter 2 section 2.1 for a review on spoon-use in 
infants). Collection and transport of liquids has also been observed in the wild. Chimpanzees 
for example use leaves to collect fresh water in crevices (Goodall, 1986).
 2.5. Body maintenance
Body maintenance is the use of an external object to act on a reachable part of one's 
body or appearance. Toothbrushes,  scissors,  hairbrushes and combs are good examples of 
typical  human tools used for body maintenance.  In  wild animals,  one of  the most  recent 
examples is stone-rubbing behaviour observed in an adult brown bear (Ursus arctos), using 
stones to scratch his face, neck and arms, presumably to relieve itching skin caused by the 
moulting of his  fur,  instead of rubbing himself  against  a  standing object,  as brown bears 
usually do (Deecke, 2012, see Fig 2).
Figure 2. Series of photographs of a brown bear using a stone to scratch parts of his body,  
adapted from Deecke (Animal Cognition, 2012), University of Cumbria.
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 2.6. Protection of one's own body part
The last category of tool use functions evoked in this section is the use of tools to 
avoid harm to a part  of the body, as when investigating a fire (Seed & Byrne,  2010).  In 
animals, a well-known example is the wearing of sea sponges by dolphins, presumably to 
protect their rostra when foraging on the sea floor (Mann et al., 2008, Fig. 3). 
Figure 3. Picture of a dolphin carrying a sponge. Taken from Mann et al. (PLOS One, 2008), 
Georgetown University.
The most studied tool-functionality in animals and human infants is the first: the use of  
an external object to extend the reach. More particularly, in the present work we will focus on 
the use of a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach object. This complex behaviour is considered as to 
be of the first intelligent behaviours expressed by young infants (Stoytchev, 2007; Piaget, 
1936/1952). It requires an understanding of specific causal relations, a key aspect of early 
cognitive development (Chen & Siegler, 2000). The next chapter describes the development 
of infants'  interactions with objects, from simple manipulation to tool use actions such as 
these.
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 Chapter 2. The emergence of tool use
Before  they  can  use  tools,  infants  first  have  to  acquire  physical  knowledge about 
objects in the environment. Psychologists agree that this knowledge is based on continuous 
discovery of the environment with all of the sensory systems that are already present at birth 
(vision, touch, hearing, smell, and taste). This exploration of the environment requires manual 
skills. The present chapter begins with a first succinct section surveying infants' behavioural 
development prior to tool use. More especially, this survey focuses on the development of 
manual skills from birth to two years of age, which is the period when tool use behaviours  
emerge.
 1. First steps toward tool use
 1.1. Behavioural repertoire during the first months of life
At birth,  infants suddenly  encounter  a  new external  environment.  The behavioural 
repertoire of newborn infants has been described in terms of reflex movements, spontaneous 
movements and perception-action loops.
Inborn reflexes were widely described by Piaget, as part of the first stage of his theory 
of  sensorimotor  development  of  intelligence  (1936/1952).  By definition,  reflexes  refer  to 
stereotyped and elicited behaviours that are not goal directed. Movements such as the sucking 
reflex (Wolff, 1968), the Moro reflex (Moro & Freudenberg, 1921) and the grasping reflex 
(von  Hofsten,  1984)  are  typical  reflexes  which  are  present  at  birth.  They  progressively 
disappear over the course of development, either being replaced by or integrated into more 
elaborate  and  voluntary  movements.  Other  movements,  in  contrast,  such  as  the  postural 
reflex, continue to play an important role throughout development and are still  present in 
adulthood. 
Apart from the reflexes, some behaviours also frequently appear in the absence of any 
kind of external input. Researchers describe them as 'spontaneous movements': they consist in 
rhythmical movements with no particular goal, which might play a role in the development of 
more  elaborate  movements.  One  example  is  non-nutritive  sucking  behaviour  (see  Wolff, 
1968), which may serve as a training for nutritive sucking behaviour.
Initially,  reflexes and spontaneous movements were thought to make up the whole 
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behavioural  repertoire  of  neonates.  However,  more  recently  there  has  been  convergent 
evidence in the developmental literature that most neonatal behaviours are goal-directed and 
prospective  (von  Hofsten,  2007).  Nutritive  sucking  behaviours,  for  example,  have  been 
described as being prospectively monitored by neonates in order to adjust milk flow (e.g., 
Craig  &  Lee,  1999).  Recent  studies  using  ultrasound  recording  during  pregnancy  have 
revealed that certain types of spontaneous behaviours are present before birth; for example, 
foetuses suck their thumbs in the womb (e.g., Hepper, Wells & Lynch, 2005) and even show 
planning abilities when performing such behaviours (Zoia,  Blason,  D'Ottavio,  Bulgheroni, 
Pezzetta, Scabar & Castiello, 2007). Most of these behaviours are integrated into sensorimotor 
or perception-action loops (von Hofsten, 2004; 2007). On the basis of continuous feedback 
from their own commands and actions, infants begin to explore their own movements and 
make goal-directed behaviours in response to the environment. One example is pre-reaching 
behaviour (Grenier, 1981; von Hofsten, 1984), which neonates perform when presented with a 
salient object within the visual field and are given enough head support. According to von 
Hofsten (1984), pre-reaching behaviours decrease during the first two months of life, replaced 
by the predominance of intense visual activity toward the object. 
Over  the  course  of  sensorimotor  development,  infants  adapt  their  behaviours  in 
reaction to the feedback from the environment, through what are known as 'circular reactions'. 
First  introduced  by Baldwin (1896),  this  terms  refers  to  a  behavioural  response  to  some 
stimulus in the environment which not only adapts to the stimulus itself, but also introduces 
some  modifications  to  old  reactions  through  the  influence  of  environmental  changes. 
According to Eleanor Gibson, this kind of exploration is driven by “intrinsic motivation” (E. 
Gibson, 1988, p.2) to acquire new knowledge. Piaget (1936/1952) described the first circular 
reactions as essentially related to the infant's own body movements. For example, infants can 
become fascinated with observing their hand open and close, and try to repeat this gesture 
numerous times. After a few months, infants become more focused on the external world and 
begin to repeat actions in order to cause some particular change in the environment. 
 1.2. From reaching to efficient grasping
About  two  months  after  birth,  the  first  voluntary  reaching  movements  in  normal 
conditions appear, and subsequently undergo progressive improvement, in terms of control 
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motor trajectories, velocity of the hand, accommodation of gravitational force, etc. Reaching 
also  improves  with  the  acquisition  of  postural  stability  (Spencer,  Vereijken,  Diedrich  & 
Thelen, 2000).
Soon after the first reaching behaviours, infants begin to intentionally grasp objects, 
through active coordination between vision and prehension (von Hofsten & Rönnqvist, 1988). 
This ability enables infants to successfully grasp objects that are within reach, and spend time 
exploring  them.  Object  explorations  can  be  uni-  or  bimanual,  sometimes  involving  oral 
exploration  as  well,  and  involve  highly  diverse  behaviours,  such  as  sliding,  banging, 
squeezing, waving, tearing, rotating, transferring from hand to hand, and fingering the objects 
(von Hofsten, 2013). As early as seven months of age, infants engage in role-differentiated 
bimanual  actions during  object  manipulations  (Fagard  & Pezé,  1997;  Corbetta  & Thelen, 
1996; Kimmerle, Mick & Michel, 1995 ; Fagard & Jacquet, 1989). In behaviours of this type, 
the two hands have complementary functions, one serving as a support, or stabilizer, while the 
other  explores  the  object.  Exploring  activities  lead  to  learn  about  object  properties  and 
affordances.  The  properties  of  objects  that  learned include  such characteristics  as  height, 
colour and shape. Vision studies using habituation paradigms have shown that abilities such 
as  identifying  the  height  of  objects  (Hespos  &  Baillargeon,  2001),  or  their  solidity  or 
continuity (Spelke et al., 1992) emerge before 6 months of age. An important aspect of what 
infants  discover  when  exploring  an  objects  is  its  range  of  affordances. The  notion  of 
affordance is a term introduced by James Gibson (1966, 1979), referring to the perception of 
all the possibilities for physical action related to an object, surface, person or anything else in 
the environment. For example a handle on a cup provides an affordance for holding. In this 
sense, an affordance is not only a function of the object's independent characteristics, but also 
involves the perception of the object through and in relation to one's own motor capacity. 
With the maturation of new action systems over the course of development, infants learn more  
and more about the world. This developmental accumulation of information about objects and 
the environment contributes to infants' intellectual development (E. Gibson, 1988).
 1.3. From simple object exploration to complex means-end behaviours
After  this  initial  period  of  acquiring  knowledge  about  objects,  environments  and 
affordances,  around  8  months  of  age  infants  begin  to  show  clearly  intentional  actions, 
attempts to achieve a specific desired effect. This involves not only repeating familiar actions,  
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but  also  adapting  to  new  situations.  Furthermore,  around  this  time  infants  also  start  to 
combine objects with other objects or with the environment, and may also combine several 
actions in order to achieve a particular goal. Such uses of intermediate actions or 'means' to 
attain a  distinct  goal  or  'end'  are  what  Piaget  called  'means-end behaviours'  (1936/1952). 
Infants' first means-end behaviour is usually performed in the intentional use of a support as a 
means of bringing an object that it supports within reach. Infants aged 9-10 months of age 
discover that an out-of-reach toy standing on a cloth (the support) can be retrieved by simply 
pulling on the cloth (Willatts, 1999; Willatts, 1984; Bates, Carlsonluden & Bretherton, 1980; 
Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975; Piaget, 1936/1952). This type of behaviour (pulling a combination of 
supporting  and  supported  objects)  are  already  present  earlier  in  development,  but  are 
described as limited to object-retrieval without the intention to reach the object. Infants as 
young as 6 months can do this, but they do not discriminate between this situation and one in 
which the object stands beside the cloth instead of on it (Willatts, 1999). Also, when presented 
with a choice between a cloth with a novel attractive object on top of and another with a less  
attractive, more familiar object, infants will pull eihter cloth at random (Willats, 1984). A very 
similar means-end behaviour is string pulling. Slightly later in development than the use of 
supporting objects to attain supported objects, at around 10-12 months of age, infants pull on 
strings whose extremity is within reach to retrieve out-of-reach objects that are attached to 
them (Brown, 1990; Bates, Carlsonluden & Bretherton, 1980; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975; Piaget, 
1936/1952; Richardson, 1932). Likewise, the ability to ignore strings that are not attached to 
the object also increases around 10 months (Richardson, 1932), suggesting that infants' string-
pulling  behaviour  is  goal-directed  at  this  age.  Piaget  (1936/1952),  when  testing  his  own 
children on the string problem at the end of their first year of life, noted that they discovered 
the pulling effect of the string through active exploration. In this age period, infants engage in 
numerous  trial-and-error  explorations,  leading  to  continuous  discovery  of  new  means  of 
action  by  trying  out  behaviours  and  paying  attention  to  their  results.  The  aim  of  such 
explorations  is  the  search  for  novelty,  as  Piaget  explicitly  mentioned  in  the  following 
quotations: “The fifth stage (…) is  primarily the stage of elaboration of the 'object'.  It is 
characterized, in effect, by the formation of new schemata which are due no longer to a simple 
reproduction of fortuitous results but to a sort of experimentation or search for novelty as 
such.” (1952, p. 264). “The child discovers in this way that which has been called in scientific 
language the 'experiment  in  order  to  see'.”  (1952, p.  266).  From all  explorations and the 
associated discoveries, new possibilities arise. When holding objects to try doing things with 
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them in relation to the environment, the object becomes part of the self, forming a new “arm +  
object” system that changes the boundaries between body and environment (Smitsman, 1997, 
quoted in  Smitsman & Corbetta,  2010).  This phenomenon allows infants to  perform new 
actions in an enlarged peripersonal space and discover new affordances. According to Piaget, 
this period also corresponds to the first intelligent use of tools. More precisely, infants begin 
to use objects such as sticks to bring objects into reach (cf. 'la conduite du bâton', Piaget, 
1936). From systematic observations on his own children, Piaget reported that infants develop 
the use of the stick between 12 and 18 months of age, either by active exploration (for his  
children Lucienne and Laurent)  or  by observational  learning (for  Jacqueline).  The author 
stated that the discovery of the affordance of the stick, namely the possibility of extending the 
reach of the infant's hand, arises from a combination of the desire for the out-of-reach object  
on one hand, and infants' usual behaviours such as striking and throwing objects on the other. 
Making the out-of-reach object move by striking it with the stick, allows infants to discover 
that the object can be moved with the stick, and as a consequence can be brought into the field  
of reach.
Finally,  around  18  months  a  new  period  begins,  where  infants  understand their 
environment through mental operations, also called 'insight'. At this stage, rather than simply 
using trial-and-error, wherein they mostly understand through active experimentation, infants 
faced with a problem-solving situation first think about the situation and how to solve the 
problem that it presents. This is what Piaget defines as the period of 'early representational 
thought' period, wherein infants begin to develop mental representations of events or objects 
in the environment.
 1.4. Learning by observation
The  learning and acquisition  of  new skills  is  influenced not  only  by infants'  own 
actions on the world, but also by observing other agents performing actions. In particular, 
imitating actions directed toward objects can accelerate infants' discovery of object properties 
and affordances. The research literature on imitative development in infants is too vast to be 
presented in detail in this thesis. However, as we are interested in infants' learning of tool use 
actions by observation (see Chapters 2, 3 and 5), here we will briefly survey the main steps in  
the development of observational learning of object-directed actions in infancy. It is important 
to note that in developmental psychology, the term “observational learning” is used to refer to 
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any type of imitation,  both of novel  and familiar  actions.  The term “imitation” is  usually 
restricted to actions that are familiar to the infant, whereas “imitative learning” refers to the 
learning of novel actions by observation (see Esseily, 2010, pp.16-17 for a review on the 
taxonomy of learning processes).
Infants  begin  to  imitate  object-directed  actions  performed  by  external  agents  at 
around 6 months of age (Elsner, 2007). For example, they easily imitate the squeezing of a 
plastic duck or the scratching of a surface with a cube (Abravanel, Levan-Goldschmidt & 
Stevenson,  1976).  At  this  age,  infants'  imitation  abilities  are  limited  to  familiar  actions, 
already present in infants' behavioural repertoire (Piaget, 1951 ; Abravanel et al., 1976). At the  
end of the first year of life, infants start to imitate simple goal-directed actions with objects,  
like pushing a button that activates a beeping sound (e.g., Meltzoff, 1988). At this age, infants 
also learn novel means-end actions by imitation,  like opening a transparent box to get an 
object  that  is  inside  it  (Esseily,  Nadel  & Fagard,  2010).  During  the  second  year  of  life, 
observational learning abilities become more and more flexible (Elsner, 2007). For example, 
infants become sensitive to verbal cues during demonstration, and to situational constraints. 
Over the course of the second year of life, infants are able to learn increasingly complex 
means-end  actions  by  observation,  including  as  tool  use  actions  (e.g.,  Esseily,  Nadel  & 
Fagard, 2010; Chen & Siegler, 2000).
 2. Summary of empirical facts about the emergence of tool use
Until  recently,  the study of the development  of tool  use behaviours in  infants has 
received relatively little attention (see Keen, 2011, for a recent review). Moreover, the first 
studies focused on the development of the use of the spoon, a tool with a particular status, as 
infants have numerous opportunities to observe the use of this tool socially, and to try using 
this tool themselves. Section 2.1 briefly presents the studies that have been conducted on the 
development of spoon use during the second year of life. Section 2.2 looks at tool use actions 
that are much less familiar to infants, namely the use of tools to act on out-of-reach objects. In 
this section, we describe five important issues that have been raised by experimental studies 
on tool use in infants. The first aspect (section 2.2.1) concerns the role of perceptual factors in 
infants' tool use performance, more particularly that of the spatial relationship between the 
tool and the goal. When infants have overcome the problem posed by spatial configurations 
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either spontaneously or by observation, the second issue that interested researchers is infants' 
ability to identify the functional affordances of a tool, and to transfer this knowledge to a 
novel situation (section 2.2.2). A third issue (section 2.2.3) that has been of interest involves 
infants' planning abilities, as tool use actions require not only planning to achieve a specific 
goal, but also planning how to achieve this goal efficiently. A fourth issue (section 2.2.4) 
stress the fact that infants' ability to perform and plan actions involving the use of a tool is 
influenced by their past experience with that tool. A final issue (section 2.2.5) that has been 
investigated in some studies is the extent to which infants benefit from demonstration when 
learning to use a tool. 
 2.1. The case of the spoon
The spoon is one of the first tools that infants use, soon followed by other tools that 
are  commonly  used in  everyday life,  such as  the  toothbrush.  The spoon is  a  tool  that  is 
specific to humans. Its primary goal is to feed someone by transporting food efficiently from a  
recipient toward the mouth. This differs in three ways from the tool use actions on out-of-
reach objects that will be described in this chapter. The first main difference is that with the 
spoon, the tool action is directed toward the mouth, which is already a characteristic of actions 
performed soon after birth, and even in utero, as with thumb sucking. The second difference is 
that  infants  have numerous opportunities,  starting at  4-5 months of  age,  to  observe other 
agents using spoon-like tools. The last main difference concerns the action itself and its goal. 
Spoon  use  is  essentially  determined  by  sociocultural  rules,  whereas  other  tool  actions 
discussed in this section are the consequence of physical constraints in the environment, such 
as the goal being out of the subject's reach. For these reasons, work on the development of 
spoon use will not be reviewed in much detail here. However, spoon does in a sense make it 
possible to extend the reach of the hand, as do other tools, such as sticks and rakes. Thus, 
summarizing work the emergence of spoon-use in infants here is of some interest.
Spoon-use usually develops between 9 months of age and the end of the second year 
of life. Learning is progressive and develops through observation, experience and trial-and-
error (Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989). Around 9-12 months, infants are capable of holding a 
spoon, but with relatively unplanned grasping strategies and trajectories toward the mouth 
(McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 2001). Around 14-15 months of age, infants become able to 
manipulate  the  spoon toward  the  food-recipient,  but  are  not  able  either  to  fill  the  spoon 
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efficiently, or to bring the bowl to the mouth without spilling its contents (Gesell & Ilg, 1943). 
At 18 months, infants are able to fill the spoon, but still have difficulty feeding themselves 
efficiently  without  spilling  food.  However,  infants  at  this  age  show less  variability  than 
younger infants in their grasping patterns, as well as more involvement of the contralateral 
hand in task-related activities (such as holding the plate), and more stable movements in all 
components of the task (Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989). Also, in one study, when the spoon was 
presented at a difficult orientation, i.e., with the handle presented toward the non-preferred 
hand, 19-month-old infants took into account the spoon's orientation, appropriately adjusting 
their grip before grasping the spoon (see “correct radial  grip” in Fig. 4). On the contrary, 
younger infants are more likely to use “ulnar-” or “bowl-end grips” when the handle of the 
spoon is oriented toward their non-preferred hand (McCarty, Clifton & Collard, 1999).
Figure 4. Schematic drawing of the three grips on a spoon: correct radial grip (left), ulnar grip 
(center), bowl-end grip (right), (from McCarty et al., Dev. Psychology, 1999).
This brief description of infants' spoon use highlights several aspects of the learning of 
this ability. First, infants have to discover the affordances of the spoon: the handle affords 
grasping,  while  the  bowl  can  scoop  food  during  meals  (van  Roon,  Van  Der  Kamp  & 
Steenbergen, 2003). Then, as investigated by McCarty and colleagues, infants have to choose 
a suitable grip pattern from among a large variety of possible grips. Finally, they have to learn 
how to fill the spoon, transport the bowl efficiently into the mouth, and coordinate movements  
of  the  hand,  head and mouth.  In  light  of  these  characteristics,  spoon use is  of  particular 
interest in the domain of the development of motor planning activities to attain a specific goal,  
which is an issue that has also been investigated using other types of tools.
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 2.2. Tools to act on out-of-reach objects
Tool use actions are defined by a specific goal (e.g., to obtain an out-of-reach object), 
and by the subgoal of performing an intermediate action to achieve this goal (e.g., grasp and 
use a stick to bring the object within reach). Tool use actions can thus been categorized as 
means-end behaviours. As mentioned above, the first means-end behaviours appear at the end 
of the first year of life, with the use of pulling behaviours on supporting objects and strings to 
retrieve other objects. These actions are characterized by the involvement of two objects that 
are spatially connected to each other: the out-of-reach object is either placed on the supporting  
object,  or directly attached to the string.  In the case of tool use,  however, the tool is,  by 
definition, detached from the environment, from the tool-user and also from the goal-object. 
Thus, it is probable that this kind of more complex means-end behaviours develop at the same 
time as cloth- and string-pulling behaviours. The following subsections give an overview of 
empirical work on tool use across development.
 2.2.1. Perceptual factors and spatial relationships
A well-known experiment investigating the perceptual factors that influence infants' 
problem-solving abilities is the study of Bates, Carlsonluden and Bretherton (1980). They 
presented infants aged 9-10 months with the following means-end tasks: using cloth- and 
string-pulling tasks, as well as hoops, hooks and sticks to bring objects into reach. For some 
of these tasks, the authors varied perceptual factors (such as colour and texture) and spatial  
contiguity between tool and toy along a gradient of difficulty (see Fig. 5).
Figure 5. Configurations of tools and objects in one of the experiments conducted by Bates et  
al. (Infant Behavior and Development, 1980).
Bates et al. found that generally, 10-month-olds had more difficulty solving the the 
problems when the tool and the goal shared the same colour and texture. Thus, according to 
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the authors, the ability to discriminate the tool and the goal object as two separate entities 
helps infants uncover the link between the tool and the goal. More importantly, they found 
that spatial contiguity between the tool and the toy (see conditions 3, 4 and 6) facilitated the  
infants' performance, while the presence of a spatial gap (as in conditions 5, 7 and 8) made the  
task very difficult to solve for 10-month-old infants. The main conclusion was that in the 
absence of spatial contact between tool and toy, “anticipatory imagery” is needed to perceive 
the function of the tool, which is very difficult for infants of this age (Brown, 1990, p.122). In  
a similar unpublished experiment, Brown and Slattery (1987, cited in Brown 1990) found that 
between 13 and 18 months of age, infants could not make contact between the tool and the toy  
without seeing the solution demonstrated by an adult. In another study, Brown (1990) showed 
that  by  24  months  of  age,  infants  become  able  to  spontaneously  understand  the  pulling 
affordance of tools that are spatially separated from the goal object.
In a similar experiment to that of Bates et al. (1980), van Leeuwen, Smitsman and van 
Leeuwen (1994), investigated the developmental changes in the use of a hook to retrieve an 
out-of-reach object, in two age groups (8 to 22 months and 23 months to 3.8 years). The 
authors varied the number of operations needed to solve the task (see Fig. 6), with the main 
assumption that not only spatial contiguity between the tool and the toy, but also the number 
of operations required to perform the task, affects infants' performance.  Figure 6 shows the 
different  conditions  of  spatial  relation  between  the  hook  and  the  toy  that  they  used  to 
disentangle the two hypotheses. If the 'contact versus non-contact' hypothesis is correct (cf.  
the conclusions of Bates et al. above), then infants should succeed equally in conditions a, b 
and  d; whereas if the 'number of operations' hypothesis is correct (van Leeuwen et al.), the 
infants' performance should decrease from conditions a to e (with equivalent performances in 
e and d), until a certain age where they succeed in all conditions.
Figure  6. Configurations  of  hook  and  toy,  in  increasing  order  of  difficulty.  (From  van 
Leeuwen et al., Journ. of Experimental Psychology, 1994).
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The authors found that the contact hypothesis was not sufficient to explain infants' 
lack  of  success  in  conditions  with  a  spatial  gap.  Indeed,  the  infants'  performance  was 
generally better in the contact-condition b than in d, and in the non-contact-condition c than in 
e. However, the number of operations hypothesis was only partially validated, as they found 
another factor that had an effect on infants' performance. This other factor was the perception 
of the affordance of the tool itself. Indeed, the infants could either perceive the tool as a hook 
in which the toy can be enclosed (hook affordance) or only take into account the tool's straight  
handle and use it as a stick (stick affordance). Thus, infants' performance differed according to 
the functional part of the tool that they used.
In a follow-up experiment, the authors tested infants aged 21.5 months to 25 months 
on their ability to learn the different hook tasks by demonstration. They presented the same 
conditions of spatial relationship as those illustrated in Fig. 6 above, in decreasing order of 
difficulty,  that  is,  from  conditions  e to  a.  The  authors  showed  that  as  soon  as  infants 
succeeded in one difficult condition, either spontaneously or after demonstration, they were 
able to perform the task spontaneously in all the following easier conditions.
Taken together, these studies highlight the fact that using a tool is more difficult for  
young infants when the goal and the tool are spatially disconnected. One hypothesis to explain 
this  phenomenon is  that  in  order  to  perform the  task  in  such conditions,  infants  have  to 
mentally imagine the connection between the two elements, which is difficult early in the 
development. Thus, while infants can solve the string- and the support-problems at the end of 
their first year of life, it is only later in development, about the end of their second year of life,  
that  they  develop  the  ability  to  use  tools.  However,  it  remains  unclear  how  the  spatial 
configuration  of  tool  and  goal  objects  influences  infants'  understanding  of  a  tool's 
functionality.
 2.2.2. Transfer abilities
As soon as infants are able to use a tool even in the presence of a spatial gap between 
the  tool  and  the  goal,  a  question  arises  concerning  infants'  understanding  of  the  tool. 
According to some researchers, one way to evaluate true understanding of tool use is to test 
infants' ability to transfer this competence to another, similar context (Brown, 1990; Piaget, 
1936). A well-known paradigm is to present the infants with a selection of tools that are either 
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functional and non-functional for solving a task that they face. In 1990, Brown published a 
study on early learning transfer in problem-solving tasks in infants between 17 and 36 months 
of  age.  She  was  the  first  to  point  out  the  differences  between  infants'  performance  in 
naturalistic studies on problem solving in comparison with what has been reported in studies 
conducted in an experimental situation. In a first experiment, Brown designed a series of tool 
use tasks involving the choice of a functional tool among a set of tools, some of which were 
non-functional. Infants from three age groups (17-24, 25-30, and 31-36 months) were first 
trained to successfully retrieve the out-of-reach toy with one of these sets of tools (“learning 
set”, see Fig. 7). Then, another set of tools was presented, containing at least one functional 
tool  (“transfer set”,  Fig.  7).  The infants'  task was to  choose the correct tool  based on its 
functionality but not on the perceptual features irrelevant to the task, in order to retrieve an 
out-of-reach object.
Figure  7.  Representative  example  of  a  learning set  (1)  and a  transfer  set  (2)  in  the  first  
experiment. In this example, the functional tools are respectively the rake (1A) and the hook 
(1D) in the learning trial, and the hook (2D) in the transfer trial (From Brown,  Cognitive  
Science, 1990).
As mentioned in the previous section, a first interesting result from this study was that 
no infants below 24 months of age were able to succeed at the task spontaneously during the 
learning phase, without first seeing their mother demonstrate the solution. Even between 24 
and 30 months, the spontaneous success rate in the learning phase was only about 33%. This 
first result contrasts with the age at which Piaget found evidence for the spontaneous use of 
stick-like tools to retrieve out-of-reach objects, and the transfer of this behaviour to other 
types of tools. The second result concerns infants' ability to transfer their knowledge to a new 
set of tools immediately after succeeding in the learning phase. The authors found no age 
differences in infants' transfer abilities. All of them chose the appropriate tool on the basis of 
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its  function rather  than  irrelevant  perceptual  features.  Two additional  similar  experiments 
were conducted to control for variables that might have influenced infants' choice (colour, 
shape,  rigidity  and length).  These  experiments  also  contained an additional  test-condition 
where none of the tools were functional, forcing the infants to choose a non-functional tool. 
The results of this particular condition showed that the rigid nature of the tool was the most  
important  variable  in  infants'  tool  selection,  whereas  its  length  was  the  least  important 
variable, suggesting that infants at this age range had some trouble correctly evaluating the 
distance between the end of  their  arm and the inaccessible  toy.  Taken together,  the three 
experiments  confirmed  that  infants'  choice  was  systematically  guided  by  the  pulling 
affordance of the functional tools. Finally, the author discussed two different possible ways of 
interpreting  the  absence  of  difference  in  transfer  abilities  with  age.  The  first  possible 
explanation was that the learning phase and the transfer phase were too similar, making the 
transfer task easy enough for younger infants to perform at the same level as older infants. 
The second explanation of the absence of age differences in transfer abilities was that as soon 
as  infants  understand  the  functionality  of  the  tool  in  a  given  situation,  transferring  this 
knowledge to other similar situations is not an issue. In the same paper, Brown also reported 
results from a series of experiments on transfer abilities for the string-pulling task, which will  
be further discussed in the experimental section on the precursors of tool use (Chapter 4).
In an experiment similar to Brown's choice task, Chen and Siegler (2000) tested the 
transfer abilities of younger (18-24 months) and older (24-36 months) infants. In a first series 
of trials (pretraining trials), the infants were presented with a choice of six tools, among which 
only one could be used to retrieve an out-of-reach toy. All infants were encouraged to retrieve 
the toy, and to use the tool for that purpose, but contrary to Brown's subjects who saw a 
demonstration of how to solve the task if they were not able to do it spontaneously, Chen and 
Siegler's subjects were not shown the solution during the pretraining trials. After these first 
trials, infants were randomly assigned to one out of three instruction conditions: one with no 
further instruction, one where they received a verbal hint on how to use the tool, or one where 
they saw four demonstrations by an adult. Two additional trials (posttraining trials) with the 
same set of tools were then presented. The whole sequence was repeated twice with different 
sets  of  tools  (rake,  cane and ladle)  and toys  (turtle,  bird  and doll).  Similarly  to  Brown's 
findings, the authors pointed out that in the pretraining trials, the infants rarely solved the toy 
retrieval  task  spontaneously.  This  result  did  not  significantly  differ  between  the  two age 
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groups. A second result of this study was the significant difference in infants' performance 
depending on the type of instruction they were given between the pretraining and postraining 
trials. The hint and demonstration groups performed significantly better after they received 
either a demonstration or a verbal instruction, whereas the infants in the group that received 
no further instructions or demonstrations did not improve their performance between the two 
test  phases.  Finally,  the  authors  found  evidence  for  transfer-abilities  in  both  age  groups. 
However, older infants transferred more systematically from one trial to another than younger 
infants, and generally needed fewer trials before being able to transfer.
A first important result that comes out from these studies is that, at least before three 
years of age, infants' spontaneous performance in tool selection tasks is very poor. Even after 
several trials, their performance changes little or not at all. In contrast, demonstrations and 
instructions by an adult help infants as young as 18 months learn to perform the task and 
transfer this newly acquired knowledge to other sets of tools. In these studies, however, it is 
difficult to evaluate why the infants needed a demonstration. Was infants' spontaneous failure 
due to difficulties with using tools and understanding their function spontaneously? Or was it 
to  difficulties with discriminating the functional  from non-functional  tools? Beginning by 
presenting infants with only one tool and a goal to be attained would have made it possible to 
control for this issue.
 2.2.3. Planning a tool use action
Experiences that infants gather while acting in the environment guide their actions on 
the physical world (Barrett, Davis & Needham, 2007), and increase their planning abilities. 
Infants as young as four months old take into account variables such as the direction and the 
distance  of  an  object  relative  to  their  body  in  planning  their  grasping  (von  Hofsten  & 
Rönnqvist, 1988). When performing a more complex action such as using a tool, infants have 
several successive actions to perform in order to attain their goal. The first action is to grasp 
the tool, which researchers have referred to using various terms, such as “grasping phase” 
(Cox  &  Smitsman,  2006a),  “approach  phase”  (Claxton,  Keen  &  McCarty,  2003)  and 
“preparation phase” (Claxton, McCarty & Keen, 2009)). The second action is to perform the 
tool  action  itself,  by  transporting  the  tool  toward  the  goal  (“transporting  phase”:  Cox & 
Smitsman,  2006a),  or  in  other  words  to  apply  the  tool  to  the  goal  (“application  phase”: 
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Claxton et al., 2009). For this reason, tool use particularly well-adapted for evaluating infants' 
action planning (Smitsman & Corbetta, 2010). These two phases are usually evaluated in two 
distinct ways in tool use studies: (1) tool grasping and hand change strategies, and (2) time to 
grasp or to attain the goal. To our knowledge, apart from McCarty et al.'s studies with the 
spoon  (2001,  1999),  only  one  experiment  has  focused  on  investigating  infants'  planning 
abilities as manifested in a tool  use action.  Cox and Smitsman (2006a)  evaluated infants' 
grasping strategies in a series of retrieval tasks with a stick and a hook. In an earlier study (see  
Cox & Smitsman 2006c), the authors observed that effective tool use actions with a hook or a 
stick were easier to perform with a so called “sweeping movement”. It is easier to perform 
this movement successfully with the hand contralateral to the side of the object (with the tool 
in a central position relative to the child), to “realize a suitable alignment of tool and object, in  
which the tool  is  held orthogonal to  the object's  movement path that stretches diagonally 
across the table” (Cox and Smitsman, 2006a, p.631). The aim of this action planning study 
was to evaluate change through development in the dependency of infants' grasping strategies 
on the position that the toy had to be pulled in from (in a hole either at the infants' left or their  
right, see Fig. 8). In a first experiment, they presented two- and three-year-old infants with a 
centrally and horizontally positioned stick, and a small toy behind the stick. The toy had to be 
brought into a hole either to the left or the right side of the infant (see Fig. 8a).
Figure 8. Configurations of the two experiments of Cox & Smitsman, 2006a. In both tasks (a 
and b), the toys were placed in a central position behind the tool. The toy had to be pulled in a 
hole close to the child, either on the right or the left side of the table. In both pictures here the 
hole is illustrated on the left side of the subject. In  b, the situation with the hole to the left 
does not present a conflict, whereas the hole to the right does present a conflict (From Cox & 
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Smitsman, Dev. Science, 2006a).
The  authors  found  a  significant  difference,  in  terms  of  hand  choice,  between  the 
grasping  strategies  of  older  infants,  who  grasped  the  tool  more  often  with  the  hand 
contralateral  to the toy, and those of younger infants, who were more influenced by their 
right-hand preference. It is worth noting here that the authors did not test individual hand 
preference, but considered that infants were generally right-handed. However, these results 
confirm  McCarty's  observations  with  younger  infants  and  simpler  tasks  (McCarty  et  al., 
1999). In a second experiment, Cox and Smitsman added an additional constraint to the task 
by replacing a stick with a cane, and varying the position of the hook (either to the left or to 
the right: see Fig 8b). With this new configuration, the task became asymmetrical, which can 
lead infants to a conflict in hand choice between the side of the hole and the side where the 
functional extremity of the tool is located. The results showed that both elements influenced 
infants'  initial  hand choice and their hand change during the task,  at  two and three years 
respectively. The authors explained the difference in the two-year-olds'  planning strategies 
between the two experiments in terms of perception of the affordance of the tool. With the 
cane, the older infants immediately perceived that the tool afforded enclosure of the object, 
which accordingly directed their choice to the side of the hole into which the object had to be 
pulled.
This study illustrates how infants' planning abilities are mediated by various internal 
and external inputs. Internal factors, in this example, include hand and motor preference, as 
well as dexterity with the tool. External factors include perceptual sources of information. The 
authors  stress  that  these  factors  are  integrated  together  in  a  “dynamic  action-selection 
process” (Cox & Smitsman, 2006a).
 2.2.4. Familiarity versus novelty of the tool
Along with internal and external factors, past experiences with a tool also influence 
infants' actions and planning abilities, notably in terms of the flexibility of the action. In other 
words, the knowledge we have of a particular tool may somehow influence or constrain our 
use of this tool. Here we present several studies investigating the extent to which familiarity 
with a tool influences infants' performance of a particular action, and, how much experience is  
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needed to observe such an influence, if any.
To test this question, Barrett, Davis and Needham (2007) looked at how infants' prior 
experience  with  a  tool  influenced their  performance of  an unfamiliar  action.  The authors 
hypothesized that, due to experience, infants would be less likely to use a familiar tool than an 
unfamiliar  one  in  an  appropriate  way in  a  novel  situation.  They tested  12-18  month-old 
infants' ability to learn a new tool action with either a familiar tool (a spoon) or a very similar 
but novel tool (see Fig. 9) by imitation. The action was to insert the end of the tool into an 
opening in a box in order to switch on a light. This kind of action is not novel in terms of the  
required motor repertoire,  as infants are used to inserting objects  into apertures from the 
beginning of  the  second year  of  life.  However,  the  infants  were  expected  never  to  have 
encountered  a  situation where inserting something into a  box had a  direct  effect  such as 
causing light to be emitted.  In half  of the trials,  the opening was small,  so that only the 
straight end of the tool could be inserted, whereas the bowl end could not.
Figure 9. Illustration of the light box, the novel tool and the familiar tool (spoon) presented in 
Barrett, Davis & Needham's first experiment (2007). Both tools had a straight end (handle) 
and a bowl-end (From Barrett et al., Dev. Psychology, 2007).
In accordance with their  main hypothesis,  the authors found that infants were less 
likely to use the familiar spoon appropriately (i.e., insert the straight end when the opening 
was small), in comparison with the novel tool. Interestingly, older infants grasped the bowl 
end of both tools more often than did younger infants, and were also more likely to change 
hands between the grasping phase and their first attempt to insert the tool. Prima facie, this 
result seems to compete with the authors' familiarity hypothesis, as older infants should have 
more experience with the spoon than younger infants. Thus, on this hypothesis, older infants 
should have expressed a stronger bias toward a familiar action (i.e., grasping the spoon at the 
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handle rather than at the bowl end) than younger infants. The authors argued that instead the 
older  infants'  actions  toward  the  spoon were  more  flexible  than those  of  younger  infants 
because of a refinement of their cognitive abilities. Moreover, this age effect was not found in 
a  follow-up experiment  with  infants  within  the  same age  range.  This  second experiment 
aimed to  test  the  familiarity  hypothesis  with  a  single  tool,  thus  eliminating  the  potential  
differences of shape between the spoon and the previous 'novel tool'. Infants were familiarized 
during a whole week with the performance of on an insertion task using the same novel tool 
as the one presented in the first experiment seen in  Figure 9 above. One group was trained to 
grasp the tool at its handle, another group was trained to grasp the tool at the bowl end, and a 
third  group  was  alternately  trained  on  both  types  of  grasping.  After  the  one-week 
familiarization  period,  the  infants  were  presented with  two novel  tasks:  an insertion  task 
requiring them to insert  the straight  end of the tool  into an opening, and a  tracking task 
requiring them to use the bowl end. The results showed significant biases toward the familiar 
type of grasp when trying to perform both of the tasks, influencing success rate.
With this pair of experiments, the authors showed that familiarity (past experience) 
with a tool not only influences the type of actions that infants perform with the tool, but even 
influences their initial action on the tool itself. This familiarity can have an effect even on a 
small time-scale, as infants in the second experiment only had one week of experience with 
the new tool. In fact, Smitsman and Cox (2008) found that even the familiarity accumulated 
within a single session can influence infants' action with a tool. In a first experiment, they 
studied the extent to which 3-year-old children's previous exclusive experience of either the 
'pushing or pulling function of an L-shaped tool would influence their performance when the 
goal changed, requiring them to perform the other action (pulling or pushing respectively). 
They  found  that  familiarization  with  one  particular  action  during  four  consecutive  trials 
creates a bias toward this action when the goal is changed on the following trial, theoretically 
requiring  the  child  to  perform another  action  to  achieve  the  goal  of  the  task  efficiently. 
Similarly, in a second experiment, they tested the grasping strategies of 3-year-old children 
toward a spoon. The handle of the spoon was presented centrally, after having been presented 
in  a  left  or  right  orientation during  four  consecutive  trials,  thus  influencing infants'  hand 
choice to grasp the spoon (see Fig. 10).
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Figure 10. Configuration of the second experiment of Smitsman & Cox, 2008. The spoon was 
presented four times with its handle oriented either to the right or the left, and then presented 
centrally (From Smitsman  Cox, Infancy, 2008).
Again, the authors found that hand choice during the four first trials influenced the 
infants' hand choice when the spoon was presented centrally.
To sum up,  these  studies  show that  infants'  past  experiences  with  a  tool  strongly 
influence the way they use it. Infants' performance with familiar tools in novel situations can 
be hampered by previous knowledge of these tools that infants have acquired. In addition, a 
very short experience with a tool suffices to affect actions that are performed with it—such as 
how it is grasped. Taken together with section 2.2.3, we see that past experiences, internal and 
external factors act together in a continuous and dynamic interplay to determine how infants 
use a tool in both familiar and unfamiliar situations.
 2.2.5. social learning of tool use
Demonstrations of a tool use action can facilitate infants' understanding and use of 
tools (Björklund, 2011). Among the studies on the emergence of tool use previously described 
in this chapter, more than half explored infants' ability to perform a task with a tool after one 
or more demonstrations by an adult. For example, in their transfer studies, both Brown (1990) 
and Chen and Siegler (2000) showed that most children under 30 months of age failed to 
spontaneously find a solution to problems requiring them to use a tool to retrieve an object, 
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but that they could succeed after demonstration by an adult from 18 months onward. It is 
worth noting that several abilities were evaluated in this type of task. First, children have to 
select the correct tool  (“choice-task”)  and then to  use it  to  retrieve the object  (“retrieval-
task”). Thus it is not straightforward in these cases to determine which of these sub-tasks, 
retrieval or choice, the demonstration helped the children to perform.
In simple tool use situations, where infants are presented with a tool that is spatially 
separated from the goal,  few studies  have  tested  the  effect  of  demonstrations  of  the tool 
action. For example, in van Leeuwen et al.'s (1994) experiments investigating their number of 
operations hypothesis, more than half of the children aged 21.5-25 months benefited from 
seeing a demonstration of the hook task. According to Brown (1990), infants can benefit from 
the demonstration of tool use action at a still-younger age. She reports on an experiment by 
Brown and Slattery (1987, unpublished data, in Brown, 1990), showing that 13-18 month-olds 
“can learn, with a demonstration, to envision the point of contact” between the toy and the 
tool  (Brown, 1990, p.123).  However,  since to our knowledge this study has not  yet  been 
published, the conditions in which infants benefit from the demonstrations are not clear. The 
only experiments explicitly investigating the effect of the demonstration of tool use actions in 
young  infants  are  two  studies  conducted  in  parallel,  one  with  infants  (Esseily,  Nadel  & 
Fagard,  2010) and another  similar  study comparing  young infants and macaques (Fattori, 
Brevegliery,  Bosco,  Marzocchi,  Esseily  &  Fagard,  2008).  Both  studies  evaluated  the 
performance of infants aged 8 to 18 months on different means-end task, both spontaneously 
and after demonstration. Means-end tasks of varying difficulty were chosen, in accordance 
with the age of the infants. Thus, younger infants (8-, 10- and 12-month-olds) were tested on 
simple tasks not involving the use of tools. Infants of 15 months were tested on a rake task 
requiring them to retrieve an out-of-reach toy, and 18-month-olds were presented with a box 
and a velcro-covered stick that would allow them to retrieve an object that was stuck in the 
box. Infants were able to learn the tasks by observation starting at 12 months of age. Thus, 15-  
and  18-month-olds  succeeded  better  at  the  tasks  involving  tool  use  after  observing  it 
demonstrated. In contrast, none of the tested macaques in Fattori et al. (2008) were able to 
solve the task either spontaneously or after observation. Even after observation, however, the 
infants' success rate remained remarkably low. For example, the success rate on the rake task 
at 15 months was around 30% after observation, as compared with 12% spontaneous success. 
This is somewhat striking given that, as reported in the review of infants' development of 
object manipulations above (see section 1, this chapter) that infants are proficient imitators of 
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simple actions starting at 8 months of age, and for means-end tasks starting at 12 months of 
age. However, there is still a dearth of studies that systematically investigate the development 
of infants' abilities to learn to use tools by demonstration during their second year of life.  
Thus, the questions of when infants become sensitive to the demonstration of a tool, and how 
direct and indirect demonstrations influence human infants' learning of tools remain open.
 3. Developmental perspectives on the emergence of tool use
The  developmental  origins  of  the  capacity  to  use  tools  have  been  the  subject  of 
controversy in recent decades. A number of perspectives on how tool use develops in human 
infants and non-human animals have been articulated. One debate concerns the question of 
whether using tools requires sensitivity to physical principles, or whether no particular form 
of causal understanding is required to use tools (McCormack, Hoerl & Butterfill, 2011). From 
this question arises the second main debate: if tool use indeed involves causal understanding, 
how does this causal cognition arise? Through what mechanisms does causal understanding of 
tool use develop? This section presents an overview of the different perspectives on these 
issues presented to explain the emergence the ability to use tools.
 3.1. Does tool use require causal understanding?
By definition,  means-end behaviours involve  attaining a desired  goal  by means of 
intentional actions. But does performing those “intentional actions” necessarily imply a true 
understanding of the mechanical relations between these actions and the desired effect? Let us 
take the example of the first means-end behaviour that emerges in infants during their first 
year of life: pulling a cloth to bring closer an object that is laying on top of it. Willatts' (1984) 
observed that 6-month-old infants were able to successfully bring the object into reach by 
pulling the cloth. This behaviour was expressed in the absence of a clear understanding of the 
relations between the cloth and the object, as when presented with two cloths, only one of 
them supporting an object, the six-month-olds chose a cloth at random, independently of the 
position of the object. Piaget (1936/1952) defined these means-end behaviours without clear 
intention as transitional behaviours, where infants can perform the task effectively, but are not 
able  to  effectively  perceive  the  solution  as  such.  In  their  review of  cognitive  skills  and 
abilities in tool use and tool making, Bushnell, Sidman and Brugger (2006) also raised this 
question about the need to understand the mechanical relations between means and end. They 
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refer to the example of Schlesinger and Langer (1999), who tested infants aged 8 and 12 
months on a tool use task, as well as a cloth-pulling task similar to the one from Willatts  
(1999). One group of infants was presented with the task (pulling either a cloth or a hook to 
retrieve an out-of-reach toy), several times, with the toy positioned either in contact or not in 
contact with the tool. They showed that infants as young as 8 months were able to use the 
cloth to intentionally retrieve the toy, and that 12-month-olds succeeded on the hook task. In a 
second experiment, they contrasted these observations with observations of infants who had 
no direct access to the hook or the tool, but who were shown visual  displays of possible 
versus impossible versions of the performance of same tasks (the toy being retrieved with the 
hook or the cloth, in conditions either of contact or no contact). In the “impossible” condition, 
the toy appeared to be retrieved without contact with the hook or the cloth. The authors found 
a delay between the ages where infants could perform the two means-end tasks (i.e., 8 months 
for the cloth and 12 months for the tool) and the ages where infants displayed discriminative 
mean looking times between possible and impossible events (12 months for the cloth, and 
above 12 months for the hook). The researchers interpreted their results as a developmental 
shift between causal action and causal perception, from a Piagetian point of view. The fact 
that the infants could use the hook before showing complete causal understanding supports 
the hypothesis that tool use does not necessarily imply that these cognitive abilities are in 
place.
However, from a critical point of view, two aspects of these results merit examination. 
First, the study stopped at 12 months, and the authors did not continue testing the looking-
time paradigm for the hook task at a later age to precisely determine the age at which infants 
actually discriminate  between possible and impossible events (if  they do discriminate).  A 
second point is the authors' interpretation of “successful” behaviours on the hook task. In the 
no-contact condition of the action-part of the experiment, a trial was classified as successful 
when  infants  “offered  the  tool  to  the  experimenter”  or  “dropped  tool  on  the  floor,  etc.” 
(Schlesinger & Langer, 2000, p. 198). These behaviours were interpreted as evidence that the 
infants had understood that the tool and the toy were not in the appropriate spatial conditions 
to allow them to solve the task. However, it could also be hypothesized that success in the 
contact condition was due to the proximity of the tool and the toy in itself, as the toy lay in the  
trajectory of the tool and thus could be retrieved without the infant's thinking about the tool as 
a tool. Thus, in the no-contact condition, behaviours such as giving or discarding the tool may 
reflect the infants' inability to figure out what to do with the hook, rather than any form of 
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success. Schmuckler (2011) also raised this issue in a discussion of Schlesinger and Langer's 
study, and on his own results on a similar experiment  (Cheng & Schmuckler,  2008).  The 
authors asked 8-, 12- and 16-month-old infants to perform a similar tool action with a hook, 
and to discriminate between possible and impossible tool use events. Although they found age 
differences in the action task, with 12- and 16-months olds performing better than younger 
infants, they observed that none of the infants demonstrated truly competent tool use. Even at 
16 months, all infants' performance was far from the highest score of true competency in tool 
use  (Schmuckler,  2011,  p.  254).  In  contrast,  and  similarly  to  Schlesinger  and  Langer's 
prediction in the vision part of their experiment, they found that 16-month-olds were able to 
discriminate between possible and impossible events. These latter results call into question the  
conclusion of Schlesinger and Langer about the precedence of causal perception over causal 
action in a tool use situation.
 3.2. The cognitive perspective
According to  the cognitive  perspective,  tool  use behaviours find  their  origins in  a 
cognitive change leading to a sudden insight into the potential connection between the tool 
and the goal.  This insight  is  preceded by a period of unsuccessful  trials,  as described by 
Köhler (1925) in his series of empirical observations in captive chimpanzees. Anthropoid apes 
are good models to investigate the question of how tool use behaviours emerge as they share 
more traits with humans (such as body and brain structures) than with “lower apes” (Köhler, 
1925, p.1), but who are almost never confronted to such problems, contrary to human adults 
who encounter such situations in their everyday life. Köhler presented nine chimpanzees with 
different means-end tasks, among them tasks involving the use of external objects that were 
already present in the environment. Köhler often observed that the animals did not solve the 
tasks spontaneously, but first showed signs of great frustration. The following text (Box 1) is a 
representative extract of the behaviours that Köhler observed in the nine chimpanzees. In this 
extract, Nueva, a female chimpanzee, is faced with an out-of-reach banana standing outside of 
the cage.
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Box 1: Extract from Köhler (1925), The mentality of Apes, p. 33.
Applied  to  human  infants  the  cognitive  perspective  predicts  a  discontinuity in  the 
development  of  their  capacity  to  manipulate  objects,  and  more  especially  tools.  This 
discontinuity is attributed to cognitive changes leading to the sudden understanding of an 
object's functionality as a tool. Such cognitive changes are linked to other newly acquired 
knowledge, such as physical knowledge about objects (e.g., Hespos & Baillargeon, 2006, for 
infants' knowledge about supporting objects), knowledge about means-end behaviours (e.g., 
Willatts, 1999), the ability to represent events or objects mentally (e.g., Piaget, 1936/1952) 
and  enhanced  attentional  skills  (e.g.,  Bushnell  &  Boudreau,  1998).  However,  Matheson 
(1931), in his replication of Köhler's experiments with young infants, investigated whether 
infants aged two to three years would show a degree of insight similar to chimpanzees when 
confronted with similar problem-solving tasks. The author reported that, at least before three 
years of age, infants rarely solved the task by insight. The behaviours he observed on different 
string  and tool  tasks  were  closer  to  simple  trial-and-error,  as  the  children  made pointing 
gestures and tried out various object manipulations before eventually succeeding on the tasks. 
 3.3. The perception-action perspective
Lockman  (2000,  see  also  Gibson  &  Pick,  2000)  presented  the  perception-action 
perspective on the development of tool use in infancy. On this view, tool use arises from a 
cumulative result of infants' sensorimotor explorations during their first year of life. On the 
basis of these perception-action experiences, infants develop their manual skills and dexterity, 
and  gradually  learn  about  object-object  interactions,  as  described  in  Piaget's  account  of 
sensorimotor development. In the perception-action view, and in contrast with the cognitive 
view, the emergence of tool use is embedded in a continuous developmental process that runs 
from early exploratory behaviours to more complex manipulations and means-end behaviours 
such as tool use. Action serves here as a mediator for knowledge about the affordances of 
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“She grasps at it, vainly of course, and then begins the characteristic complaint of the chimpanzee:
she thrusts both lips—especially the lower—forward, for a couple of inches, gazes imploringly at the
observer, utters whimpering sounds, and finally flings herself on to the ground on her back—a gesture
most eloquent of despair, which may be observed on other occasions as well. Thus, between lamen-
tations and entreaties, some time passes, until—about seven minutes after the fruit has been exhibited
to her—she suddenly casts a look at the stick, ceases her moaning, seizes the stick, stretches it out of
the cage, and succeeds, though somewhat clumsily, in drawing the bananas within arm's length.”
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objects,  but  does  not  necessarily  require  some  new  level  of  representation  (Schmuckler, 
2011). On this view, the study of the emergence of tool use should start at a very early stage in  
development, to allow for the continuous evaluation of infants' perceptual and motor skills 
from simple object manipulations until the beginning of tool use (Guerin, Krüger & Kraft,  
2013).  For  example,  the  study of  infants'  patterns  of  banging objects  on  surfaces  should 
provide  meaningful  information on the  way infants  learn  about  the  possible  functions  of 
objects,  such  as  hammering  (Kahrs,  Jung  &  Lockman,  2012;  Greif  &  Needham,  2011; 
Lockman,  2000).  The  expression  of  complex  manipulatory  behaviours  has  already  been 
pointed  out  as  a  possible  precursor  of  tool  use.  For  example,  Vauclair  and  Bard  (1983) 
reported  that  human  infants  perform  more  complex  manipulatory  behaviours  (such  as 
bimanual explorations, exploring objects while holding them, etc.) than young chimpanzees 
and  bonobos.  Moreover,  human  children  develop  complex  skills  very  early  in  their 
development,  whereas  such  skills  are  only  present  during  adulthood  these  other  primate 
species. From a similar perspective, Kenward, Schloegl, Rutz, Weir, Bugnyar and Kacelnik 
(2011) showed that tool-using crows developed significantly more combinatory behaviours 
with objects before using tools, while the tendency in non-tool-using crows was for these 
behaviours to decrease and disappear.
 3.4. Social influence
The three perspectives described above do not specify the role of social influence in 
the transmission and learning of tool-using skills. Humans show complex social behaviours, 
involving not only imitation but also teaching and complex collaborative activities (Vaesen, 
2012). Several animal species, and especially non-human primates, engage in different forms 
of  socio-cultural  transmission,  but  to  a  limited  extent  in  comparison  to  human  social 
behaviours. Tomasello (1999) reviewed the social behaviours that nonhuman primates do not 
express in their natural environments: pointing objects out to others, holding and showing 
objects  to  others,  actively  offering  objects  to  others,  and  most  importantly,  intentionally 
teaching new behaviours to others. To a limited extent, the influence of social interactions in 
the learning of tool use during development has been  addressed both in human infants (as 
described in the previous section) and animals. For instance, two-year-old human infants were 
reported  to  imitate  a  tool  use  action  significantly  more  than  its  goal  (known  as  “true 
imitation”), whereas young chimpanzees are more likely to reproduce the goal than the action 
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(also  called  “emulation”,  Nagell,  Olguin,  Tomasello,  1993).  By  reproducing  the 
demonstrator's action (e.g., using a rake to retrieve an object), an individual is more likely to 
discover the affordance of the tool itself than when they try to reproduce only the goal (e.g., 
retrieving an object  by any means).  Vauclair  (1993) pointed out  another  social  difference 
between juvenile chimpanzees and human infants in his comparative report on tool use and 
object  manipulation in  the two species  (1993):  human infants and adults  often engage in 
mutual communication during manipulatory behaviours, whereas adults' chimpanzees do not 
usually intervene in explorations by their infant (Bard & Vauclair, 1984). Other tool-using 
species,  such as juvenile  New Caledonian crows, have been shown to develop tool-using 
behaviours even in the absence of social demonstrators, and at the same time as juveniles who 
have been exposed to regular demonstrations (Kenward, Rutz, Weir & Kacelnik, 2006). The 
socio-cultural differences between human and non-human animals is one issue that has been 
suggested  by  some  researchers  as  an  explanation  for  the  much  greater  variability  and 
complexity of human tool use as compared to non-human animal tool use (e.g., Vaesen, 2012; 
Vauclair, 1993). 
As a conclusion regarding these perspectives on tool  use development,  it  is  worth 
noting that some of them have been presented in direct opposition to each other. For example, 
the  continuous  perception-action  perspective  was  proposed  as  an  alternative  to  the 
discontinuous cognitive perspective involving sudden insight. According to some researchers, 
however (see for example Guerin, Krüger & Kraft, 2013; Keen, 2011; Vauclair, 1993), tool 
use learning arises from complex and continuous interactions between cognitive, perceptive, 
social and motor systems. For example, Guerin, Krüger & Kraft (2013) presented a interesting 
overview of the interactions between sensorimotor behaviours (“concrete track”, see Fig. 11) 
and representations of the physical world (“abstract track”) that infants develop on the basis 
of their sensorimotor experience until they reach the stage of tool use. Figure 11 illustrates 
these  interactions,  starting  at  a  simple  level  (Stage  1)  wherein  sensorimotor  behaviours 
progressively lead to the development of simple representations of the world, which in turn 
influence  new  sensorimotor  behaviours.  At  some  point,  on  the  strength  of  accumulated 
sensorimotor experiences, infants begin to link some representations to each other, provoking 
the development of new kinds of representations that make new sensorimotor experiences 
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possible (Stage 2, 3...). Thus, the apparent insights that have been proposed as a factor in the 
emergence of tool use from the cognitive perspective, arise out of the continuous exploration 
of the world in a rich physical and social context, leading to the development of complex 
representations such as the ones involved in tool use. 
Figure 11. schematic overview of the developments leading to tool use (From Guerin, Krüger 
& Kraft, IEEE T. Autonomous Mental Development, 2013).
As Keen mentioned in her review of the development of problem-solving in children 
(2011, p.3), “perception, cognition, and motor development are so intertwined and related that 
it is usually unwise to study a single process in isolation. […] even language and attachment 
are  related  to  problem solving”.  In  the  present  work,  we  have  sought  to  investigate  the 
emergence of tool use in infants by taking most of these aspects into account.
 4. What is missing? Main objectives of the present thesis
As this review of literature has highlighted, very little work has been published on the 
emergence of tool use in infancy, despite a resurgence of interest  on the topic in the last 
decade. In addition, most of the studies that have been done so have isolated and described a 
single factor potentially involved in the learning of tool use, whereas no study has actually 
focused  on  the  overall  development  of  this  capacity.  Moreover,  existing  studies  on  the 
emergence of tool use have been conducted either on a single small age span (e.g., Brown, 
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1990: Esseily et al., 2010) or on comparisons between two or three broad age groups (e.g., 
Brown, 1990; Chen & Siegler, 2000; van Leeuwen et al., 1994). Thus, it is difficult to derive a 
clear picture of the developmental steps leading to tool use during the second year of life on 
the basis of existing studies. Finally,  most recent reports on the emergence of tool use in 
infants point out that the mechanisms involved in tool use are still unknown. Stoytchev, for 
example, in his recent work on the elaboration of a developmental approach to autonomous 
tool  use  in  artificial  intelligent  systems  mentions  that:  “After  ninety  years  of  tool-using 
experiments with animals, there is still  no comprehensive theory attempting to explain the 
origins, development, and learning of tool behaviours in living organisms” (Stoytchev, 2007). 
In the present thesis, we aim to contribute some more systematic studies on the bases of the 
development of tool use in humans during the first two years of life, by jointly considering 
three aspects: spontaneous tool use, prerequisites for tool use, and the role of observational 
learning in the acquisition of tool use. The ultimate aim of this work is to better understand 
how tool use abilities emerge in human infants, and to try to infer what might be some of the  
mechanisms involved in this development.
 4.1. Developmental steps leading to tool use
Chapter 3  aims to clearly draw the developmental sequence of tool use during the 
second year of life. We report longitudinal and cross-sectional data from 12 to 22 months of 
age on a tool task involving the use of a rake to retrieve an out-of-reach object. The position 
of the tool relative to the goal varied in increasing order of difficulty to further investigate the 
role of spatial relationships between tool and goal. Although here the role of demonstrations 
was  not  the  main  point  of  interest,  as  it  was  in  later  experiments,  we  nevertheless 
systematically included demonstrations by an adult when infants failed in some condition. We 
performed a detailed analysis, identifying 26 behavioural patterns, in order to evaluate the 
infants' understanding of the rake's functionality. Finally, we investigated the extent to which 
infants plan their actions when using a rake to retrieve an object.
 4.2. Prerequisites leading to tool use
The longitudinal and cross-sectional studies in Chapter 3 raise several questions about 
what  infants  perceive  of  the  physical  relations  between  objects,  and  in  particular  their 
connectedness.  A first  question that  will  be  briefly  addressed  in  Chapter 4 concerns  the 
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perception of composite objects. This work was motivated by the intriguing observation that, 
at an age where infants do not seem to understand that a tool may help retrieve an out-of-
reach object, they nevertheless immediately grasp the tool if the object is attached to its end. 
Earlier  studies  also  reported  this  phenomenon  in  macaques,  which  are  non  tool-using 
monkeys. We thus wondered at what age and in what conditions infants start to perceive a 
composite object as a whole, making infants act on a proximal part of the object to act on a 
distal, interesting part, of an object.
The  second  question  is  directly  related  to  the  first.  As  very  young  infants  perceive  and 
experience  that  two  connected  objects  can  move  together,  it  seems  that  the  notion  of 
connectedness is acquired quite early in development. However, infants have difficulty using 
this knowledge when the task involves more components. For example, infants in the middle 
of their second year of life are able to successfully retrieve a toy attached to a string to bring 
the object into reach. However, these same infants fail if the situation involves choosing the 
connected  string  among a set  that  also includes  non-connected  strings.  We pose here  the 
question of the perceptual and attentional abilities involved in infants' means-end behaviours, 
along with those involved in tool use.
 4.3. Observational learning of tool use
The data from the two studies in Chapter 3 are unequivocal about the rather late effect 
of demonstrations of tool  use in infants'  development.  In  Chapter 5 we look at  why the 
observational learning of tool use appears so much later for tool use than for other means-end 
behaviours. We present data from a study investigating whether additional information about 
the demonstrator's intention during a tool use action helps infants to learn by observation 
earlier in development.
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 1. Introduction
As described in  the  previous  chapter,  infants'  capacities  to  use  tools  efficiently  is 
influenced by the spatial relationship between the goal object and the tool, as well as by past 
experience  and planning abilities.  However,  two important  issues  have  been neglected  in 
research on the emergence of tool use in infants. First, we do not yet have a precise picture of  
the developmental steps leading to tool use. Apart from a few studies on the mastery of self-
feeding with the spoon (McCarty et al., 1999; 2001), and the work of Piaget (1936/1952) on 
the description of the development of stick use, systematic experimental work investigating 
how tool use emerges during infancy is still lacking. Doing such work is the first aim of the 
two  studies  presented  in  this  chapter.  The  second  issue  concerns  the  developmental 
mechanisms through which tool use emerges. As stressed in the conclusion of the last chapter, 
we  still  lack  insight  on  how  exactly  tool  use  develops.  Is  it  by  sudden  insight  or  by 
progressive familiarization with tool affordances? Do infants need to observe a model before 
being able to use tools?
The development of infants' acquisition of skills can be investigated using different 
methods. One method is to observe infants' daily experience with objects in different contexts 
until  the  skill  emerges.  However,  this  type  of  “naturalistic  observation”  is  very  time-
consuming and involves many external elements that cannot be controlled from one child to 
another.  For  this  reason,  experimental  psychologists  usually  explore  the  emergence  of  a 
capacity  either  with  longitudinal  or  cross-sectional  experiments.  Longitudinal  studies  are 
based on regular observations (e.g., every day, week or month) during a specific period during 
development of infants' behaviour and performance on particular controlled tasks. In cross-
sectional studies, on the other hand, the performance of independent age-groups on controlled 
task  is  observed,  with  each  infant  only  observed  once.  The  two  methods  represent 
complementary ways of exploring a given issue in development. Both types of studies are of 
interest with regard to the two issues that I am focussing on here. Longitudinal studies are 
particularly  well-adapted  for  use  in  investigating  the  process  by  which  infants  achieve 
mastery of a particular skill (Keen, 2011). As longitudinal studies in developmental research 
are usually conducted on small  numbers of infants, cross-sectional studies can be used to 
replicate their findings on a larger scale and to control for the influence of experience and 
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familiarity that infants from longitudinal studies may have gathered over the course of various 
sessions.
Section 1 briefly describes a longitudinal study on five infants observed every month 
from 12 to 22 months of age. This study was conducted in our laboratory before the beginning 
of the present thesis. However, it is of importance to look at this study in the first section for 
the two following reasons. First, the results of this longitudinal study are closely linked to the 
whole of the present work, and in particular to the study presented in Section 2 of this chapter. 
Moreover, the scoring scale of the longitudinal study is a joint work, which was produced in  
collaboration and which has been reused in all of our further studies on tool use. Thus, in 
section 1 here I present the longitudinal study (quite briefly), with particular emphasis on the 
methods and scoring. Two papers linked to this experimental work (Fagard, Rat-Fischer & 
O'Regan, 2012; Fagard, Rat-Fischer & O'Regan, submitted), can be found in appendices 2 and 
3 of the thesis.
Section 2 presents a cross-sectional study, which investigates similar questions to the 
longitudinal experiment in a more controlled framework and on 60 infants aged 14, 16, 18, 20 
and 22 months (Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, 2012a).
In section 3, on the basis of the cross-sectional data, we evaluated infants' planning 
abilities in a tool use action to retrieve an out-of-reach object, in relation with their hand-
preference (Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, 2012b).
 2. Brief description of the longitudinal study
Contribution to the study
This study was designed and conducted by J. Fagard and J.K. O'Regan. The data were coded by J. Fagard, A.-Y.  
Jacquet, L. Rat-Fischer and J.K. O'Regan. All authors of the paper participated in the creation of the scoring  
system, the discussions and the interpretation of the data. Two papers were written on the basis of this study by J. 
Fagard and J.K. O'Regan, and can be found in the appendices of the thesis (Appendices 2 and 3).
 2.1. Goals of the study
The  goals  of  this  study  conducted  by  J.  Fagard  and  J.K.  O'Regan  were,  first,  to 
characterize the steps in infants' development toward tool use, and second, to investigate the 
possible mechanisms leading to the emergence of this capacity by following the development 
of tool use in individual infants.
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 2.2. Methods
Four infants aged 12 months at the beginning of the study, were tested on a regular 
basis (approx. every 1 to 1.5 months) on a tool use task until the age of 20 months. The 
subjects were presented with an out-of-reach attractive toy and a white T-shaped rake-like tool 
placed centrally  on the table.  As we know from the developmental  literature that infants' 
difficulty with using tools is related to the spatial relationship between the tool and the object 
(e.g., Bates, Carlsonluden, & Bretherton, 1980; van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & van Leeuwen, 
1994), several spatial configuration conditions were presented (see Fig. 1). The conditions 
were presented in increasing order of difficulty, according to van Leeuwen et al.'s  (1994) 
description of the number of steps needed to complete the task. Thus, in the first condition 
(C1),  the  tool  and  the  out-of-reach  toy  were  attached  to  each  other,  forming  a  single 
“composite-object”. In condition C2, the toy was placed against the rake, inside its trajectory. 
In condition C3, the toy was also inside the tool's trajectory, but not in contact with it. In C4,  
the toy was outside the rake's trajectory and not in contact with it. Finally, in C5, the out-of-
reach toy was presented centrally on the table, and the tool was placed directly in the infant's 
hand. 
Figure  1.  Tool  use  conditions  (C1  to  C5)  presented  in  the  longitudinal  study  (the  same 
conditions were used in the cross-sectional study presented below).
Besides spatial  arrangement, another aspect that was investigated is the learning of 
tool  use  by  observation.  Thus,  when  infants  failed  to  complete  the  tool  task  in  a  given 
condition, they received a series of two successive demonstrations of that condition. Overall, 
there were 6 test sessions per infant, 303 trials in total, and between 1 and 3 demonstrations 
per session.
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 2.3. Data coding
Table 1. Strategies observed over all trials (in a few trials two strategies, and more rarely three, occurred 
in succession)
NT: No try (score 0)
 Grasps tool, gets rid of it, loses interest in it (tool is grasped  here without being the focus of attention)
 Looks at toy, looks at tool, looks at adult, doesn’t do anything
 Refusal
T1: Begging for toy and not using tool after its grasping leads to failure (score 1)
 Points to toy and refuses or ignores the tool  
 Points to toy, then grasps tool (either spontaneously or upon encouragement by the experimenter), points again toward toy with 
other hand
 Grasps tool, the toy does not come, does not try again with the tool, may then point to toy with bare hand
 Grasps tool, gets rid of it (throws it away, places it on the table), and points to the toy  
 Looks at toy, pulls tool while looking at toy, stops action with tool on seeing that the toy does not come, points to toy 
T2: Exploring tool but not using it in connection with the toy (score 2)
 Points to toy, then grasps tool and plays with it (puts into mouth or rubs, swipes, hits, etc. on table)
 Grasps tool, interested in tool only (puts into mouth or rubs, swipes, hits, etc. on table)
 Grasps tool, swipes table with it and sweeps toy away by accident
 Grasps tool,  plays with it and then rejects it, may be interested in toy again
T+T: Using tool in connection with toy not for retrieval (score 3)
 Points to toy, then grasps tool (spontaneously or upon encouragement by the experimenter) and touches or pushes toy with it
 Grasps tool, touches or pushes object with tool
 Grasps tool (after pointing first to toy or not), points to toy with tool
S1: Using tool for retrieval: trial and error, difficult or half success, or only after demonstration (score 4)
 Grasps tool, moves tool, tries to bring back toy, failure
 Grasps tool (after first pointing to toy or not), retrieves or tries to retrieve toy after demonstration
 Grasps tool after encouragement (after first pointing to toy or not), moves tool and retrieves toy with it
 Grasps tool (after first pointing  to toy or not), awkward movements to bring toy to hand, success
 Grasps tool (after first pointing to toy or not), retrieves toy after several attempts
S2: Using tool for retrieval: Intentional mature success (score 5)
 Grasps tool, moves tool to retrieve toy, success 
Ambiguous cases (not interpretable, thus no score)
 Points to toy, hand on tool more or less by chance, grasps tool, rakes with it, toy comes by chance (in C2 or C3)
 Points to toy then grasps tool upon encouragement by experimenter and brings the toy to hand possibly by chance (in C2 or C3)
 Points to toy, grasps tool spontaneously, retrieves toy possibly by chance (in C2 or C3)
 Grasps tool spontaneously, retrieves toy possibly by chance (in C2 or C3)
 Grasps tool (spontaneously or upon encouragement by the experimenter) and gives tool to adult 
(“Moves” tool excludes successes where by simply pulling the tool toward himself the infant could retrieve the toy by pure chance (C2 or 
C3). R1 and R2 were coded only for C4 and C5 conditions, when the tool first had to be moved to the side to be used.
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Infants' performance on the tool tasks was evaluated on the basis of a set of elementary 
behaviours, such as looking behaviours, pointing gestures, grasping and manipulation of the 
rake (either as an object or as a tool), and social interaction with an adult. Overal, there were 
26 typical behaviours expressed by infants over all trials, which we devided into 5 categories 
(see Table 1 above). The first category (NT), refers to trials where infants showed no interest 
in the task: they did not explore the rake or try to get the toy (approx. 9% of all trials). Trials 
categorized as NT were given a score of 0. Category T1, scored 1, involved behaviours that 
were directed only toward the out-of-reach toy, with no particular interest toward the tool 
shown (e.g., discarding or ignoring the tool). Category T2, scored 2, included trials where the 
rake was manipulated for its own sake, as an object, but not as a tool. Category T+T, scored 3, 
refers  to  trials  in  which infants  manipulated  the  rake  in  interaction  with  the toy,  without 
showing a clear intention to retrieve it. Category S1, scored 4, refers to trials where the infant  
used the rake as a tool to retrieve the object, but with somewhat awkwards movements, or 
attempted to do so but still failed because of motor difficulties such as inappropriate grasping 
of the handle, unefficient movements, accidental pushing of the toy out of the reach of the 
tool, etc. Finally, category S2, scored 5, was for trials where infants showed mature success in 
using the tool to retrieve the object.
 2.4. Results
 2.4.1. Mean spontaneous success
In the condition where the toy was attached to the tool (C1), infants succeeded in 
100% of trials,  starting from the first  trial.  Infants performed significantly fewer pointing 
gestures toward the toy in this condition than in all other conditions, suggesting that in C1 the 
infants already knew how to get the out-of-reach toy. 
As infants already succeeded in C1 at the youngest age tested, all further analyses 
were restricted to C2-C5, to evaluate change in successful performance of the task with age. 
Figure 2 illustrates the infants mean success rate as a function of age.
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Figure 2. Mean success as a function of condition and age (data from the longitudinal study).
As can be seen on this graph, C4 and C5 (toy outside the trajectory of the rake) were 
quite never succeeded before 17-18m of age, whereas conditions C2 and C3 (toy inside the 
rake) were already succeeded at some trials at 12 months. Considering this differences, C2-C3 
has been discussed together, and compared with C4-C5.
C2-C3: To succeed in these conditions, the infants needed to perform a simple raking 
movement, as the toy stood in the trajectory of the rake. Interestingly, success in C2 over time 
was U-shaped. At a young age, infants usually grasped the rake and succeeded at the task by 
performing such raking movements. Later, infants were more likely to perform behaviours 
directed  either  toward  the  rake  or  toward  the  toy,  without  managing  to  retrieve  the  toy. 
Success in C3 seems to have increased steadily as the infants got older.
C4-C5: Before 17 months, all infants failed to retrieve the toy in the conditions where 
the  toy  was not  in  the  trajectory of  the  rake.  Success  in  these  conditions  seems to  have 
increased drastically between 17 and 18.5 months of age.
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 2.4.2. Observational learning
Figure 3. Mean score in C4/C5 before and after demonstration, as a function of age
To evaluate the effect of demonstrations, only data from C4 and C5 were considered, 
as they success could not be achieved in these conditions by haphazardly pulling the rake and 
thereby accidentally retrieving the object. As can be seen in Figure 3, the infants' mean score 
across sessions mostly did not change before 18.5 months of age. Between 12 and 17 months,  
the mean score was about 1.5, meaning that infants' behaviours were mainly directed either 
toward the toy (score 1) or to the tool (score 2).
 2.5. Discussion
The U-shaped evolution of success rate with age in condition C2 (toy inside/against 
the rake) could be explained in several ways. One possibility is that the development of tool 
use is not continuous, and that there is a temporary regression in infants' capacity to use the 
rake as a tool in conditions without a gap. Such temporary regressions in infants' behavioural 
development  are  common,  as  for  example  the  resurgence  of  two-handed  reaching  when 
learning to walk around the end of the first year of life (Corbetta & Bojczyk, 2002). However, 
the fact that at 15.5 and 16.5 months infants more rarely managed to retrieve the goal object in  
this simple condition than at a younger age, instead raking around the toy and/or pointing 
toward the toy with the other hand, suggest that infants had no idea that the rake could be 
useful for retrieving the toy. Taken along with the lack of success in the conditions with a gap 
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(C4 and C5), it seems that it is only starting at 17 months of age, when infants succeed in 
conditions with spatial gaps, that infants make a clear link between the rake and the toy, and 
come to understand the functionality of the tool. This conclusion contradicts Bates et al.'s 
(1980) interpretation of an experiment, wherein they observed similar differences between 
conditions with a gap and conditions without a gap in 10-month-old infants. Finding that the 
conditions with no gap were easier for infants to solve, they concluded that infants understood 
the tool's functionality, but only in the condition where the means and the end were spatially 
connected.
A  second  finding  from  this  longitudinal  study,  is  that  infants  benefit  from 
demonstration only starting at  18 months of age. The fact that infants did not  learn from 
demonstrations before 18 months is surprising, as we know from the developmental literature 
that infants can learn other means-end actions by observation starting at 12 months of age. 
Given the small number of infants in this study, it was important to confirm this result on with 
a larger number of infants. This is one aim of the cross-sectional study that I will present in 
the next section.
Finally, the results were discussed in terms of possible mechanisms underlying the 
development of tool use. First, the fact that young infants were mostly interested either in the 
toy or in the rake, but did not connect them, suggests that there might be some age-related 
attentional limits. The second issue concerns the importance of manipulation and experience 
with the tool before being able to perceive the affordance of the tool. In fact, it seems that  
infants needed to spend a significant amount of time manipulating the tool, either for its own 
sake or in interaction with the environment and the out-of-reach object, before understanding 
its affordances. In addition, behavioural strategies differed from one session to another. These 
two facts are in line with the perception-action perspective formulated by Lockman (2000), 
who  suggested  that  the  precursors  of  tool  use  may  be  found  in  earlier  manipulatory 
behaviours. The last aspect that was highlighted as important in infants' acquisition of tool use 
is the ability to learn this action by observation, which appeared at around the same age as the 
first spontaneous success.
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 3. Cross-sectional study
Contribution to the study
This study was designed on the basis of the longitudinal study described above, with the main contribution of L. 
Rat-Fischer. All the subjects were recruited and tested at the Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception by L. Rat-
Fischer. The data were coded by L. Rat-Fischer, with double coding by J. Fagard and the master student Cecilia  
Florean. The statistical analyses and interpretation of the data were conducted by all the authors of the paper,  
which  was  written  by  L.  Rat-Fischer.  The  results  were  presented  as  a  poster  at  a  developmental  robotic 
conference  (Epirob,  Francfurt,  2011)  and  as  an  oral  presentation  at  the  annual  conference  of  the  Société 
Française de Psychologie (Metz, 2011), and the student Symposium of the CNRS research group Neurosciences  
Cognitives du Développement (2011).
 3.1. Introduction
The  main  goal  of  the  cross-sectional  study  was  to  verify  the  findings  of  the 
longitudinal study with more infants, and in more controlled conditions. The purpose of this 
replication  at  a  greater  scale  was  to  establish  the  developmental  steps  leading  to  the 
emergence of tool use, and to further investigate the potential underlying processes.
Because the longitudinal study confirmed that spatial arrangements and learning by 
observation were playing an important role in the acquisition of tool use, we tested these two 
issues  in  a  similar  way  in  the  cross-sectional  study.  One  slight  difference  was  that  the 
demonstration in the present experiment was performed by the parent whose lap the infant 
was  sitting  in,  contrary  to  the  longitudinal  study  where  the  demonstrations  were  mostly 
performed  by  the  experimenter  in  front  of  the  infant.  This  was  to  ensure  that  the 
demonstration was properly visible to the child, in a more ecological way, to control for any 
effect  of  perspective.  However,  as  will  be  seen  in  the  paper,  no  differences  were  found 
between the two types of demonstrations.
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The Emergence of tool use during the second year of life
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Authors: Rat-Fischer, Lauriane, O'Regan, J.Kevin, & Fagard, Jacqueline.
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Abstract
Despite a growing interest for the question of tool use development in infants, no study has so 
far systematically investigated how learning to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach object 
progresses with age. This was the first aim of this study, in which 60 infants, aged 14, 16, 18, 
20 or 22 months, were presented with an attractive toy and a rake-like tool. There were five 
conditions of spatial relationships between the toy and the tool, going from toy and tool being 
connected, to there being a large spatial gap between them. A second aim of the study was to 
evaluate at what age infants who spontaneously fail the task can learn this complex skill by 
being given a demonstration from an adult.  Results show that even some of the youngest 
infants could spontaneously retrieve the toy when it was presented inside and touching the top 
part  of  the  tool.  In  contrast,  in  conditions  with  a  large  spatial  gap,  the  first  spontaneous 
successes were observed at 18 months, suggesting that a true understanding of the use of the 
tool has not been fully acquired before that age. Interestingly, it  is also at 18 months that 
infants began to benefit from the demonstration in the conditions with large spatial gap. The 
developmental steps for tool use observed here are discussed in terms of changes in infants' 
ability to attend to more than one item in the environment. The work provides insight into the 
progressive  understanding  of  tool  use  in  infancy,  and  into  how  observational  learning 
improves with age.
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Introduction
Learning to use a tool is a critical step in human development, and there has recently been a 
growing interest  in  the  emergence  of  this  ability  in  infants  (see  Keen,  2011 for  a  recent 
review).  To our  knowledge however,  no study has  so far  systematically  investigated how 
learning to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach object progresses with age. This was the first 
goal of the study presented here. A second goal was to evaluate at what age infants that fail 
spontaneously can learn this fairly complex skill from a demonstration given by an adult.
Tool use in human infants develops during the period from age 8 to 24 months following a 
development described by Piaget's (1952) sensorimotor stages 4 to 6 (McCarty, Clifton & 
Collard, 2001). 
At sensorimotor stage 4 (8-12 months), where infants start being able to sequentially plan 
steps to attain a goal, the literature shows evidence for the beginnings of tool use. Infants are 
able to retrieve an out-of-reach object when no spatial gap disrupts the link between the tool 
and the toy, as when the toy is on a cloth, at the end of a string, or even inside and against the  
tool  (Bates,  Carlsonluden  &  Bretherton,  1980;  Brown,  1990;  Piaget  1952;  see  also  van 
Leeuwen, Smitsman & van Leeuwen, 1994).
At stage 5 (12-18 months), where infants begin to be able to combine and relate two objects  
together, the literature suggests that infants are still not able to use tools when there is a spatial  
gap (Brown, 1990; see also van Leeuwen et al.,  1994, though these latter authors do not 
precisely specify the age range). On the other hand, they may start being able to do the task 
with the spatial gap if they are given a demonstration by an adult (Esseilly, Nadel & Fagard,  
2010; see also van Leeuwen et al., 1994). It is also worth noting some other studies related to 
tool use performed on children at this sensorimotor stage, and which concern the development 
of the motor skill involved in using a spoon (Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989; Mc Carty, Clifton 
& Collard,  1999). This behavior may be easier than many tool use situations because the 
movement  involved  is  directed  towards  the  child  (Keen,  2011;  McCarty  et  al.,  1999).  It 
develops  gradually  over  stage  5  and  involves  diverse  strategies  where  hand  preference, 
trajectory control and type of grasping play a role.
Finally, at stage 6 (18-24 months), in which infants start to make plans that imply mental 
representations and transformations of objects, existing studies provide evidence that infants 
more fully understand tools. In conditions of spatial gap, infants are now even more easily 
able to profit from demonstration from an adult (Chen & Siegler, 2000). In the later part of 
this period (from 24 months), conditions of spatial gap begin to no longer pose a problem for 
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children even without demonstration (Keen, 2011; Brown, 1990). Furthermore,  infants are 
able  to  spontaneously  choose  the  relevant  tool  among  a  choice  of  functional  and  non-
functional tools (Brown, 1990; but see Chen & Siegler, 2000). Again it is worth noting that at 
the beginning of the 18-24 month period, the motor skills involved in spoon use are optimally 
planned as a function of hand position (McCarty et al., 1999). 
From this quick overview of the existing studies we see that the spatial gap between tool and 
toy seems to play an important role. Another interesting factor seems to be whether infants are 
able  to  profit  from an  adult's  demonstration.  Unfortunately  however,  existing  studies  are 
limited either to broad age-group ranges (e.g. van Leeuwen et al., 1994; Brown, 1990; Chen 
& Siegler, 2000), to a single small age span (e.g. Bates et al., 1980; Esseily et al., 2010 (for 
the rake task)), or in the case of the spoon (Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989; McCarty et al., 1999; 
Mc  Carty  et  al.,  2001)  they  concern  more  the  progress  of  motor  skill  acquisition  than 
cognitive development itself.
Given the importance of tool use as a hallmark of human cognitive development, the lack of 
systematic age-linked studies is surprising. 
The aim of the present work is to fill this gap by systematically describing developmental 
changes in learning how to use a tool, spontaneously and after demonstration, while varying 
the spatial gap between tool and toy.
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Material and Methods
Participants
A total of 60 healthy full-term infants participated in this cross-sectional study (20 females). 
Five age-groups of 12 subjects were tested : 14-month-olds (13mo 28d to 14mo 13d), 16-
month-olds (15mo 28d to 16mo 9d), 18-month-olds (17mo 26d to 18mo 4d), 20-month-olds 
(19mo 27d to 20mo 10d), 22-month-olds (21mo 25d to 22mo 5d). Infants were recruited from 
a list of local families who expressed interest in taking part in studies of infant development. 
Prior parental consent was granted before observing the infants.
Design and materials
The experimental  apparatus  was designed to  assess  at  what  age  and in  which  conditions 
infants are capable of using a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach toy. A desired toy was placed out 
of reach, at different positions near a white cardboard rake-like tool (15cm x 20cm), designed 
to be visually plain (see Figure 1). During the whole experiment, infants sat in the lap of one 
of their parents, in front of a table (80cm x 120cm). An experimenter sat facing the infant 
behind the table. A digital video camera recorded the whole session.
Procedure
Infants were first allowed to familiarize themselves with the toy and the tool by manipulating 
them for approximately 30 seconds to 1 minute. In the tool-use test itself, an attractive toy 
was placed in front of the infant, successively in five conditions (see Figure 1): toy attached to  
the rake part of the tool (C1 - no spatial gap, attached), toy inside and against the rake part of 
the tool (C2 - no spatial gap, unattached), toy inside the tool but not against it (C3 - small  
spatial gap), toy to the side of the tool (C4 - large spatial gap), and toy in the middle of the  
table, with the tool directly held out to the infant by the experimenter (C5 - effectively a very 
large spatial gap). The conditions were presented in order of increasing spatial gap from C1 to 
C5. All infants received one trial at C1, where they all immediately succeeded. They were 
then directly presented with two trials at C2. If both trials were successful, then they received 
two trials of C3 (and so on until C5). If infants failed in one or both trials of a condition then, 
they were given one or two additional trials of this condition. If the infant failed to retrieve the  
toy on two trials out of three, parents were asked to give two consecutive demonstrations of 
the failed condition. If infants failed in a condition after demonstration, they were directly 
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presented  with  condition  C5.  Thus  conditions  C3  and  C4  were  only  presented  if  they 
succeeded  in  the  previous  condition,  either  spontaneously  or  after  demonstration;  only 
conditions C1, C2 and C5 were presented to all the infants.
Data analysis
Data were analyzed (1) in term of success/failure for each condition (C1 to C5); and (2) on the 
basis of a behavioral category for each infant. For this, a score of 0 was attributed when 
infants expressed no interest in the toy, the tool, or more generally for the task; a score of 1 
was attributed when infants were mostly interested in the out-of-reach toy, pointing toward it 
and possibly trying to retrieve it without using the tool; a score of 2 was attributed when 
infants were mainly interested in manipulating the tool itself, possibly alternating its attention 
between toy and tool, but not in connecting the two; a score of 3 was attributed when infants 
systematically and repetitively brought the tool to bear on the toy, but seemingly not with the 
purpose of  retrieving the toy;  and a  score of 4 was attributed when infants succeeded in 
retrieving  the  toy  with  the  tool.  We also  coded as  4  the  rare  cases  when infants  clearly 
attempted to retrieve the toy with the tool, but failed because they inadvertantly moved the toy  
out of reach (means of 2%, 3%, 3%, 0%, and 1% of trials at ages 14, 16, 18, 20, 22 months 
respectively). An important point should be noted about conditions C2 and C3, where the tool 
and the toy were spatially close. In these conditions, the toy was so positioned that it  lay 
between the tool-head and the child. This had the consequence that simply pulling the tool 
through a small distance would inevitably bring the toy into reach. Thus, in these conditions, 
successes scored 4 could have been achieved by chance, as infants could pull the tool and 
obtain the toy by pure spatial  contingency (O’Regan,  Rat-Fischer  & Fagard,  2011).  High 
scores in conditions C2 and C3 with little or no spatial gap should therefore not be considered 
as true indicators of an infant's comprehension of the tool. For this reason we analyzed these 
conditions separately in some analyses. 
Scoring reliability
The infants’ behaviors were coded from the videotapes. Thirteen infants (22%) were coded 
independently by a second observer to assess inter-observer reliability. Reliability between the 
two observers was found to be 90%. 
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Results
1. Does spontaneous success vary with age and condition?
Figure 1 presents the mean percentage of spontaneous success for each condition as a function 
of age. Infants succeeded spontaneously in Condition C1 on the first trial, leading to a mean 
of  100%  at  each  age  and  thus  this  condition  was  not  further  analyzed.  For  the  other 
conditions,  a  repeated  measures analysis of  variance  (ANOVA)  on  the  percentage  of 
spontaneous successes (N = 2 to 5 per infant for each condition) as a function of Age (x5; 14, 
16, 18, 20, 22 months) and Condition (x4; C2, C3, C4, C5) shows a main effect for age, 
F(4,49) = 11.87, p<.001, η² = .16, and a main effect for condition, F(3,147) = 33.48, p<.001, 
η² = .26. There was no age x condition interaction. A post-hoc LSD test for age effect shows 
that the 14-16-month-olds (mean success 20.31% and 23.13% respectively) were different 
from the 18-20-month-olds (mean success 40.15% and 45.18% respectively) and from the 22 
month-olds (mean success 69.86%). The 18-20 month old infants were also different from the 
22 month-olds. A post-hoc LSD test shows that all conditions differ significantly from each 
other  except  C4  and  C5  (p  =  .20).  All  18  and  20  month  old  infants  who  succeeded 
spontaneously  at  C4  and  C5  had  had  a  demonstration  leading  to  success  in  a  simpler 
condition. In contrast, four 22 month old infants succeeded spontaneously in conditions with 
large spatial gap without any previous demonstration in simpler conditions. 
Insert fig1 about here
2. Does the effect of demonstration vary as a function of age and condition? 
2a. Success vs. Failure
All infants who received a demonstration had failed at the previous trial. We compared the 
percentage of infants who succeeded after demonstration. As the number of infants was not 
necessarily the same between age groups for each condition, we could not use a standard chi-
square  analysis.  Thus,  the  data  were  analyzed  with  the  procedure  of  Marascuilo, 
corresponding to a chi-square analysis adapted to multiple comparisons when sample size is 
not  equal  between  groups.  For  conditions  C2  and  C4,  there  were  no  significant  age 
differences. The only significant differences were between the youngest and the oldest age 
groups at  condition C3,  χ2(df = 1,  N14  = 5,  N22 = 1) = .80,  p < .05,  (20% success after 
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demonstration at 14 months, 100% success at 22 months); and condition C5, χ2(df = 1, N14  = 
11, N22 = 4) = .75, p < .05, (0% vs. 75% success at 14 and 22 months, respectively).
2b. Level of performance (0 to 4) 
To further analyze the effect of demonstration, we used the score defined in the data analysis 
section to compare the behaviors toward the toy and the tool before and after demonstration. 
Given the fact that there were few demonstrations for some infants, we decided to pool little 
or no spatial gap conditions (C2-C3) as well as large spatial gap conditions (C4-C5). Thus, for 
the infants who received a demonstration at the two conditions (e.g. C2 and C3), the value 
considered  is  the  mean  over  the  two conditions,  whereas  for  the  infants  who received  a 
demonstration at only one of the two conditions (e.g. C2 or C3), the value considered is this  
value. 
C2-C3
The difference in score before and after demonstration was tested using a paired t-test for each 
age group. The effect of demonstration was significant for infants aged 18 months (mbefore = .
83, mafter = 3.00, t(5) = -3.08, p < .05, d = 1.26) and 20 months (mbefore = 1.71, mafter = 2.86, t(6) 
= -2.83, p < .05, d = 1.07). The t-test showed no significant effect of demonstration for infants 
aged 14 months (mbefore = 1.56, mafter = 2.33, t(8) =  2.19, p = .06, d = .73) and 16 months 
(mbefore = 1.10, mafter = 2.30, t(9) = -2.17, p = .06, d = .69). The 22-month-old group could not 
be tested, as only two infants needed a demonstration over all trials in conditions C2 and C3. 
Both infants switched from score 1 (before) to score 4 (after demonstration). 
C4-C5
Figure 2 shows the score before and after demonstration at  C4-C5. Paired t-tests  showed 
evidence for a significant effect of the demonstration at 18 months, t(6) = -2.32, p = 0.05, d 
=  .88,  and  at  22  months,  t(7)  =  -2.47,  p  <.05,  d  =  .87.  There  was  no  significant  score 
difference between before and after demonstration for the three other age groups: 14 months 
(p = .19); 16 months, (p = .72); and 20 months (p =.16).
Insert fig2 about here
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Discussion
The  aim  of  this  study  was  to  investigate  the  developmental  steps  leading  to  tool-use 
acquisition in infants across specific age groups during the second year of life. Five conditions 
involving different spatial relationships between toy and tool were successively presented, 
with a demonstration being provided by the experimenter in case of failure.
The results show that in all conditions, when the toy was not attached to the tool, performance 
increased significantly with age, with 14 and 16 month infants differing from older infants, 
and  18-20  month  infants  also  differing  from  22  month  infants.  For  all  age  groups,  the 
difficulty of using a tool increased with the spatial distance between the toy and the tool. 
Thus, the task was very easy when a physical connection between toy and tool was present 
(C1); more difficult with the toy against the tool (C2); even more difficult with the toy inside 
but not against the tool (C3); and most difficult when there was a spatial gap between toy and 
tool (C4-C5). These results are in accordance with previous results stressing the importance of 
the spatial gap between toy and tool (Bates et al., 1980; Brown, 1990; van Leeuwen et al.,  
1994). 
The following is a more detailed analysis of infants' ability to succeed in the task without 
demonstration,  according to  age  group.  At  14  and 16 months,  in  the  comparatively  easy 
conditions with little or no spatial gap, success rate was less than about 50%, which is in line 
with a longitudinal study on a similar task (O’Regan et al., 2011). O’Regan et al. suggested 
that the early successes in these conditions are more due to the fact that the toy can move with 
the tool by contingency, as the toy lies in the trajectory between the tool-head and the child, 
than to a true understanding of the tool’s functionality. In this 14-16 month age period, infants 
never succeeded in conditions with a spatial gap, which also fits with previous results (Brown, 
1990; van Leeuwen et al., 1994; O’Regan et al., 2011). At 18 months, infants begin to succeed 
in conditions with a large spatial gap, when the toy is not between the tool-head and the child, 
which is coherent with O’Regan et al.’s results suggesting that age 18 months is a landmark 
for this kind of tool-use task. However, O’Regan and colleagues' results bear on only four 
infants followed longitudinaly and needed to be confirmed. At 22 months, infants did still not 
systematically succeed in the two conditions with a large spatial gap, which is in accordance 
with the literature (Keen, 2011). 
With regard to the necessity for a demonstration of the use of the tool, infants benefit from 
watching an adult demonstration starting around 18 months of age. This is fairly coherent 
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with the findings of Chen & Siegler (2000), who, in a task requiring a group of 18-26 month 
infants to choose between alternative tools, including one similar to our tool, found that adult 
demonstrations can be very effective. In the present study, this effect is particularly visible 
when we analyze the change in behavior between the trial directly before and the trial after 
demonstration. For C2-C3 (little or no spatial gap), it was only starting from 18 months of age 
that  infants  changed  their  behavior  between  the  trial  directly  before  and  the  trial  after 
demonstration.  For  C4-C5  (spatial  gap),  only  the  18-  and  22-month-olds  showed  an 
improvement after demonstration. This improvement manifested itself by the fact that infants 
in these two age-groups mostly went from focusing their initial attention either on the toy 
(scored 1) or on the tool (scored 2), to focusing their attention on the combination of both the 
toy and the tool (scored 3 or 4). At 20 months however, no significant effect of demonstration 
was found. The global and individual results indicate that all seven subjects who needed a 
demonstration in these conditions had an initial score of 1, mostly focusing their attention on 
the toy. After demonstration, only two infants changed their behavior to combine the two 
components. We have no explanation for this drop in performance at 20 months, and assume 
it is due to a quirk in the 20 month group of infants.
It is worth noting that at C4-C5, the 14-month-olds tend to have a higher score than the 16-
month-olds. A fine grain analysis of the frequency of the different behaviors observed at each 
age show that 14-month-olds globally manipulate the tool (scored 2) more than the other age 
groups. In contrast, the 14 months seem to express less interest toward the out-of-reach toy 
(scored 1) than the 16 month olds. Thus, even if all 14-month-olds noticed the toy and showed 
interest in it, it seems that their attention was more easily attracted toward the tool and its 
exploration.
Why does tool-use learning from demonstration appear only after 18 months in this study? 
After all, infants are known to learn means-end tasks from observation from the beginning of 
their second year of life (Esseily, Nadel & Fagard, 2010; Provasi, Dubon & Bloch, 2001; see 
Elsner, 2007, for a review). The absence of effect of the demonstration before 18 months may 
be partly explained by the particular conceptual difficulty of the tool-use task, compared to 
other simpler tasks, and because of the several successive steps it involves. But the absence of 
an early effect of demonstration may also be due to the way we provided the demonstration, 
which  was  relatively  restricted  in  content  and  variety.  If  this  is  true,  then  adding  more 
information to the demonstration, like pedagogical cues (e.g. Csibra & Gergely, 2006; Sage & 
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Baldwin,  2011),  social  cues  (Kiraly,  2009;  Nielsen,  2008),  or  making  the  goal  of  the 
experimenter  more  obvious  (Carpenter,  2002;  Kiraly,  2009),  or  providing more instances, 
would allow infants to learn the tool-use task from demonstration earlier. Also, as in many 
studies of social learning, we assessed the infant's behavior directly after the demonstration. 
Hirata  et  al.  (2009)  in  their  study  of  the  acquisition  of  tool-use  ability  by  observing  a 
conspecific model in chimpanzees, has suggested that it  may be necessary to consider the 
effect of learning by observation over a longer term. Further, longitudinal studies will help 
elucidate  this  question,  and  may  also  allow  better  understanding  of  the  mechanisms 
underlying the process of tool-use learning in human infants.
Taken  together,  the  results  suggest  that  the  development  of  tool  use  emerges  from  a 
continuous and gradual  process  rather  than abruptly (Lockman,  2000).  What  mechanisms 
could  underlie  this  progression  over  the  period  from  14  to  22  months,  in  particular  as 
concerns the difficult conditions of spatial  gap, where the toy cannot be retrieved without 
understanding the tool’s functionality?  At 14 months, even if infants almost always express 
their interest in the toy at some time in the trial, they seem to be mainly interested in exploring  
the tool, without keeping the goal of retrieving the toy in mind. At 16 months, infants are 
more  likely  to  focus  their  attention  on  the  goal  of  retrieving  the  toy,  often  ignoring  or 
discarding the tool. From 22 months onwards, infants seem to become able to spread their 
attention simultaneously on the toy and the tool and make the link between the two. This 
attentional change is even sometimes possible at a younger age when infants see an adult 
demonstrating the tool-use task, or if they succeed after demonstration at a simpler condition 
of the tool task. It would be interesting to further investigate the link between the increase in 
tool-use performance observed here around 18 months and the change, around the same age, 
in the capacity to learn a complex skill by observation. 
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Figure captions
Fig1. Mean percentage of success in each condition as a function of age (with error bars 
showing one standard error above and below the mean). 
Fig2. Mean score before and after demonstration as a function of age (with bars showing one 
error above the mean) in conditions with large spatial gap (C4-C5).
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 4. Planning the use of the rake
Contribution to the study
This paper was based on the same study run by L. Rat-Fischer as the previous paper. The statistical analyses and 
interpretation of the data were conducted by J. Fagard and L. Rat-Fischer. The paper was written by J. Fagard,  
and  the  results  presented  as  a  poster  by  L.  Rat-Fischer  at  the  Workshop  Lateralization,  praxis  and  
communication gestures (Paris, 2012).
 4.1. Introduction
In the cross-sectional study, two main types of movements were observed: lifting up 
the rake in the air, and raking it on the table, either in a straight trajectory toward the subject, 
or in a “sweeping movement”. Such sweeping movements were first described by Cox and 
Smitsman (2006a, 2006c) as a movement of the rake directed diagonally toward the subject. 
This natural movement is usually easier to direct toward the right diagonal when the tool is 
grasped with the left hand, and vice versa. As we presented the rake in a central position on 
the table, with the toy either to the right or to the left side of the rake (conditions C2, C3 and 
C4 only, see Fig. 4), we might expect that infants who efficiently planned their tool use action 
would choose the hand to grasp the tool with according to the side that the object was on. For 
example, when the toy was placed to the left of the rake,  infants should have chosen their 
right hand to perform the sweeping movement toward the left, to enclose the object within the 
rake (see Fig. 4). 
Figure 4. Condition C4 with the object to the left and to the right of the tool.
However, hand choice for grasping might also be influenced by infants' handedness at 
the moment of the test. The spoon-studies of McCarty et al. (1999, 2001) were the first to 
highlight this trade-off between hand preference and efficient planning for grasping. Young 
infants (i.e., 9- and 14-month-olds) grasped the spoon more frequently with their preferred 
hand,  leading in  some conditions  to  an uncomfortable  grasping position.  In  contrast,  19-
month-olds were able to adjust the hand that grasped the spoon depending on the position of 
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the handle. Cox and Smitsman (2006a) found a similar difference between 2- and 3-year-old 
children, on a tool task with a hook involving the use of a sweeping movement. However, 
both the spoon and the hook tasks were asymetrical. The spoon was presented in a horizontal 
line in front of the child, with the handle to one side and the bowl to the other side. In the  
hook task, it was asymetrical because of the crook part of the hook. In our tool task with the  
rake, we presented the rake in a central position, which should not have influenced infants' 
initial grasping.
In the cross-sectional study, we evaluated infants' hand preference with a test adapted 
to young infants (see Fagard & Marks, 2000). Thus, conditions in our study were ideal to 
evaluate which factor most influenced infants' grasping of the tool with age. In line with the 
findings of McCarty et al. (1999, 2001) and Cox and Smitsman (2006a), we hypothesized that 
younger infants would be more influenced by their hand preference, leading to lesser success 
in conditions C2, C3 and C4. Older infants, in contrast, who perceive the tool's functionality 
(that is, starting at 18 months), should more frequently use their contralateral hand in response 
to the position of the toy. The paper presented here investigates this hypothesis.
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Abstract
In this study we investigated whether hand preference influences infants’ choice of what hand to use in 
grasping a new tool presented at the midline, and whether this will change in the course of learning the 
functionality of a tool. The tool was a rake within reach placed beside an out-of-reach toy presented  
either to its right or to its left. Forty-eight infants from 16 to 22 months of age were tested. The results  
show that use of the right-preferred hand to grasp the rake is strong as of 16 months of age and does  
not change significantly with age in the condition where using the right hand leads to a better outcome 
than using the left hand. In the condition where using the left-non-preferred hand makes toy retrieval  
easier, infants increasingly use the left hand with age. Thus, when grasping the tool, younger infants 
are more influenced by their hand preference than older infants, who are better at anticipating the most 
successful strategies. 
Key words: hand preference, tool use, development
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Introduction
There has long been much interest in the evolution of handedness in tool use, considered as a marker  
of hemispheric specialization for sequential behaviors requiring the  interplay of sensory input and 
motor output.  Many indices show that a majority of early hominids already preferentially used their  
right  hand to make and manipulate tools  two millions of  years  ago (Steele & Uomini,  2005).  In  
modern human adults,  the use of a tool such as a hammer is considered one of the best items to  
evaluate  handedness,  being  among the actions subject  to the  strongest  degree  of  hand preference 
(Corey, Hurley, & Foundas, 2001; Mackenzie & Peters, 2000; Porac, Coren, Steiger, & Duncan, 1980;  
Steenhuis, Bryden, Schwartz, & Lawson, 1990). Another tool, the pencil for writing, also elicits a high 
level of handedness. Writing is an over-practiced skill. For the hammer, adults expect that using it will  
require finely coordinated action and that  they will  need their  best  hand to achieve the precision 
required in the successive steps of the action. Contrary to adults, infants have little practice and little  
anticipation of their action with a tool, and one can wonder what will drive their choice of hand when 
they are presented with a new tool in the midsagittal plane, next to an object to be acted upon, before 
they have a good understanding of the tool’s functionality. Will hand choice go from a slight to a  
stronger bias in favor of the preferred hand as they come to anticipate the action that the tool is used 
in? This hypothesis seems compatible with existing data suggesting that tool use develops the most in 
infants  during  the  second  year  of  life  (McCarty,  Clifton  & Collard,  2001),  and  that  by  this  age 
handedness can already be observed, even though not as strongly as in adults (Gesell & Ames, 1947; 
Dellatolas, Tubert Bitter, & Curt, 1997). Testing this hypothesis is the goal of the study presented here.
The emergence of hand preference in infants has been extensively studied, in particular for unimanual 
object grasping and manipulation in cross-sectional studies. As soon as grasping emerges there are  
clear signs of hand preference (Cornwell, Harris, & Fitzgerald, 1991; Fagard & Lockman, 2005; Hawn 
& Harris,  1983;  Lewkowicz & Turkewitz,  1982;  McCormick & Maurer,  1988;  Michel,  Ovrut,  & 
Harkins, 1985; Morange & Bloch, 1996; Ramsay, 1980). This hand preference does not lead to a  
population ratio of right-handers as high as the one found in adults for writing, and many infants show 
no preference. The percentage of non-lateralized infants varies between studies and depends on the 
number and kind of items used to observe handedness, and of the criteria used to categorize the infants  
as right- or left-handers. One finding common to most studies, however, is that many more infants are  
found to be right- than left-handers from the beginning (Fagard & Streri, 2004). 
The early emergence of handedness has been found in longitudinal studies as well, but these studies 
have also often shown that handedness fluctuates during the first months of prehension and that infants 
may alternately use either of the two hands, or both, depending on the session. However, the overall  
distribution of percentages always shows a clear tendency toward using the right hand in the majority  
of infants. In addition, handedness in the first sessions predicts handedness in later sessions rather well 
(Coryell  & Michel,  1978;  Ferre,  Babik,  & Michel,  2010;  Flament,  1975;  Gesell  & Ames,  1947; 
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Ramsay, 1985; Corbetta & Thelen, 1999) and handedness changes relatively little over the first two 
years of life (Michel, Tyler, Ferre, & Sheu, 2006; Cochet, Jover, & Vauclair, 2011; Jacquet, Esseily, 
Rider, & Fagard, 2012). In this last study, infants were tested every 3 months between 8 and 20 months 
on a 10-item handedness test. The results showed that by 8 months of age infants already show a hand 
preference for reaching and grasping simple objects that is predictive of later handedness.
Most of the items used to evaluate infants’ handedness involve simple actions consisting of grasping 
objects directly. In contrast, when grasping a tool, the aim is to use it to perform a secondary action on  
another object or on the self. In contrast with the many studies on  handedness for tool use in non-
human primates (Hopkins & Rabinowitz, 1997; Humle & Matsuzawa, 2009; Lonsdorf & Hopkins, 
2005; McGrew & Marchant, 1997), only a few studies on handedness for tool use in infants have been 
published. These studies have mostly used handedness as a window to study the development of action 
planning (Claxton, McCarty, & Keen, 2009; Cox & Smitsman, 2006; McCarty, Clifton, & Collard,  
1999; McCarty et al., 2001). For instance, in their 1999 study, McCarty et al. investigated the hand 
used to grasp the handle of a spoon (in addition to toys with handles) depending on which side the 
food-loaded bowl was presented to. The infants were first tested for hand preference. Then the authors  
placed the object in such a way that, for half of the trials (when the handle was on the side of the non-
preferred hand), grasping with the preferred hand would lead to an awkward retrieval of the food.  
They observed that  9-month-olds  and most  14-month-olds generally grasped the spoon with their 
preferred hand, disregarding the item’s orientation, whereas older children (19-month-olds and some 
14-month-olds) used the hand that was likely to be the most efficient for retrieving the food. In another 
study (McCarty et al., 2001), the authors also presented tools with a handle oriented to the left and  
right on alternate trials. The tools included a spoon, a hairbrush, a hammer and a magnet. The first two  
tools were used in two conditions: toward oneself and toward a puppet. The results showed the same 
tendency of the younger infants to grasp the tool with the preferred hand irrespective of the side of  
presentation of the handle, whereas older infants used their non-preferred hand when it was on the side 
of the handle. 
These studies show that when the task constrains infants to choose between using their preferred hand 
but with the result being that using the tool becomes more difficult, or using the non-preferred hand 
when it is more likely to result in successful action, they start by using their preferred hand (usually  
the right) and give up using it between 14 and 19 months. However, infants are not completely naïve  
to the spoon at 9 months of age, and they may have been influenced by the observation of right-
handed persons caring for them and feeding them or themselves using their right hand (Fagard & 
Lemoine, 2006). In addition, the spoon was presented laterally and the tendency to grasp the spoon to 
the side ipsilateral  to the preferred hand may have been too strong for the younger infants.  Older  
infants  may  be  better  at  inhibiting  this  tendency.  We thought  it  interesting  to  check  the  relative 
influence of spontaneous hand preference and level of skill with a completely new tool presented in 
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the sagittal plane so that the asymmetry is a feature not of the tool itself, but of the relative position of  
the independent object that is to be acted upon using the tool. In the study presented here, we tested 
which factor, hand preference or anticipation of the more suitable hand, would have a greater influence 
on infants’ choice of hand to grasp a new tool, and whether this choice would change as the infants  
progress in their understanding of the tool’s functionality. 
In order to do this, we decided to observe infants’ hand choice to retrieve a tool at different stages of 
tool use. Infants learned to use a rake to use a toy placed in different spatial positions in relation to it  
(toy to the left of the tool or to its right). Because of humans’ tendency to bend the arm slightly when 
pulling something toward themselves, it is easier to use the right hand than the left to rake in an object 
located to the left of the rake, and vice versa. Thus, two conditions were compared, one leading to  
easier success with the tool grasped with the right hand (toy to the left), and one leading to easier  
success with the tool grasped with the left hand (toy to the right). We investigated whether hand choice 
(right  versus  left)  changed  between  16  and  22  months,  an  age  span  during  which  progress  in  
understanding  the  functionality  of  the  rake  to  retrieve  an  out-of-reach  object  has  been  observed 
(O’Regan, Rat-Fischer, & Fagard, 2011; Rat-Fischer, O’Regan, & Fagard, 2012). 
  
Methods
Participants
A total of 48 healthy full-term infants participated in the study (15 females). They included 16-month-
olds (15mo 28d to 16mo 9d), 18-month-olds (17mo 26d to 18mo 4d), 20-month-olds (19mo 27d to 
20mo 10d), and 22-month-olds (21mo 25d to 22mo 5d), Each age group was made up of 12 infants. 
The infants were recruited from a list of local families who had expressed interest in taking part in 
studies on infant development. Prior parental consent was granted before observing the infants.
Procedure
The  experimental  apparatus  was  a  desired  toy  placed  out  of  reach  at  different  positions  near  a 
cardboard  rake  (15cm x  20  cm).  After  being  tested  for  unimanual  handedness,  infants  were  first 
familiarized with the toy alone and with the rake alone for approximately 30 seconds to 1 minute of 
manipulation. Then they were tested successively in five tool-use conditions, among which three could 
be analysed for handedness: toy inside/touching the rake (C1), toy inside the rake but not touching it 
(C2), and toy to the side of the rake, at about 10 cm from the rake head (C3) (see for example C3 in 
Figure 1). The two other conditions that could not be analysed for handedness were toy attached on  
one side of the rake and rake given in hand. The toy was always just out of arm's reach. The rake was  
always presented within reach, in front of the infant, in the middle of the table. The toy was presented 
in alternation to the right or to the left of the rake, with the first side of presentation in counterbalanced 
order.  The conditions were presented in order of increasing difficulty,  from C1 to C3. All infants 
underwent two trials in C1. If they successfully retrieved the object, these were followed by two trials 
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in C2. If both of these trials were successful, then two trials in C3 followed after. If they failed on one 
of the two trials for a condition, then the infants were given a third trial in this condition. If, in a given 
condition, the infant failed to retrieve the object on two trials out of three, the parent was asked to give 
two consecutive demonstrations of obtaining the toy with the rake in that condition. Infants were then 
tested again after the demonstration. If they failed again on a condition after seeing a demonstration,  
the infants were not tested on the subsequent condition(s). Thus the infants only underwent trials in  
conditions  C2  and C3  if  they  succeeded  in  the  previous  condition,  either  spontaneously  or  after 
demonstration. The number of trials per infant was 2 to 6 in each condition. For the demonstration, the 
parents were asked to pick up the rake once with the right and once with the left hand. 
The participants sat in the lap of one of their parents, in front of the test table (80 cm x 120 
cm), throughout the experiment. An experimenter sat facing the infant behind the table. A digital video  
camera recorded the whole session.
 5. Evaluation of unimanual handedness
We used a handedness test to compare each infant’s handedness for grasping simple objects (Sacco, 
Moutard, & Fagard, 2006) with their preferred hand for tool use. In this test, infants were presented 
with five small objects placed along their mid-sagittal plane.
 6. Data recording and analyses
Each session was taped using a video camera. The videos were analyzed frame by frame and the hand 
used to grasp (left, right or both hands) was coded. Interrater agreement, based on two independent 
observers coding three infants per age group, was 100%.
For the handedness test, the laterality index (LIht) was calculated as follows: [Nb of right hand grasps 
– nb of left hand grasps ] / [Nb of right G + nb of left hand G + nb of bimanual G]. Based on the LIht, 
infants were categorized as right-handed (LIht≥ 0.5), left-handed (LIht≤-0.5) and non-lateralized (-
0.5<LIht<0.5). A laterality index for tool use (LItu) was calculated using the same formula.
Results
 7. Unimanual handedness for grasping objects (handedness test)
The mean laterality index (LIht) was .14 (16 mo), .38 (18 mo), .41 (20 mo), and .36 (22 mo). Although 
the LIht tends to increase with age, particularly between 16 and 18 months, an ANOVA on LIht as a 
function of age (x 4) showed no significant age effect. As can be seen in Table 1, many infants were 
non-lateralized, but the percentage decreased with age, particularly between 18 and 22 months. The 
proportion  of  right-handers  tended  to  increase  with  age,  but  was  already  much  higher  than  the 
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percentage  of  left-handers  from the  start.  A Chi-squared  test  showed  that  the  age  effect  was  not 
significant (p=.27). 
Insert Table 1 about here
 8. Handedness for tool use
We first checked whether there was a difference in the use of the two hands as a function of condition:  
the  percentage  of  right-hand use  was  66.7%,  66.9%,  and 59.7% for  conditions  C1,  C2,  and  C3,  
respectively. An ANOVA on these percentages as a function of condition showed that there was no  
effect of condition (p=.38). We also checked whether there was a difference in the use of the two 
hands  depending  on  the  status  of  the  trial  (spontaneous  or  after  demonstration).  There  was  no 
significant difference (p=.13). Thus we decided to pool the three conditions, as well as spontaneous 
and after-demonstration trials,  to analyse the results  for handedness.  Since we wanted to evaluate  
handedness  for tool  use  per se,  and not  only handedness  as  defined by the test,  we started  each 
analysis  by evaluating  the whole  group,  before  separately  analysing right-handers  (and non-right-
handers when possible) as determined by the test. The mean laterality index for grasping the tool, both  
spatial conditions pooled (LItu) was .39 (16 mo), .25 (18 mo), .16 (20 mo), and .27 (22 mo). An 
ANOVA with repeated measures on Condition (x2, simple grasping on the handedness test and tool  
use, repeated measures) and age (x 3) showed no effect of condition, no effect of age and no age x 
condition interaction. Thus, as for the test of handedness for simple grasping, there was no age effect  
for grasping the tool, no difference between simple grasping and tool grasping, and no interaction  
between condition and age. Thus it appears that hand preference is present for grasping the tool to the  
same extent  as for simple grasping at  16 months  of age,  before  the infants understand the tool’s  
functionality. 
 8.1. Grasping the rake as a function of side of presentation
The whole group of infants more often used their right hand (RH) to grasp the rake when the toy was  
to the left of the rake (RH: 81.9%; LH: 18.1%) and their left hand (LH) more often when the toy was 
to  the right  of  the rake (RH: 45.4%; LH: 55.6%).  A  t-test  for  matched samples  showed that  the 
difference between the percentage of right-hand use in the two conditions was significant ( t(46)=7.08, 
p<.000001). When the results of the infants categorized as right-handed on the handedness test were 
analysed separately, the right hand was more often used to grasp the rake when the toy was to the left  
of the rake (RH: 86.5%; LH: 13.5%), but also, to a much lesser extent, when it was to the right of the 
rake (RH: 54.8%; LH: 45.2%). A t-test for matched samples showed that the difference between the 
percentages of right-hand use in the two conditions was significant (t(25)=4.1, p<.001). When only 
results from the infants categorized as non-right-handers on the test were analysed, the right hand was 
still used more often to grasp the rake when the toy was to its left (RH: 75.3%; LH: 24.7%), but left-
69
Chapter 3. Principal steps in tool use
hand use clearly predominated when the toy was to the right of the rake (RH: 33.7%; LH: 66.3%). A t-
test for matched samples showed that the difference between the percentages of right-hand use in the 
two conditions in non-right-handers was significant  (t(19)=6.5, p<.00001).  Thus, non-right-handed 
infants more often used the hand contralateral to the toy (left hand for toy to the right but right hand 
for toy to the left), whereas right-handed infants more often used their right hand. 
All infants used the contralateral hand more often when it was the right hand than when it was the left  
hand, although this was less true for non-right-handers. A t-test for matched samples showed that this 
difference (81.9% vs. 55.6%) was significant (t(45)=3.48, p<.01). It was even more significant when 
only right-handers were considered (86.5% vs. 45.2%,  t(25)=4.46, p<.001). In contrast,  it was not 
significant when only non-right-handers were considered (75.3% vs. 66.3%, p=.43).
 8.2. Influence of age 
The difference in hand use between the two spatial conditions also varied between age groups (see 
Figure 1). When the toy was positioned to the left of the rake, infants in all age groups grasped the 
rake with their right hand, with a slight increase from 16 to 22 months (77.5%, 78.9%, 82.3%, and  
88.9%, at 16, 18, 20, and 22 months, respectively). An ANOVA on the percentage of right-hand grasps 
as a function of age was not significant (p=.74). When only the infants categorized as right-handers 
were considered, the percentage of right-hand grasps is slightly higher, except at 18 months (83%, 
70.8%, 96.4%, and 91.7%, at 16, 18, 20, and 22 months, respectively). Again, an ANOVA on the 
percentage  of  right-hand  grasps  as  a  function  of  age  in  right-handed  infants  was  not  significant  
(p=.22). When only the infants categorized as non-right-handers were considered, the percentage of  
right-hand grasps did not change much with age (72.9%, 86.9%, 62.6%, and 77.8%, at 16, 18, 20, and 
22 months, respectively). Again, an ANOVA on the percentage of right-hand grasps as a function of 
age was not significant (p=.62).
When the toy was positioned to the right of the rake, 16-month-olds also tended to grasp the rake with  
their right hand (RH: 57.2%) whereas the majority of the older infants grasped the rake more often 
with the contralateral left hand in this case (RH: 48.6%, 34%, and 37.8% at 18, 20, and 22 months, 
respectively).  An  ANOVA on  the  percentage  of  right-hand  grasps  as  a  function  of  age  was  not 
significant (p=.42). The percentage of right-hand grasps in this condition was higher when only the 
infants categorized as right-handers were considered (73.3%, 62.5%, 43.4%, and 47.5% at 16, 18, 20, 
and 22 months, respectively). Again, an ANOVA on the percentage of right-hand grasps as a function 
of age in right-handed infants was not significant (p=.49). When only the infants categorized as non-
right-handers were considered, the percentage of right-hand grasps was lower and tended to diminish 
with age (45.7%, 34.7%, 21%, and 24.4% at 16, 18, 20, and 22 months, respectively). Once again, an 
ANOVA on the percentage of right-hand grasps as a function of age in non-right-handed infants was 
not significant (p=.67).
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Insert Figure 1 about here 
When the two side conditions (toy to the left and toy to the right) were compared age by age, results  
varied across age groups. A t-test for matched samples comparing the percentage of right-hand grasps 
in  the  two side  conditions  showed no  significant  difference  at  16  months  (p=.13),  but  did  show 
significant  differences  at  18  months  (t(11)=2.6,  p<.05),  20  months  (t(11)=6.2,  p<.0001),  and  22 
months (t(11)=5.1, p<.001). The increasing difference with age between the two side conditions is due 
to the fact that the frequency of right-hand use when the toy was to the right tends to decrease with 
age, whereas the frequency of right-hand use when the toy was to the left increases slightly. When the  
same t-test is calculated only on the infants categorized as right-handed by the handedness test, the 18  
month-olds, like the 16-month-olds, show no significant difference in their choice of hand between the 
two conditions (p= .56 at 16 months and p=.63 at 18 months).  For the two oldest age groups the  
difference remains significant (20 months:  t(45)=3.48, p<.01; 22 months:  t(45)=3.48, p<.02). There 
were not enough non-right-handed infants in each age group to perform the same analysis for them.  
Thus, it appears that, with age, infants increasingly use the hand contralateral to the toy, even when it 
is the left hand rather than their preferred right hand, to grasp the rake. However, in Figure 1 it is  
noticeable that even older infants used their contralateral hand more when this hand was the right hand 
than when it was the left hand. 
Finally, it is clear that handedness (as evaluated by the test) influenced strategy more when the toy was 
to the right of the rake than when it was to the left. When the toy was to the left of the rake, the 
percentage of infants grasping the rake with the contralateral right hand varied little with handedness 
as evaluated by the test. In contrast, when the toy was to the right of the rake, right-handers used their  
right hand to grasp the rake more often than non-right-handers, and this difference is significant (see 
Table 2). 
Insert Table 2 about here
 8.3. Does it pay to grasp the rake with the contralateral hand?
We performed an analysis to determine whether the infants truly succeeded more often when they 
grasped the rake with the hand contralateral to the toy. We first checked whether success differed as a 
function of the side of the toy. A Chi-squared test on the percentage of success as a function of side of 
presentation did not prove significant (p=.46). The percentage of success was greater when the hand 
contralateral to the toy was used to grasp the rake, as opposed to the ipsilateral hand, and Chi-squared 
tests calculated for each age group separately showed that the difference was significant for all age  
groups (see Table 3). 
Insert Table 3 about here 
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 9. Hand preference and success at tool use
Finally we wondered whether being right-handed versus being non-lateralized would influence the 
success rate. We first analyzed change in the percentage of success as a function of age and condition. 
Success was more frequent in older than in younger infants, more frequent in C1 than in C2, and more  
frequent at C2 than at C3 (see Figure 2). An ANOVA on the percentage of success as a function of 
condition (repeated measures) and age showed a significant effect of age (F(3,88)=8.56, p<.001), a  
significant effect of condition (F(2,88)=39.78, p<.0001), but no age x condition interaction. A LSD 
post-hoc test showed that the age effect was due to a difference between 16-month-olds and the three  
older age groups. All three conditions differed from each other. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
To  determine  whether  being  right-handed,  left-handed  or  non-lateralized  (as  categorized  by  the 
handedness test) made a difference for tool use, we performed ANOVAs on the percentage of success 
as a function of handedness category. Since there was no interaction between age and condition for 
success,  we  used  mean  percentage  of  success  in  this  analysis.  Three  series  of  ANOVAs  were 
conducted: right-handers versus left-handers versus non-lateralized; right-handers versus non-right-
handers;  and  lateralized  versus  non-lateralized.  The  ANOVAs were  first  performed  on  the whole 
population, and then separately for each age group. None of the ANOVAs proved significant. Thus,  
type of handedness does not seem to have affected success at tool use.
Discussion
The goal of this study was to evaluate the extent to which hand preference influences infants’ choice of 
hand to grasp a new tool, and whether this influence changes as infants’ understanding of the tool’s 
functionality  improves.  To this  end,  we observed 16-  to  22-month-old infants  grasping  a  rake  to 
retrieve an out-of-reach toy in two lateral grasping conditions: in one condition the toy was placed to  
the left of the rake, and in the other the toy was placed to the right of the rake. In addition, the position  
of the toy relative to the tool (inside touching, inside not touching, or to the side) made the task more 
or  less  difficult.  Since  the  differences  between  these  three  levels  of  difficulty  did  not  affect  the 
frequency with which the infants used their right and left hands, we pooled them to analyse the results 
for handedness. The rake itself was always presented in the infant’s sagittal plane.
We first  checked  handedness  for  simple  grasping  using  a  test  of  handedness.  More  infants  were 
categorized as right-handers than as left-handers (between 2.6 and 7 times more). This was the case as 
of 16 months of age, and there was a slight but non-significant tendency toward an increase in right-
handedness with age, and a decrease in non-lateralization, in particular between 18 and 22 months. 
Although these results are based on a relatively small number of testing items due to the fact that we 
did not  want  to extend an already relatively long testing session,  they correlate  well  with results  
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obtained with the same items presented twice (Sacco et al., 2006). The results are in accordance with 
previous results showing that hand preference for grasping simple objects is established by 16 months 
of age for the majority of infants, and that there is only a slight tendency toward an increase in the  
frequency of right-handers with age (Cochet et al., 2011; Jacquet et al., 2012).
The results concerning the hand chosen to grasp the rake showed that the right hand was used more 
often than the left, to the same extent as for the handedness test. The overall tendency to use the right 
hand to grasp a rake presented in the midline did not change with age. Thus, already at 16 months of  
age, a majority of infants are right-handed for grasping a tool, but no more than for grasping simple  
objects, and this is true for all age groups. Comparing hand use as a function of the spatial constraints  
of the task, at 16 months of age most infants used their right hand more than their left to grasp the rake 
in both lateral conditions. Even though they used their right hand more when the toy was to the left of 
the rake than when it  was to the right,  the difference between the two lateral  conditions was not 
significant at this age. On the other hand, all three older groups used their right hand more when the 
toy was to the left of the tool, but they used their left hand more when the toy was to the right of the  
tool.  The  difference  in  the  percentage  of  right-hand  use  between  the  two  lateral  conditions  was  
significant at 18, 20 and 22 months. This change at 18 months is interesting to relate to previous 
results showing an increase in the understanding of the rake’s affordances to retrieve a far-away toy at  
that age (O’Regan et al., 2011; Fagard et al., 2012; Rat-Fischer et al., 2012). However, at 18 months 
the infants categorized as right-handed on the handedness test have still some difficulty to inhibit the 
use of their right hand, as shown by the absence of difference between the two spatial condition when  
right-handers  are  considered  separately:  this  could  not  be  interpreted  as  only  due  to  a  lack  of  
anticipation since at the same age, non-right-handed infants show a significant greater use of their 
right hand than of their left hand when the toy was to the left of the rake. 
Hand preference, as evaluated by the handedness test, influenced the results. Infants categorized as  
non-right-handers  by the handedness  test  grasped the rake more with their  left  hand than infants  
categorized as right-handers, and they grasped the rake more with their left hand than with their right  
hand when the toy was to the right of the rake.
These results show that two factors influence the choice of hand when grasping a new tool to retrieve 
an out-of-reach object: hand preference, as evaluated by a handedness test, and the placement of the 
object to be acted upon with respect to the tool. Hand preference does not change much with age 
and influences infants of all age groups, as shown by the greater use of the hand contralateral to the 
object when it was the preferred hand than when it was the non-preferred hand. The side of the object  
relative to the tool influences older infants to a greater extent than younger infants. This increasing use 
of the contralateral hand with age, when the spatial condition makes it easier to perform the task with  
this hand, is in accordance with previous results showing that infants start using their non-preferred 
hand more than their preferred one when it will lead to a better outcome sometime between 14 and 19 
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months (Claxton et al., 2009; Cox & Smitsman, 2006; McCarty et al., 1999, 2001). The effect of the 
relative positions of the toy and the rake could have been explained by low-level visual constraints if  
this effect had been observed in younger age groups as well as older ones.  The fact that the effect 
increases with age means that it reflects some anticipation of the results of the action depending on the  
hand used to grasp the rake. Thus, it seems that younger infants do not anticipate as well as older  
infants that using the contralateral hand may be useful to retrieve the toy; it is conceivable that their 
understanding of the task is not strong enough to help them inhibit their tendency to use the preferred 
hand, as for 18-month-old right-handers. This fits with the finding that an increase in the capacity to  
incorporate visual information about the objects’ structure into the action increases during the second 
year (Barrett, Traupman, & Needham, 2008).
Behind the question of the development of hand preference tested in a simple grasping handedness test 
and choice of hand during tool use lies an important point, which is the relationship between hand 
preference  and  hemispheric  lateralization  for  praxis  (i.e.  planning  of  complex  actions,  real  or 
simulated). There are two main theories on this relationship. One theory (“shared” theory) claims that  
left-hemispheric dominance for praxis and hand preference in both simple and complex actions are 
associated (Geschwind & Galaburda, 1985), and that right-hand preference can be explained by the 
left  hemisphere’s  direct  control  over  it.  However,  this  would  mean  an  opposite  hemispheric  
lateralization of praxis for left-handers, which is far from being systematically the case, as we shall see 
below. According to another theory (“independent” theory), hand preference and praxis are relatively 
independent (Vingerhoets, Acke, Alderweireldt, Nys, Vandemaele, & Achten, 2012). Such a view has 
received support  from a large study on patients  undergoing an intracarotid  amobarbital  procedure 
(IAP) as part of their preoperative evaluation for epilepsy surgery (Meador, Loring, Lee, et al., 1999). 
This study showed a left-hemisphere specialization for praxis, independently of hand preference. Data 
from brain injured patients also suggest a distributed network within the left cerebral hemisphere in 
the representation of skilled action, including tool use, in right- as well as in left-handers (Johnson-
Frey,  Newman-Norlund, & Grafton, 2005; Vingerhoets et  al.,  2012). In other words, a left-hander 
whose left hand is controlled by the contralateral right hemisphere for executing simple actions, such 
as  grasping  an  object,  should  nevertheless  show  a  left-hemisphere  control  for  planning  complex 
actions. The two theories lead to different hypotheses for the development of hand preference (Fagard,  
2012).  If  left-hemisphere  specialization  for  praxis  and  hand preference  are  closely  associated,  as 
postulated by the first theory, then infants should increasingly use their right-preferred hand as they  
increasingly master new more complex manual skills and form representations of the corresponding  
motor programs.  On the other hand, if handedness and praxis lateralization are independent,  hand 
preference should not increase particularly with the development of complex manual skills. 
Testing these hypotheses would require a longitudinal study to check whether right-hand preference 
changes as complex skills emerge during the first years of life (“shared” hypothesis) or whether the 
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development  of  hand  preference  for  simple  grasping  and  the  emergence  of  complex  skills  are 
independent. Our results are more in favor of some independence, since hand preference does not wait 
understanding  of  tool  use  to  be  expressed,  and  does  not  change  significantly  (in  the  absence  of  
constraints against the use of the preferred hand) as understanding of tool use emerges. In fact the only 
changes that we observed is a better capacity to inhibit the use of the preferred right hand when the 
spatial constraints favored the use of the left hand, and thus a better anticipation of the hand most  
fitted for the task. This fits with the observation that hand preference can be observed in 16-week-old 
fetuses (Hepper, Shahidullah, & White, 1991), at a time when praxis is probably very limited, and that  
this early hand preference is well correlated with the child’s handedness twelve years later (Hepper,  
Wells, & Lynch, 2005). 
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Figure captions
Table 1: Percentage of infants categorized by the test for handedness as a function of age 
Table 2: Percentage of infants’ use of the right hand to grasp the tool as a function of their handedness on the 
handedness test
Table 3: Percentage of success as a function of age and of the hand used for grasping the rake 
Figure 1: Percentage of grasps with hand opposite to the toy side as a function of toy’s position and age of 
participant
Figure 2: Percentage of success as a function of age and condition: (C1: toy inside/touching the rake; C2: toy 
inside the rake but not touching it; C3: toy to the side of the rake, at about 10 cm from the rake head)
16 18 20 22
Right-handers 41.7 50 58.3 66.7
Non-lateralized 41.7 50 33.3 8.33
Left-handers 16.7 0 8.3 25
Table 1: Percentage of infants categorized by the test for handedness as a function of age
Handedness 
test
Toy to the left Toy to the right
Right-handers 86.5 (23) 54.8 (36.5)
Non-lateralized 75.3 (29) 33.6 (35)
ANOVA NS F(1,45)=4.01, p=.05
Table 2: Percentage of infants’ use of the right hand to grasp the tool as a function of their handedness on the  
handedness test 
Age (months) Contralateral Ipsilateral Chi2
16 60.5 26.3 9.53, p<.01
18 60 39.5 4.05, p<.05
20 61.9 40.7 3.6, p=.05
22 72 45.2 6.9, p<.01
 : 
Table 3: Percentage of success as a function of age and of the hand used for grasping the rake 
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Figure 1
Percentage of grasps with hand opposite to the toy side as a function of toy’s position and age of participant
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Figure 2
Percentage of success as a function of condition and age (C1: toy inside/touching the rake; C2: toy inside the 
rake but not touching it; C3: toy to the side of the rake, at about 10 cm from the rake head)
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 Chapter 4. Developmental steps leading to tool use – basic 
mechanisms
 1. General introduction
The results of the longitudinal and cross-sectional studies presented in the previous 
chapter raise question about two important issues regarding the development of tool use in 
infants. 
The first issue concerns infants' perception of spatial relations (connectedness or lack 
thereof)  between  objects.  In  the  condition  where  the  object  to  be  retrieved  was  directly 
attached to the rake-like tool (C1), infants as young as 12 months spontaneously grasped the 
handle of the tool and successfully reached for the attractive object. In the opposite case, in 
the conditions where the object was not attached to the tool, the infants' performance was 
much lower.  This result  leads us to the conclusion that  at  12 months,  infants are able  to 
understand that when two objects are physically connected in space, they form a unique object 
that can be handled as a single composite object. Thus, at least at the end of the first year of 
life, infants seem to know that they can grasp the part of an object that is within reach (in this 
example the handle of the tool) to get the part that is out of reach (the attractive object). In 
light of this result, the question we were interested in was the following: when do infants start 
to perceive that when a composite object is made of two clearly distinct parts, grasping any 
part will make the whole object move? In section 2, I will briefly report the results of a study 
conducted in our lab that investigated this question (Fagard, Florean, Rat-Fischer & O'Regan, 
in prep).
The  second  issue  concerns  infants'  use  of  the  notion  of  connectedness  in  other 
problem-solving situations. The fact that at 12 months of age infants have knowledge about 
composite objects suggests that they understand that objects that are spatially connected can 
be moved together. This corresponds to the age at which infants are able to use a supporting 
object or a string to retrieve an out-of-reach object that stands on it  or a string to retrieve 
something attached to it. However, when presented with a choice of several strings, only one 
which is connected to the out-of-reach object, the 12-month-old infants from our longitudinal 
study, and even older infants (unpublished data), usually fail to select the appropriate string to 
retrieve the object. This is striking with respect to the results on the composite object. Twelve-
month-old  infants  understand  the  notion  of  connectedness,  but  are  not  able  to  use  this 
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information in  contexts  involving multiple  objects,  only  one  of  which  is  connected.  One 
hypothesis  is  that  infants  might  have  difficulty  inhibiting a  motor  response  toward  the 
multiple strings, independently of their understanding of the notion of connectedness. This 
hypothesis was tested in the experiment presented in Section 3.
 2. Perception of composite objects
Note : The study on composite objects is only presented very briefly, as it was not the main topic of this thesis,  
and because I was only involved in a part of this work. However, as the results are interesting in the context of  
the tool and multiple strings problems, it is nevertheless relevant to survey them here.
Contributions to the study
This study was designed by J. Fagard, J.K. O'Regan and C. Florean. The subjects were recruited by L. Rat-
Fischer and tested by C. Florean (100%) and L. Rat-Fischer (~20%). The coding and interpretation of the data  
were performed by C. Florean, S. Margules and J. Fagard. The paper was written by J. Fagard and J.K. O'Regan. 
The  results  were  presented  jointly  with  results  from other  studies  by  L.  Rat-Fischer  in  the  form of  oral 
communications at developmental robotic conferences (Robotdoc, Lausanne, 2012; Dagstuhl Seminar 13072, 
Dagstuhl,  2013)  and  at  the  student  symposium of  the  CNRS research  group  Neurosciences  Cognitives  du  
Développement (2012).
The perception of object as wholes is influenced by a range of characteristics, such as 
featural properties (e.g., colour, texture), motion information (all parts of an object typically 
move together in the same direction), and spatial information (presence or absence of spatial 
gaps).  Infants are  known to be sensitive to  the physical  laws that  govern objects,  and in 
particular to the notion of cohesion between objects. Habituation paradigms have shown that 
3-month-old infants perceive the unity of objects (Spelke & Van de Walle, 1993). However, to 
our knowledge, no study has yet investigated the question of how infants take this information 
into account when presented with a composite object. To test this, we presented to 6-, 8- and 
10-month-old infants with an attractive out-of-reach toy and a handle within reach (see Fig. 
5).  In  one  condition  (connection),  the  toy  and  the  handle  were  spatially  and  physically 
connected to each other, forming a unique composite object. In a second condition (touching 
but not connected), the toy and the handle were spatially connected, but were not attached to 
each other. In a third condition (invisible connection), the toy and the handle were spatially 
separated, but were physically connected to each other by an invisible fishing line.
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Figure 5. Three conditions for the straight object. The same conditions were presented for the 
L-shaped object, see the figure below (Pictures by C. Florean).
All conditions were repeated twice, once with a straight handle (as presented in Fig. 
5),  once  with  an  L-shaped  handle  (see  Fig.  6).  The  task  with  the  L-shaped  handle  was 
supposed to be more difficult than the one with the straight handle, as the out-of-reach part 
was not in the same line of vision as the reachable part of the handle, thus forcing infants to  
visually  follow the handle to  see  the connection  between the  two parts  of  the  composite 
object. With the L-shaped handle, it was easy to code the part of the object that the infant was 
looking at, the ball or the part of the handle that was within reach. The straight object was 
presented obliquely in order to make it possible to code the infant’s gaze in a similar way.
Figure 6. Examples of subjects presented with both kinds of handle: straight handle and L-
shaped handle. Pictures extracted from the videotapes.
Condition 1 was scored according to the infant's visual and manual performance with 
the object. For example, infants who pointed toward the out-of-reach part of the object, or that 
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grasped the handle without looking at the out-of-reach part, were given the lowest score of 1. 
In  contrast,  infants  who grasped and pulled  the  handle  while  looking at  the  out-of-reach 
object, or while anticipating the grasping of the out-of-reach part of the object by preparing 
the free hand, were given the highest score of 3. Infants whose behaviour was difficult to 
score, meeting neither the criteria for a score of 1 nor of 3, were scored 2. Conditions 2 and 3 
were  used  as  control  conditions.  We hypothesized  that  infants  who were  sensitive  to  the 
notion of composite objects (i.e., who scored 3 in condition 1) should be surprised when the 
out-of-reach part of the composite object did not come along with the handle, in condition 2 
(touching  but  not  connected,  which  was  visually  similar  to  condition  1).  Similarly,  we 
expected these infants to be surprised when the non-connected attractive part did come along 
with the handle, in condition 3 (invisible connection), despite the spatial gap between the two 
parts of the object. Similarly to condition 1, infants were scored in terms of levels from 1 to 3, 
with 1 reflecting no surprise behaviours, and 3 obvious surprise behaviours (such as stopping 
the movement, looking at the experimenter or laughing). Level 2 was again an intermediate 
score between 1 and 3.
The  analyses  of  the  data  from  condition  1  showed  a  significant  score  difference 
between the 6-month-olds and the older infants. The difference was the same for the L shape 
and the straight handles. In conditions 2 and 3, there was a significant difference between the 
surprise scores of the younger and older infants infants, with older infants showing more 
surprise.  Again,  the  difference  remained  the  same  for  both  types  of  handles.  Finally,  a 
correlation between conditions 1 and 2 showed a significant positive correlation between the 
scores from the two conditions. Thus infants who had a the best score in condition 1 were also 
significantly more surprised in condition 2.
The results of the present study suggest a developmental change in infants' integration 
of the notion of composite objects around 8 months of age. When presented with a composite 
object, composed of a handle part that is within reach and an attractive part that is out-of-
reach,  older  infants  anticipate  that  the  out-of-reach  part  can  be  retrieved  by  moving  the 
handle,  whereas  6-month-olds  do not.  Moreover,  the performance level  with a  composite 
object (condition 1) was correlated with the level of surprise in a condition that presented the 
same initial appearance, when the out-of-reach part did not move with the handle (condition 
2).  These results  confirm that infants  have acquired the notion of  connectedness  between 
objects very early in development. This is in line with studies showing that in the second half 
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of the first year of life, infants can use connected objects (supporting objects and strings) as a 
means to retrieve out-of-reach objects.
 3. Perception of connectedness: The multiple-strings task
Contributions to the following study
This study was designed by L. Rat-Fischer, in collaboration with J. Fagard, K. O'Regan and with technical help  
from Antoine Luu, of Tobii Technology. The 14 subjects in the preliminary study and all the subjects in the paper  
were recruited and tested at the Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception by L. Rat-Fischer (100%) and the  
Master's student Blandine Filluzeau (~20%). Both experimenters participated in the data coding. The statistical 
analyses and interpretation of the data were performed by L. Rat-Fischer, who also wrote the paper. The final 
version of the paper has been submitted at the time of the submission of the present thesis. The design of the 
study was presented by L. Rat-Fischer as a poster at the Eyetrackids Conference in Montreal (2011). The results  
were presented with results  from other  studies  by L.  Rat-Fischer  as  oral  communications at  developmental  
robotic conferences (Robotdoc, Lausanne, 2012; Dagstuhl Seminar 13072, Dagstuhl, 2013) and at the student 
GDR Symposium Neurosciences Cognitives du Développement (2012).
 3.1. Introduction to the paper
The results of the previous study show that before the end of the first year of life,  
infants have acquired the notion that two objects attached in space can be moved together. 
Also, it is known from the developmental literature that in the same age period, infants can 
use  strings  and  supporting  objects  as  means  for  bringing  an  out-of-reach  object  closer. 
However,  a  number  of  personal  observations  raised  questions  about  infants'  capacity  to 
perceive connectedness between objects in other problem-solving tasks. A first observation 
arose during the longitudinal study described in Chapter 3 (Fagard, Rat-Fischer & O'Regan, 
2012), which we did not mention in the publication because it was an exploratory part of the 
study. The infants in this longitudinal study were regularly presented with either two or four 
strings —one end of each was in reach of the subject— and an out-of-reach object that was 
attached to one of the strings.  The gap between the object and the non-connected strings 
varied between 5 and 10 cm. A striking result was that even at 16 months of age, most infants 
seemingly chose the strings at random. In an additional preliminary study, we reproduced this 
result with 14 infants aged 16 months (Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard,  unpublished data). 
Infants were tested on the multiple-strings task, for five to eight trials, depending on their 
level of motivation. Four strings were presented on each trial, only one being connected to the 
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toy. The mean percentage of success for these 16-month-old infants was 55% (min = 29%; 
max = 83%). On many of these trials, success was ambiguous, as infants bimanually pulled 
two strings at a time. When considering only the trials where infants pulled only one string at  
a  time,  the mean success  rate  dropped to 40%, with only 3/14 infants  above 50% mean 
success  (number  of  trials  for  all  infants:  4  to  7).  This  success  rate  is  remarkably  low 
considering the fact that at this age infants can use the notion of connectedness in the single-
string task and in the composite-object task. In light of the results of these two preliminary 
studies, we conducted a study, presented in the next paper, which investigates why most 16-
month-old infants failed to solve the multiple-strings task.
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Paper 3 (submitted)
Visual attention in a means-end task: the case of multiple strings
 3.2. Visual attention in a means-end task: the case of multiple strings (Paper 3)
Authors: Rat-Fischer, L., O'Regan, J.K., Fagard, J.
Abstract
The aim of  the  present  study was to  understand what  factors  influence  infants'  problem-
solving behaviours on the multiple-strings task. The main question focused on why infants 
usually solve the single string-pulling task at 12 months at the latest, whereas most 16-month-
old infants still cannot solve the task when several strings are presented, only one of which is 
attached. We investigated whether this difficulty is related to inhibitory control abilities using 
a perception-action paradigm. During the first part of the experiment, we assessed the ability 
of infants aged 16 to 20 months to solve the multiple-strings task.  The infants were then 
divided into three groups based on performance (a “failure” group, an “intermediate” group, 
and a “success” group). The three groups' looking strategies were compared, particularly with 
regard to predictive gaze when seeing an adult performing the task. We found that only infants 
who successfully performed the action task also visually anticipated which string the adult 
had to pull in the visual task. Our results show that lack of inhibitory control is one factor that  
contributes  to  infants'  failure  at  the  task,  and  support  the  direct  matching  hypothesis, 
according to which infants need to be able to perform the actions themselves before being 
able to anticipate similar actions performed by others.
1. Introduction
Physical properties of objects and their relations to other objects are detected very early in 
infancy.  Vision  studies  using  habituation  paradigms  have  shown  that  abilities  such  as 
identifying objects' height (Hespos & Baillargeon, 2001), solidity or continuity (Spelke et al., 
1992) emerge before 6 months of age. At this age, infants also understand some dynamic 
aspects of objects, in particular the cohesion of two objects moving together in the same 
direction (Spelke et al., 1992) and the principle of contact (Leslie et al., 1987) wherein one 
object is affected by another only if there is contact between them.
In action studies, this notion of contact between objects, also known as “connectedness”, has 
been explored in older infants, mainly using two paradigms: pulling a support to retrieve an 
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out-of-reach object placed on top of it, and pulling a string attached to the out-of-reach object.  
Studies have shown that infants are able to use the support as a means for bringing the goal  
object within reach at  around 9-10 months of age (Willatts,  1999;  Schlesinger & Langer, 
1999; Willatts, 1984; Bates, Carlsonluden, & Bretherton, 1980; Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975; Piaget, 
1936/1952). Concerning the string paradigm, Richardson (1932) was, to our knowledge, the 
first to write about the string task in infants. He reported an increase in the occurrence of 
pulling a string when an object was attached to it around 10 months. Piaget reported from 
observations  on  his  own children  that  the  capacity  to  pull  a  string  to  retrieve  an  object 
emerged at about 11 months of age (Piaget, 1936/1952). For each of his three children, Piaget  
noted that they discovered the pulling effect of the string through active exploration. Later, the  
string behaviour was included in assessments of psychological development, and the age of 
10-12 months was found to be the period when infants began solving the string problem 
(Uzgiris & Hunt, 1975). Thus, it appeared that at this period, infants understand the notion of 
connectedness between objects.
One way to decide whether infants understand a physical concept is to give them a choice of 
possible  ways  to  perform  a  particular  task.  Some  tool  use  studies  for  example  have 
investigated whether infants are capable of selecting the correct, functional tool from among a 
set of non-functional alternatives to retrieve an out-of-reach object (e.g., Brown, 1990; Chen 
& Siegler, 2000). Perceiving which tool affords the retrieval of the object and being able to 
complete  the  task  with  the  correct  tool  has  been  interpreted  as  an  indicator  of  true 
understanding of the tool's use. Following this principle in a substantially simpler situation, 
one way to evaluate whether infants understand and use the notion of connectedness in the 
string- and cloth-pulling situations is to present infants with a choice of strings, only one of 
which is connected to the toy. Infants who understand the notion of connectedness should 
identify which  string is  connected to  the toy,  therefore affording its  retrieval.  Richardson 
(1932) noted that the ability to ignore strings not attached to the object increases around 10 
months; however, even at 12 months of age, infants rarely succeeded on their first attempt at 
the task by pulling the connected string. In a more recent study, Brown (1990) found that the 
capacity to ignore the unattached strings increases with age during the second year of life. 
However  she noted that  the  infants  did  not  immediately  succeed in  choosing to  pull  the 
attached string among three strings aligned toward the object at 14 months, but only having 
succeeding at  simpler  situations  of  the  string  pulling task,  involving lesser  strings.  In  an 
exploratory study on 14 infants aged 16 months (unpublished data), we observed that they 
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rarely chose the correct string among a set  of four including three non-connected strings, 
whereas infants can theoretically pull a string to bring an object closer at around 11 months 
(cf.  Piaget,  1936/1952;  Uzgiris  &  Hunt,  1975;  personal  unpublished  data).  Such  age 
differences between the time when infants apparently understand the notion of connectedness 
and the age where they can use the notion in choice situations are striking. What factors are 
responsible for this delay?
One candidate  is inhibitory motor control.  Infants presented with multiple  strings have to 
inhibit  automatic,  string-pulling  motor  responses,  in  order  to  choose  the  correct  string. 
Inhibitory motor control has been reported to develop between 8 and 12 months of age in 
situations involving object retrieval or detour reaching (Diamond, 1991). Also, as mentioned 
above, researchers investigating string- and cloth-pulling problems have reported increases in 
the ability to ignore strings or clothes not in contact with the object starting at 10 months of 
age (e.g., Aguiar & Baillargeon, 2000, for the cloth task; Brown, 1990, and Richardson, 1932, 
for the string task). However, it seems plausible that the complexity of the task, involving (1) 
scanning the  multiple-strings  scene  in  order  to  (2)  isolate  the  correct  spatial  information, 
followed by (3) choosing and (4) pulling the correct string until the object is retrieved, could 
compete  temporarily  with  infants'  abilities  to  inhibit  the action  of  pulling.  This  might  be 
reinforced by the fact that in general it is not particularly costly for infants to pull the strings 
randomly until they retrieve the object.
To investigate whether infants' difficulties with the multiple-strings task result from inhibitory 
limitations, we designed a perception-action experiment. We compared infants' performance 
on  the  multiple  string-pulling  task  with  their  visual  explorative  behaviour  using  an  eye-
tracker.  Eye-tracking  techniques  are  ideal  to  measure  infants'  visual  exploration  of 
experimental scenes (e.g.,  Franchak, Kretch, Soska & Adolph, 2011). The experiment was 
divided into  two parts:  an action  task and a  vision  task.  In  the  action  task,  infants  were 
presented with four strings, only one of which was connected to an out-of-reach attractive toy. 
The infants' task was to choose the correct string in order to retrieve the toy. The vision task 
involved the same situation as the action task, but the string was pulled by an adult rather than 
by the infant, while the infant's looking behaviour was recorded. In particular, we checked for 
predictive  gaze  toward  the  connected  string  before  the  adult  chose  which  string  to  pull. 
Predictive  gaze  has  recently  been  used  as  a  measure  of  infants'  ability  to  anticipate  an 
outcome when observing ongoing actions (see Biro, 2012, for a brief review). This situation 
allowed us to isolate infants' visual exploratory behaviour from their motor activity, in a task 
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where no motor response was required. Thus, we expected that if a lack of inhibitory control 
were the only factor responsible for infants' failure at the action task, all infants would show 
similar visual anticipatory behaviours on the vision task, independently of their success or 
failure at the action task. In contrast, if infants failed at the action task because of limitations 
other than a lack of manual inhibition, we expected infants who failed to pull the correct 
string in action, to also fail to visually identify the correct string in the vision task. In this 
case, looking strategies on the vision task should differ between infants who fail at the action 
task and those who succeed. To test these predictions, we compared infants' looking strategies 
as a function of their performance on the string task, independently of their age, which ranged 
from 16 to 20 months. This age range was chosen because preliminary observations suggested 
that over this age period some infants fail to solve the multiple-strings problem while others 
succeed, thus enabling comparison between the looking strategies of the two categories of 
infants. Since the coding of “true” success was sometimes ambiguous due to bimanual strings 
choices, we assigned infants to three groups based on performance (failure, intermediate and 
success) as described in the Methods section. If the inhibitory control hypothesis is correct, 
we  expected  to  find  no  differences  in  looking  strategy  between  groups.  In  contrast,  if 
inhibition is not involved, or at least if it is not the only factor involved in infants' difficulty 
solving the string problem, then we expected to find differences in looking strategies, at least 
between the failure group and the success group.
Methods
Participants
The final sample of the study consisted of 41 healthy full-term infants.  We tested infants 
between 16 and 20 months of age: seventeen 16-month-old infants (M = 15months 31days, 
Range = 15mo 21d to 16mo 10d, 7 girls),  nine 18-month-old infants (M = 18months 0day, 
Range = 17mo 16d to 18mo 12d, 7 girls), and fifteen 20-month-old infants (M = 20months 
3days,  Range = 19mo  16d  to  20mo  13d,  10  girls).  Five  additional  16-month-olds,  four 
additional 18-month-olds and three additional 20-month-olds were tested, but not included in 
the final sample because of inattentiveness during the vision experiment (the total looking 
time at the scene took up less than 20% of duration of trials ; n = 4 infants), lack of interest in 
the  action task  (n = 2),  uncorrected  vision  (infant  was  tested without  glasses  because  the 
system could not track looking behaviour with glasses on, n = 1), experimenter error in the 
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presentation order of the strings (n = 3), or technical problems with the eye-tracking system 
(n = 2). All infants were recruited from a list of local families who expressed interest in taking 
part  in  studies  on  infant  development.  Parental  consent  was  granted  before  the  infants 
underwent the experiment. The infants were given a small gift for their participation in the 
study.
Design and materials
Figure 1. Illustration of the two experimental tasks. (1a) Infant performing the action task. 
(1b) infant looking at the scene in the vision task (front camera). (1c) View of the vision task 
from the  scene  camera,  above the  subject's  head.  (1d)  View of  the  four  areas  of  interest 
(AOIs):  E = string-end,  F = string,  C = area  between  string  and  toy  (either  a  gap  or  a 
connection),  and  Toy = toy  connected  to  one  of  the  four  strings.  In  this  example,  the 
connected string is F1, which is the first string on the left. The scene area includes the entire 
white cardboard area.
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1. Action task (Figure 1a)
The  task  was  presented  on  a  solid  white  carton  board  (50  cm  x  70  cm)  which  the 
experimenters could slide from their side of the table toward the opposite side, at around 5-10 
cm from the infant. The four strings placed on the board were dark grey, made of wool and 
measured either 35 cm for the two strings placed on the side, or 30 cm for the two strings 
placed in the middle, to make them equally graspable for the infant. The gap between the non-
connected string and the toy measured 5 cm. The toy was placed out of the reach of the infant, 
at 38 cm away from the near end of the board. The toys used were coloured plastic ducks, 
which are the toys that the infants tested in our lab usually express the most interest in. A 
different duck was used on each trial to avoid decrease in motivation. A digital video camera 
was positioned behind the table, to one side of the experimenter, to record the infant's active 
behaviour during the task, and to allow rough off-line coding of looking behaviour.
2. Vision task (figure 1b, c, d)
The scene for this task was laid out on the same carton board as in the action task. The board 
was again placed in front of the infant, but at a distance of approximately 70 cm away from 
the infant, and inclined horizontally at an angle of 9° with respect to the table to facilitate gaze 
measurement with the eye-tracker. The same strings were used as in the action task, but the 
gap between the toy and the non-connected strings was larger (10 cm). This distance was 
calculated based on Thales' theorem, taking into account the larger distance between the board 
and the infant, and the inclination of the board. A Tobii X120 eye-tracker was placed on a 
table slightly below the board, around 60 cm away from the infant's eyes and at an angle of 
20° from the table. A digital video camera (“front camera”: see Fig. 1b) was positioned behind  
the board, facing the infant, to check its looking behaviour outside the cardboard scene, when 
the eye-tracker cannot track the infant's gaze. A USB camera (“scene camera”: see Fig. 1c and 
1d) linked to the Tobii system, was placed just over the infant's head. The image from this 
camera, representing the subject's view and including the carton board or looking scene, was 
calibrated inside the system as the scene camera. The five calibration points used were the 
four corners and the centre of the board. Gaze direction was measured and recorded using the 
Tobii Studio program. 
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Procedure
The action task was always presented first, to ensure that the infants had understood the task 
when measuring their looking behaviour during the vision task. Before being tested with four 
strings, each infant was tested with only one string, connected to the out-of-reach toy. This 
was to make sure that all participants were able and motivated to use the string as a means to 
retrieve the toy. In both tasks, each trial was prepared behind an opaque screen, to keep the 
subject  from seeing the connection through a simultaneous movement of the  toy and the 
connected string. The test began when the mask was removed.
In the action task, the board was first presented out of the infants' reach, to prevent them from 
pulling any string at random without even looking at the toy. After the infant had looked at the 
board for at least 1 second, the board was moved toward the infant, stopping at a distance of 
5-10 cm. If the infant pulled the correct string and thus grasped the toy, he was allowed to  
play with it for about one minute. If he pulled one or several of the wrong string(s), the board 
remained in position until the infant had pulled the connected string and retrieved the object.
During  the  vision  task,  the  parent  whose  lap the  infant  sat  in  was asked to  wear  strong 
sunglasses  to  prevent  the Tobii  from tracking his/her  eyes instead of  those of  the  infant. 
Because infants often leaned toward the scene to get closer to the object, making it difficult 
for the eye-tracker to keep registering their gaze, the parents were also asked to stabilize their  
infant by gently holding their chest and arms during the task (see Fig. 1b). Again, each trial 
was prepared besides  an opaque screen.  For  each trial,  the board  was then placed at  the 
calibrated position described in the previous section. During this transporting phase of the 
board, the object and its connection to one of the four strings were covered by a mask to 
prevent  infants  from  seeing  the  connection  before  the  cardboard  was  in  the  calibrated 
position.  Then, the experimenter went to the child's left  side and removed the mask. The 
experimenter's  position  (left  or  right)  relatively  to  the  side  of  the  infant  could  not  be 
randomized because of the lack of space on the right side, due to the presence of the USB 
camera  stander.  For  this  reason,  we  controlled  for  the  presence  of  an  effect  of  side  of 
presentation in the analyses of the vision data at each position of the connected string. After 
the removal of the mask, the infant's attention was driven to the out-of-reach toy with phrases 
such as “Look at the duck! Do you see the duck? How can I get it? Which string should I  
pull?”.  After  a  mean  time  of  11.4  seconds  (SD = ±3.39s,  min = 2.03s;  max = 32.69s; 
depending on infants'  attention  toward  the  scene),  the  experimenter  approached her  hand 
toward the connected string and pulled it to bring the object within reach, giving it to the 
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infant. The cardboard was then pulled away and the next trial was prepared behind the opaque 
screen.
During both tasks the participants sat in the lap of one of their parents, in front of the test  
table. An attractive toy was always presented at the same position on the board, out of the 
reach of the subject, and attached to one of four strings. Four consecutive trials (one at each 
possible position of the string) were presented in each of the two tasks. The position of the 
connected string (see Fig. 1d for the numbering of the strings) was randomized between the 
four trials across all subjects, so that all orders of presentations were tested at least once in 
vision and once in action. The infants never saw the same order of presentation for the action 
and the vision tasks consecutively. Each experimental session lasted about 30 minutes. A 
laterality test was performed to assess infants hand preference (see Fagard & Marks, 2000) in 
order to control for any effect of side in the action task.
Data Analysis
1. Action task
The infants’ behaviours were coded from the video recordings. As infants could pull several 
strings at the same time, and as they could pull any string until they got the toy, independently 
of their actual understanding of the physical relations between the strings and the toy, it was 
sometimes difficult to code in terms of true success versus failure. We attributed a behavioural 
category to each trial.  A score of 1 was given when infants apparently pulled the strings 
randomly without looking at the out-of-reach toy. An intermediate score of 2 was given when 
infants looked at the toy before and while pulling a string, but did not pull the connected 
string first. This score was also attributed when infants pulled two strings simultaneously with 
both hands (one of which was connected to the object), making difficult to code whether this 
success was intentional or not. A score of 3 was given when infants looked at the toy before 
and while pulling directly on the connected string. The scores for each infant were averaged 
over the four trials. We then assigned infants into one of three groups based on performance: 
Group 1 (mean score 1 to 1.5), the  failure group; Group 2 (mean score >1.5 to <2.5), the 
intermediate group; and Group 3 (mean score 2.5 to 3), the success group. This coding was 
independent of the infants' age (16, 18 or 20 months). Even though more of the 20-month-olds 
suceeded at the task than in the younger infants, there was a great deal of age variability in 
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each performance group (as we will see in the Results section). Moreover, the purpose of this 
work was not to evaluate the age differences in action capacities between these ages. We thus 
preferred to compare the looking strategies of the different performance groups rather than the 
age groups.
A second observer coded 18 infants (44%) independently to assess inter-observer reliability. 
Reliability between the two observers was 80%.
2. Vision task
We analysed infants' visual behaviour from the moment when the object and the connection 
area were uncovered by the mask to the moment when the experimenter began to reach for the  
connected string. We could thus record the infant's exploration of the scene before pulling the 
string. Three areas of interest (AOIs) were defined for each of the four strings (see Fig. 1d): 1) 
the whole string (area F, from one end to the other end of each string); 2) the connection area 
(area C), corresponding either to the gap between the string and the toy, or to the connection 
between the string and the toy, in the case of the connected string; 3) the end of the string 
(area E), where the strings are usually grasped when being pulled. As the two external strings 
were longer than the strings in the mid-position, the AOIs F and E were of the same size for  
the external strings (strings 1 and 4), and for the strings in the middle (strings 2 and 3), but the 
two  pairs  differed  from  each  other.  We  defined  these  three  AOIs  to  explore  possible 
differences in looking strategies toward the connected versus non-connected strings between 
the performance groups. We used the fixation duration (FD) for each AOI. The choice to use 
the FD over the visit duration (VD, corresponding to the FD with, in addition, saccades within 
the AOIs), was motivated by the literature. Aslin (2012) suggested that not all saccades inside 
the  AOI  constitute  relevant  information,  as  they  might  only  “fly  over”  the  AOI  without 
processing any information. All  data were taken separately for each trial.  Due to different 
scene  duration  in  each  trial,  the  FD  data  were  transformed  into  percentages  of  looking 
(fixation) time at the entire scene (the area inside the cardboard).  After that, the data were 
averaged across the three non-connected strings to obtain the mean looking percentage toward 
non-connected strings. This value was then subtracted from the percentage of looking time 
spent looking at the connected string. If the value is positive, this means that the infant looked 
more at the connected string than at the non-connected strings.
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Results
I. Action task
Mean performance as a function of age
A regression analysis on mean performance (averaged over the four trials), as a function of 
age (in days, min = 478d ; max = 619d) showed a significant increase in performance with 
age (R = .31, F(1,39) = 4.14, p < .05).
As mentioned in the Methods section, the aim of our study was to focus on the differences 
between performance groups, rather than on the differences betweenages. In the following 
section we give the mean age for each group.
Mean age by performance group
An  Anova  on the  performance  groups  with  age  as  the  dependent  variable  showed  no 
significant age differences between the three groups (F2,38 = 2.57, p = .09,  η2 = .12, table 1).  
Thus, if different looking strategies are observed between the performance groups, age should 
not have directly influenced them, as the age distribution did not significantly differ between 
the groups.
Table 1. Mean age, mean score and number of subjects in each performance group. SE =  
standard error.
Group N Mean Age SE Mean score SE
1 15 17.33 0.42 1.42 .40
2 13 17.69 0.50 1.88 .50
3 13 18.77 0.48 2.67 .50
Distribution of handedness in each group
Right-handed infants could have expressed a bias toward the string that was positioned closer 
to their preferred hand. Thus, we analysed the infants' performance by the position of the 
connected string and by their handedness.
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Table 2. Distribution of handedness by group
Group N Left-handed Non-lateralized Right-handed
1 15 1 7 7 (46.7%)
2 13 2 5 6 (46.1%)
3 13 0 4 9 (69.2%)
A chi-squared analysis of handedness across the performance groups showed no significant 
difference  in  the  distribution  of  handedness  between  the  three  groups  (N = 41,  dof = 2, 
χ2 = 1.86, p = .40; Table 2). This absence of difference is important as hand preference could 
affect which string the infant pulls first. For example, right-handed infants might express a 
bias toward the string at  Position 3 (see Fig.  1). Thus, a difference in such bias between 
groups (as we will see below), should not be caused by differences in handedness between the 
groups.
Mean performance for each position of the connected string
A repeated measures ANOVA on mean performance with the position of the connected string 
(1, 2, 3 and 4; see Fig. 1) as a within-subjects factor showed a significant effect of the position 
of the connected string (F3,120 = 4.86, p < .01,  η2 = .11) mS1 = 1.82 ; mS2 = 2.02 ;  mS3 = 2.22 ; 
mS4 = 1.79). A post  hoc  analysis  indicated  that  mean  performance  was  greater  when  the 
connected string was on Position 3 than when it was in Position 1 and 4.
It is worth noting that the third position is the closest position to the right hand. Thus, higher 
performance for connected strings at the third position could have been explained by the fact 
that a majority of infants was right-handed (54% of infants) or non-lateralized (39%). At least 
right-handed infants, and possibly most non-lateralized infants might have shown a tendency 
to pull this string first, independently of which string is actually connected to the toy, because 
it  was the closest  to  their  right  hand.  If  this  were true,  infants performance would likely 
appear greater when the connected string was in Position 3 than when it was in the other 
positions. In fact, the infants' first choice was directed to the string in Position 3 (with or  
without pulling another string at the same time) in 66.46% of trials, which corresponds to 
more than two out of the four trials per infant in this task. A breakdown of this bias toward the 
third position by handedness showed that overall, right-handed infants selected this string first 
on 62.5% of their initial attempts, and non-lateralized infants on 76.56%, whereas the three 
left-handed infants chose it on 41.67% of their initial attempt. 
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Beyond the main effect of the position of the connected string on mean performance, there 
could be further significant  differences between performance groups. At least  in the third 
group (success group), infants should not show this bias toward the third position but should 
perform equivalently at each string position. Figure 2 illustrates the performance of infants 
from each group by string position.
Figure 2. Mean score  for each position of the connected string by group. Error bars give 
standard error.
The most important observation from Figure 2 is that the performance difference when the 
connected string was in Position 3 as compared to 1 and 4 only seems to have occured in 
Groups 1 and 2. It is also worth noting that Groups 1 and 2 show the same performance 
pattern,  that  is,  greater  performance  when  the  connected  string  is  in  Position  3,  and  a 
comparative decrease in performance for Positions 1, 2 and 4. In contrast, Group 3 seems to 
have performed equally at least for Positions 1 to 3. Repeated measures ANOVAS on each 
group  with  string  position  as  a  within-subjects  factor  indicated  that  this  performance 
difference in favour of the string in Position 3 was only significant in Group 1 (F3,42 = 4.94, 
p < .01,  η2 = .26).  As the distribution of handedness between groups was not  significantly 
different, this result suggests that the infants in Group 1 had a bias toward the string on the  
third position, which would explain their higher performance when the connected string was 
in Position 3. Indeed, infants in Group 1 pulled the string in Position 3 on their first attempt 
on 83.33% of trials, the infants in Group 2 on 63.46% of trials, and infants in Group 3 on 50% 
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of trials.
Finally, in Group 3, there was a significant performance difference when the string was in 
Position 4 compared to the other positions (F3,36 = 6.18, p < .01, η2 = .34), for which we have 
no particular explanation.
Mean performance by trial
To  control  for  a  possible  effect  of  the  repetition  of  the  task  with  successive  trials, 
independently of the position of the string, we performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on 
mean performance across trials. There was  no significant difference in performance across 
trials (F3,120 < 1 ; mt1 = 1.94 ; mt2 = 1.93 ; mt3 = 2.07 ; mt4 = 1.90). There was also no significant 
interaction between trials and groups (F6,114 < 1).
II. Vision
The  mean  Fixation  Duration  (FD)  toward  the  scene  was 3.78s  (SD = ±1.87s,  min = 0, 
max = 11.48s). At other times infants looked outside the scene, mostly at the experimenter, at 
their parent or visually exploring the room. As mentioned in the Methods section, infants who 
looked at the scene for less than 20% of the total trial time were not included in the final 
sample.  Mean  FD  was 2.69s  for  the  toy area  (69%  of  the  looking  time  at  the  scene; 
SD = 1.54, min = 0; max = 11.40), and 0.46s for the string area (12.44% of the looking time 
at the scene; SD = .36, min = 0; max = 2.46). For further analysis, all FDs for the toy, string 
and gap areas were converted into percentages, based on looking time at the scene in each 
trial.
III. Comparison between vision and action
In this section we compare the looking strategies of the three performance groups from the 
action task: failure, intermediate and success. In the first paragraph we analyze the differences 
in the mean percentage of looking time at the whole scene, at the toy area, and at the string 
area.
For all further analyses in the other paragraphs of Section III, the dependent variable is the 
difference between the percentage of fixation furation (%FD) toward the AOIs (F, E and C) of 
the connected string and the mean %FD toward the three non-connected strings (see Table 3). 
The performance group was integrated as aa betwee-subjects variable. To control for a side-
effect due to the left-position of the experimenter, the position of the string was added as an 
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intra-subject variable.
Table 3. Mean %FD difference (±SE) between connected and non-connected areas of interest, 
by group. Significance level: * <.05, ** <.01, ***<.001.
Area of Interest
(Difference between 
connected and mean of 
non-connected areas)
Performance group
1 2 3
F: Whole String area .02 (±1.09) -.36 (±1.17) 4.23 (±1.17) *
C: Connection area -.73 (±.86) .78 (±.92) .46 (±.92)
E: Extremity area .52 (±1.34) .67 (±1.44) 10.04 (±1.44) ***
Looking time at the scene as a function of performance group
The mean fixation duration on the scene was not significantly different between the groups 
(F2,38 = 1.84, p = .17, η2 = .09). However, an ANOVA on the mean %FD on the scene revealed 
a significant difference in the proportion of looking time at the scene between the groups 
(F2,38 = 3.27, p = .05,  η2 = .15). A post hoc analysis indicated that infants in Group 3 looked 
significantly less toward the whole scene (mean FDscene = 26.68% of the total scene duration) 
than infants in Group 1 (39.39%). Group 2 had an intermediate looking percentage of 34.94%.
The mean %FD for the toy area differed by group (F2,38 = 6.76, p < .01 η2 = .26). A post hoc 
analysis  indicated  that  infants  in  Group  3  looked  significantly  less  at  the  toy  (mean 
FDtoy = 26.68% of total scene duration) than infants in Groups 1 (77%) and 2 (71.51%).
The mean %FD on the four strings (independently of their connection with the toy) differed 
by group (F2,38 = 4.48, p < .05 η2 = .19). A post hoc analysis indicated that infants in Group 3 
looked significantly more at the strings (mean FDstrings = 16.96% of the total scene duration) 
than  did  infants  in  Group  1  (8.64%).  Infants  in  Group  2  had  an  intermediate  looking 
percentage of 12.3% at the strings, not significantly different from the other groups.
Mean percentage difference in looking time at connected versus non-connected strings (Area  
F, see Fig. 1d)
A repeated measures  ANOVA on the  mean %FD difference  between connected  and non-
connected  strings  showed  a  significant  difference  in  looking  strategies  between  groups 
(F2,38 = 4.80, p<.05,  η2 = .20 ;  Table 3,  Fig.  3).  A post hoc analysis indicated a significant 
difference  between  Group  3  (mean  %FDdiff = 4.23),  and  the  two  other  groups  (mean 
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%FDdiff = .02 for Group 1 and -.36 for Group 2). Thus, infants in Group 3 looked more at the 
connected string than the non-connected strings, unlike the two other groups (see Fig. 3). An 
ANOVA on the mean %FD difference between connected versus non-connected strings by 
group (n = 3) with the positions of the connected string as a repeated measure (n = 4) showed 
no  significant  effect  of  string  position  (F3,114 = 1.98,  p = .12,  η2 = .05),  and  no  significant 
interaction between group and string position (F6,114 < 1). This result indicates that there was 
no looking bias toward some of the strings, despite the asymmetry of the experimental setup 
(experimenter positioned to the left of the infant). Also, contrary to the action task, there was 
no bias toward the third string position. This confirms that this bias in the action task was 
related to the infants' right-hand preference. 
Figure 3. Mean percentage fixation duration difference between connected and non-connected 
whole strings, by group. Dots correspond to mean, boxes to standard error, and whiskers to 
standard deviation.
Mean percentage difference in looking time at the connection versus the spatial gaps (Area C,  
see Fig. 1d)
A repeated  measures  ANOVA on the  mean %FD difference  between the  connection  area 
versus  the  gap  areas  showed  no  significant  difference  in  looking  times  between  groups 
(F2,38 < 1; Table 3). There was no significant difference in the string position (F3,114 = 2.56, 
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p = .06,  η2 = .06),  and  no  significant  interaction  between  group  and  string  position 
(F6,114 = 1.27, p = .28, η2 = .06).
Mean percentage difference in  looking time at  the end area between connected and non-
connected strings (Area E, see Fig. 1d)
A repeated measures ANOVA on the %FD difference between the end of connected and non-
connected  strings  showed  a  significant  difference  in  looking  strategies  between  groups 
(F2,38 = 14.70, p < .001,  η2 = .44). A post hoc analysis indicated a significant difference was 
significantly different between Group 3 and the two other groups (see values in Table 3). 
Infants in Group 3 looked more at the end of the string that was connected than at the end of 
the  non-connected strings,  unlike the  two other groups (see Fig.  4).  Again,  there was no 
significant effect of string position (F3,114 < 1), and no significant interaction between group 
and string position (F6,114 < 1).
Figure  4.  Mean  %FD difference  between  the  connection  and  gap  areas,  by  group.  Dots 
correspond to mean, bowes to standard error, and whiskers to standard deviation. 
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Mean difference between trials for each AOI
In  order  to  see  whether  infants'  looking strategies  differed  from one  trial  to  another,  we 
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA on mean %FD difference between connected versus 
non-connected string areas with trial (from 1 to 4) as a within-subjects factor. We found no 
differences  between  trials  (F3,114 = 1.98,  p = .12,  η2 = .05),  and  no  significant  interaction 
between groups and trials (F6,114 < 1). There was also no significant difference in the looking 
strategies between trials for the connection versus gap areas (F3,114 = 1.25, p = .29,  η2 = .03), 
and no significant interaction between groups and trials (F6,114 = .59, p = .74, η2 = .03). Finally, 
there was also no significant difference in looking strategies for the ends of the connected 
versus non-connected strings with trials (F(3,114) < 1), and no significant interaction between 
groups and trials ((F(6,114) < 1).
These results indicate that there was no difference in visual strategies across trials for the 
connected  string  versus  the  non-connected  strings,  connected versus non-connected  string 
ends, and gap versus connection areas.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to investigate the factors that influence infants' performance 
on the multiple-string task. The spontaneous behaviours of 16- to 20-month-old infants' in the 
task are discussed first, followed by the differences in visual behaviours between performance 
groups.
Infants' performance on the multiple-string task
The results of the “action” part of the study showed that efficient performance of the multiple-
strings  task  does  indeed  develop  in  the  late  second  year  of  life.  Overall,  performance 
improved  with  age.  However,  the  ages  of  infants  were  equally  distributed  between  the 
performance groups (failure, intermediate and success).
A  first  interesting  result  is  the  general  bias  toward  the  third  position  of  the  strings,  
independently of the position of the connected string, but not of the infant’s handedness. Such 
a position bias has already been found in similar multiple-strings tasks by Richardson (1932) 
with young infants aged 6.5 to 12 months, and by Köhler (1925) with adult chimpanzees. In 
our study, this bias progressively decreased from Group 1 to Group 3. Moreover, it increased 
infants'  performance when the connected  string  was at  this  position,  relative to  the  other 
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positions. This was significant only in Group 1, however, athough infants in Group 2 showed 
the same tendency. This result is very similar to what has been found in some tool use studies 
on  infants'  planning  abilities.  Studies  on  the  development  of  spoon-feeding  showed  that 
handedness influenced infants' spoon grasping, but that the ability to use the non-preferred 
hand when it could lead to a more efficient use of the spoon increased until 19 months of age 
(Claxton, McCarty & Keen, 2009; McCarty et al., 1999, 2001). Another tool study, involving 
the use of a rake to retrieve an out-of-reach object, showed the same kind of trade-off between 
hand preference and task asymmetry (Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, 2012b). In this study, 
the authors found that between 16 and 22 months, infants became increasingly able to use 
their non-preferred hand when it made success at the task easier due to the position of the tool 
relative to the object. These results were interpreted in terms of infants' ability to anticipate 
the outcome, as a function of the movement that needed to be performed and the infants'  
handedness. In the present study, it seems that the infants in Group 1 were not able to inhibit 
their motor response with the right hand. The same tendency might explain the results of 
Group 2,  which present  patterns similar  to Group 1.  On the contrary,  the performance of 
Group 3 was similar for the various positions of the connected strings. This requires inhibiting 
their spontaneous motor response toward the string closest to their preferred hand in order to 
pull the string that is connected to the toy. The present results thus suggest that the differences 
between  infants  who  succeed  and  those  who  fail  at  the  multiple-strings  task  are  due  to 
different levels of inhibitory control toward the preferred hand.
Besides these differences in inhibitory control, other factors might influence infants response 
to the multiple strings problem. A way to verify this is to compare infants' visual behaviours 
between the groups when someone else performs the task at some distance from the infants, 
so that they are not motorically involved in the task. If inhibitory control is the only factor, 
then infants should display similar visual patterns, independently of their own performance.
Comparision between vision and action
a. Differences in visual patterns between groups
The  results  from  the  visual  task  showed  differences  in  visual  patterns  between  groups. 
Overall, infants in Group 3 looked more at the connected strings than at the non-connected 
strings, unlike the two lower performance groups. The difference was even greater for the end 
of the connected string compared to the other, non-connected strings. This result was not due 
to a decrease in infants attention toward the scene, as infants in Group 3 looked less at the 
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scene in  proportion to  the total  scene duration than did infants in  the other groups. This 
highlights  the fact  that infants  in  Group 3 correctly  discriminated  which string should be 
pulled in order to retrieve the object, but also that they anticipated where on the string by the 
experimenter  should  pull.  As  mentioned  by  von  Hofsten  (2013)  in  his  review  of  the 
development  of  action  in  infancy,  an  actor's  control  of  actions  is  closely  linked  to  the 
anticipation ofthe outcome, which is “based on knowledge of the rules and regularities that 
govern events” (von Hofsten, 2013, p. 274). This corresponds to the “ideomotor principles”, 
first introduced by James (1890). According to this theory, anticipating actions is essential in 
order to be able to plan and perform goal-directed actions. The ability to anticipate of one's  
own actions  develops  very early in  infancy. Infants as  young as four  month old  perform 
successful  intentional  grasping  behaviours  (von  Hofsten  &  Rönnqvist,  1988),  and 
progressively learn  to  adapt  their  hand  opening according to  object  properties.  Thus,  our 
results suggest that only infants in Group 3, who visually anticipated the action, have a solid 
representation of the action that has to be performed to retrieve the object.
One noteworthy observation is the absence of differences in looking time at the connection 
compared to the spatial gap, independent of performance groups. Moreover, overall looking 
time  in  this  area  was  very  low in  all  groups  (5.77% of  the  looking  time  at  the  scene). 
However, this quantitative result does not mean that infants did not look at the connection 
area at all. This area was very close to the toy (between 0 and 10 cm from the toy), which was 
the area of the scene that all  the infants looked at  the most.  Also,  because of the almost 
horizontal scene that we used, our 3-D design was probably not precise enough to precisely 
distinguish  looking at  these  two areas,  which  were  very  close  together.  It  is  thus  highly 
probable that the infants identified the connection using peripheral vision during the visual 
exploration of the toy area, fact that could not be recorded by the eye-tracker. However, the 
fact  that  we  were  not  able  to  establish  confident  measurement  of  the  infants'  looking 
behaviour toward the connection area per se does not impair the validity of our main results,  
as in any case, only infants in group 3 made sense of the information about the connection. 
We cannot determine whether the infants in the other groups actually looked at the connection 
or not. 
b. Is inhibition sufficient to explain the patterns in the infants' performance?
As discussed above,  the  results  of  the  action  task  suggest  that  there  were  differences  in 
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infants' performance according to their level of inhibitory control toward their preferred hand, 
generally  the  right.  However,  the  comparison  between  vision  and  action  suggests  that 
inhibitory control was not the only factor influencing infants' performance of the task. Indeed, 
in the vision task, where infants were not motorically involved (and thus where inhibitory 
control  should  not  influence  infants'  looking  behaviours),  we found that  the  performance 
groups used different looking strategies. Thus, while the motor inhibitory hypothesis gives 
one factor that may have an impact on infants performance on the string-pulling task, it is not  
sufficient to explain why infants failed to solve the task on the first attempt. The absence of 
anticipatory looking behaviour in Groups 1 and 2 suggest that these infants did not have the 
necessary  representations  of  connectedness  to  solve  the  task,  or  at  least,  that  these 
representations  are  not  strong  enough  to  overcome  other  factors  that  influenced  their 
performance on the task. In our experiment, only infants who effectively solved the task in 
action, also visually anticipated which string another agent who was performing the same 
task should pull.
This result is in line with recent findings from studies using predictive gaze to investigate 
infants' ability to anticipate the outcome of observed actions (e.g., Biro, 2012, Gredebäck & 
Kochukhova,  2010,  Falck-Ytter,  Gredebäck  &  von  Hofsten,  2006).  Gredebäck  and 
Kochukova (2010), for example, found that only toddlers who were manually able to solve a 
puzzle task also visually anticipated the goal when observing similar actions by another agent. 
More generally, our results provide additional experimental evidence for the direct matching 
hypothesis formulated by Rizzolatti and Fadiga (2005) and first demonstrated experimentally 
by  Flanagan  and  Johansson  (2003).  The  direct  matching  hypothesis  postulates  observers 
understand actions on the basis of motor knowledge. In other words, our understanding of 
actions that we observe is based on mapping this action onto motor representations of the 
same  action.  In  their  experiment,  Flanagan  and  Johansson  (2003)  showed that  (1)  when 
subjects observed a block-stacking task, their gaze at the actor's hand was predictive of the 
actor's action, and that (2) this coordination between the gaze and the hand was similar when 
the subjects performed the task themselves. As formulated by Biro (2012), the direct matching 
hypothesis  specifies  that  infants  need  to  be  able  to  perform  the  actions  themselves  to 
anticipate the goals of similar actions by others. Although previous experimental studies with 
infants also support this hypothesis, our study is the first, to our knowledge, to show such an 
effect by comparing an action task with a 3-dimensional, live observational task. In contrast, 
previous studies, such as those of Biro (2012), Gredebäck and Kochukova (2010), and Falck-
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Ytter, Gredebäck and von Hofsten (2006) have compared infants' performance on a given task 
with their predictive looking behaviour at a performance of that task by a videotaped agent.
It is important to stress the fact that the visual differences between groups wer not due to 
differences in the infants' visual abilities. First of all, infants of all ages were present in the  
three groups, making very unlikely that there were systematic differences in the maturation of 
the visual systems of the groups. Moreover,  one-year-old infants already possess a highly 
advanced  visual  system.  They are  able  to  identify  object  properties  very  efficiently  (see 
Atkinson & Braddick, 2013, for a review), track visual moving targets with smooth pursuit in 
an adult-like manner at the middle of their first year of life (von Hofsten & Rosander, 1997), 
even with fast-moving objects (von Hofsten, 2013). Thus, the observed differences in visual 
patterns between groups should not be due to differences in the maturation of the infants' 
visual systems.
c. Effect of repeated trials
Another interesting result, although minor in the present context, is the absence of behavioural 
and visual changes across trials. This means that, on the four action trials, the infants did not  
learn from their success (as all trials lasted until the infants had pulled the correct string and 
retrieved the object). Thus, infants who failed to immediately identify the connected string 
also failed to learn from successive trials which element would help to solve the task. In the 
vision task,  even on seeing several  demonstrations of the successful performance of task, 
infants did not change their attentional behaviours toward the scene.
This result  might again be compared with infants'  behaviours with tools in the same age-
period. Infants younger than two years of age rarely solve a tool task in which the tool is 
spatially  separated  from the  toy  (Rat-Fischer,  O'Regan  &  Fagard,  2012a;  O'Regan,  Rat-
Fischer & Fagard, 2011). Even if they happen to succeed in retrieving the toy at random, 
infants are not able to reproduce this action to succeed at the task on the next trial (O'Regan,  
Rat-Fischer & Fagard, 2011). The absence of attentional change after demonstration might be 
explained in telation to infants' very low rate of observational learning of tool use (between 0 
and 30% of observational learning between 16-20 months: Esseily, Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & 
Fagard, 2013; Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, 2012a). While Esseily et al. (2013) found no 
observational learning of tool use in 16-mont-olds, when the demonstrator's intention was 
shown prior to the demonstration it helped the infants make the link between the tool and the 
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toy. Thus, infants as young as 16 months were able to broaden their focus of attention to 
encompass both the tool and the toy. It seems plausible that adding such information during 
the  demonstration  of  the  string-pulling  task  could  have  a  similar  effect  on  infants' 
performance of the task.
General conclusion
This work aimed to understand what factors influenced infants' problem-solving behaviours 
on the multiple-strings task.  Our results show that the performance of infants differs as a 
function of their level of inhibitory control. Moreover, these results are in line with the direct 
matching  hypothesis  (Rizzolatti  &  Fadiga,  2005),  formulating  that  infants  predictive 
behaviour on an observed actions is only present if infants are able to perform that actions 
themselves.
A striking aspect of study of the string task in general concerns the notion of connectedness. 
Infants are able to solve the string problem as early as  12 months when only one string is 
present,  suggesting  that  they  have  acquired  the  notion  of  spatial  connectedness  between 
objects.  The same concept  has also been reported in studies involving composite objects, 
where infants can act on one part of an object to retrieve another part of this object (e.g., 
Fagard, Florean, et al., in prep; Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, 2012a). However, infants do 
not seem to use information about connectedness between objects to solve the multiple-string 
task.  Our results contribute to the debate on infants' knowledge of concepts and their actual 
use  of  this  knowledge  in  action.  As  Schlottmann  (2011)  pointed  out,  infants'  difficulties 
solving tasks requiring causal understanding have often been attributed to a lack of knowledge 
of the concepts related to the task. Schlottmann defended a different view, arguing instead that 
causal structure can be based on several levels of perception and underlying knowledge, and 
that failure to solve a task can be due to difficulties coordinating the different levels rather 
than lack of knowledge. On to this view, infants' failure to solve the multiple-strings task 
might be due to such difficulties with coordinating the different levels required for the task. 
Thus, even if the notion of connectedness is present earlier in infants' development, they may 
need time and experience to integrate this notion and use it in more complex tasks.
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 1. General introduction
The longitudinal and cross-sectional studies presented in chapter 3 show that infants learn to 
use tools to retrieve an out-of-reach object by observation starting at the age of 18 months. 
One study even reported some observational learning of a tool use action involving using a 
rake to retrieve an object at 15 and 18 months of age (Esseily, Nadel & Fagard, 2010; Fattori,  
Breveglieri, Bosco, Marzocchi, Esseily & Fagard, 2008). However, in our tool use study, the 
success rate was remarkably low (about 30%). This is striking, as we know that infants start to  
learn other means-end actions by observation by the end of the first  year of life (Esseily,  
Nadel & Fagard, 2010; Fagard & Lockman, 2010). One of the difficulties that infants may 
have is perceiving the actions demonstrated as goal directed. Thus, we investigated whether 
adding some cues to the demonstration would help infants understand that the action with the 
tool  is  related  to  the  goal  of  retrieving  the  object,  and  thereby  to  learn  this  action  by 
observation.
 1.1. Effect of additional cues during demonstration
Recent work on infants' observational learning capacities have shown that adding cues to 
demonstrations can help infants reproduce the target action. For example, Sage and Baldwin 
(2011) showed that adding some pedagogical cues prior to demonstration, such as eye contact,  
name referral or gaze shifting, helped infants aged 8-10 months to perform a simple tool 
action involving using a hook to retrieve an out-of-reach object standing within the crook of 
the hook (see also Csibra & Gergely, 2006, for a review of the effect of pedagogical cues in 
observational learning). In the same line, infants aged 24 months were more likely to imitate  
the exact actions required to open a box from a live model than from a videotaped TV model 
(Nielsen, Simcock & Jenkins, 2008). In this study, Nielsen et al. (2008) also showed that even 
with two models seen via video, infants were more likely to imitate the modelled action when 
the TV model provided socially interactive feedback to the infant (with help of a closed-
circuit  TV-system),  than  when the  TV model  was  videotaped  in  advance.  Another  study 
showed that the presence of the model during the test session improves 14-month-old infants' 
capacity to learn a tool-use action (using a magnetic ball to retrieve an object placed inside) 
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by imitation, as compared to a situation where the model is absent (Kiràly, 2009). Moreover, 
imitative learning was even better when the experimenter showed a failed attempt prior to the 
demonstration. This kind of information may facilitate infants' capacity to identify the goal of 
the model. Indeed, Carpenter, Call and Tomasello (2002) showed that two-year-old infants 
were more likely to learn a complex task by observation, such as opening a complex box to 
get  an  object,  when  the  experimenter  provided  information  about  the  goal  prior  to  the 
demonstration. 
From the results of the two last studies, one hypothesis to explain infants' difficulty learning 
tool  use actions by observation might be that infants do not  understand the goal  that the 
models  are  attempting  to  achieve.  However,  to  be  able  to  understand  the  goal  of  a 
demonstrator's action, infants have to be able to identify the intention behind it.
 1.2. Brief review: the emergence of intention attribution in infancy
The  ability  to  identify  the  intention  of  an  agent  emerges  early  in  infancy.  Habituation 
experiments using looking time paradigms have shown that by 3-6 months of age, infants can 
represent  the  relational  structure  of  events.  For  example,  5-month-old  infants  showed  a 
stronger novelty preference when an agent changed goals (i.e., chose a novel toy in the test 
phase,  compared to  the  familiarisation phase),  than when the  agent changed actions  (i.e,. 
chose the same toy, but at the other side of the screen; e.g., Guajardo & Woodward, 2004; 
Biro & Leslie, 2007; see Woodward, Sommerville, Gerson, Henderson & Buresh, 2009, for a 
review).  In action studies,  infants have been shown to identify the agent's  intention by 7 
months of age. For example, infants systematically grasped the same goal-object as an agent 
when the latter acted in an intentional way (grasping an object), whereas they did not grasp 
this goal-object when the agent acted in an ambiguous manner toward it (statically touching 
it;  Hamlin,  Hallina,  & Woodward,  2008).  By  10 months  of  age,  infants  can  extract  and 
reproduce the goal of a novel tool-action (such as grasping an object with a claw) when at the 
same time they are given the opportunity to compare this novel action with a familiar action 
(grasping the object with the hand;  Gerson and Woodward, 2012). By 13 months of age, 
infants are able to infer the agent's intentional attitude (unwilling versus unable to give a toy 
to the infant; Legrain, Destrebecqz & Gevers, 2012). By 14 months of age, infants are able to 
discriminate an intentional action from an accidental action. Carpenter, Akhtar and Tomasello 
(1998) presented infants aged 14 to 18 months with several test  objects that produced an 
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effect by two different means. Figure 1 shows an example of these test objects, in which a  
light  could  be  switched  on  either  by  turning  a  spinner,  or  by  pushing  a  button.  The 
experimenter performed both types of actions, and provided verbal  information about her 
intention to perform this action: “There” in case of an intentional action and “Oops” in case of 
an accidental action. The authors found that all infants imitated almost twice as many of the 
experimenter's intentional actions as they did of her accidental actions.
Fig 1. One of the test objects used to test infants' intentional understanding (pictures adapted 
from Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998).
Finally, by the middle of the second year of life, infants can produce an entire target action by 
observing an agent's failed attempt to attain a goal, thus showing understanding of the agent's 
goal despite failure (Meltzoff, 1995).
 1.3. Aim of the present study
It is clear from this brief overview that infants are able to identify the intention of an agent  
quite early in the development. One possible way to explain infants' failure to learn the tool  
action  by  observation  in  the  studies  presented  in  chapter  3,  is  that  in  these  “classical” 
demonstrations, the demonstrator's intention might not have been very clear. During classical 
demonstrations, the tool action is performed twice without any systematic information about 
the  action  or  the  goal  being  provided.  Thus,  in  such  demonstrations,  infants  may  have 
encountered some difficulties understanding the demonstrators' goal in using the tool, making 
them less likely to learn this action by observation. In the present study, we investigate this 
issue  by  comparing  several  groups  of  16-month-old  infants  presented  with  either  (1)  no 
demonstration,  (2)  classical  demonstrations,  (3)  demonstrations  preceded  by  an  explicit 
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demonstration of the experimenter's intention, or (4) two additional conditions to control for 
stimulus enhancement and motor resonance (Esseily, Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, 2013, 
Cognitive Development).
 1.4. Contributions to the study
This  study was  designed  by all  authors  of  the  paper.  All  the  subjects  were  tested  at  the 
Laboratoire  Psychologie  de  la  Perception,  by  R.  Esseily  and  L.  Rat-Fischer.  Both 
experimenters also coded and interpreted the data. Statistical analyses were conducted by R. 
Esseily and V. Huet. The paper was written by R. Esseily, who also presented the results at  
two international conferences (ICIS, Minneapolis, 2012; Dagstuhl Seminar 13072, Dagstuhl, 
2013).
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Abstract 
In the middle of the second year of life,  infants become highly capable  of using observational 
learning to  learn  new means-end actions.  Examples  are  opening a  box to  retrieve  a  toy  using 
bimanual coordination or turning a bottle upside down to retrieve a toy inside. However, when the 
means-end action involved is tool use, studies show that infants do not learn by observation before 
18 to 24 months of age. The aim of this study was to investigate why 16-month-old infants fail to  
use  observational  learning  to  learn  a  tool-use  action.  Our  hypothesis  was  that  16-month-olds’ 
difficulties in reproducing tool-use action may result from the fact that they do not understand the 
goal of the observed action. To test this hypothesis, we investigated whether showing infants an 
explicit  demonstration  of  the  goal  of  the  action  before  demonstrating  the  target  action  would 
improve observational learning as compared with a demonstration of the action only. We tested 65 
16-month-old infants on a tool-use action consisting in grasping a rake-like tool to retrieve an out-
of-reach  toy.  Infants  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  five  groups:  spontaneous  group 
(spontaneous  manipulation  of  the  tool),  classic  demonstration  group  (observation  of  a  model 
performing the demonstration of the target action), prior intention group (observation of a model 
showing her goal of retrieving the toy before showing the demonstration of the target action), and 
two additional groups to control for local and stimulus enhancement. The results show that only 
infants in the prior intention group significantly improved their performance after observing the 
demonstration. 
Keywords: Understanding intentions, observational learning, tool use, infants 
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Introduction
Many studies have  demonstrated infants'  capacity  to imitate  simple object-directed 
actions as early as 6 months (see Elsner, 2007; Elsner, Hauf, & Aschersleben, 2007; Poulson, 
Nunes, & Warren, 1989 for reviews). Generally, however, the simple actions involved in these 
studies were actions that are already in the infant's motor repertoire. 
On the other hand, few studies have investigated situations where infants are required 
to use observational learning to learn an action which is not already in their repertoire. Most  
of these observational learning studies involve means-end actions.  They show that infants 
become very good at observational learning of novel actions in their second year of life.
For  instance,  at  12  months,  infants  can  learn  by  observation  how  to  bimanually 
manipulate a rolling drum to produce music (Fagard & Lockman, 2010). Another study shows 
that  at  15 months,  infants can learn by observation how to turn a  bottle  upside down to 
retrieve a small peg inserted in it (Esseily, Nadel, & Fagard, 2010). Elsner and Aschersleben 
(2003) also showed that at 15 months, infants can learn a complex means-end action relating a  
specific means (pushing on a button) to a specific outcome (producing music). 
An interesting case, however, is presented when the means-end actions involve tool use. Here, 
it seems that infants are only able to learn by observation after about 18 months. For example 
this was observed in both a longitudinal and a cross-sectional study where infants needed to 
use a rake to bring in a desired toy (O’Regan, Rat-Fischer,  & Fagard, 2011; Rat-Fischer, 
O’Regan, & Fagard, in press). Another study (Chen & Siegler, 2000) showed that even well 
after 18 months, infants may still not be able to learn how to use a tool after observation. 
Indeed between 18 and 35 months, some infants used the tool appropriately to retrieve a toy, 
but others still used indirect strategies after observation such as reaching with their hands, 
asking for their mother’s help and simply staring at the toy without trying to reach for it. 
Melzoff (2007) has also shown that there is a steep improvement between the  16-18 month 
period and the 20-22 month period in ability to use observation to learn how to retrieve distant 
objects with a tool. 
What is special about tool use that makes it so much harder to learn by observation as 
compared to other types of observational learning? When infants observe an experimenter 
performing a means end action, acting on one object using another one, they must construe an 
online representation of what relates the objects together. In the case of tool use, both objects 
(the tool and the toy) seem to be independent and spatially separated, which probably makes 
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the task of relating the observed means (using the rake) to the goal difficult for the infants 
(Bates, Carlson-Luden & Bretherton, 1980; Rat-Fischer, O’Regan & Fagard, in press; van 
Leeuwen, Smitsman & van Leeuwen, 1994). Few studies have taken into account the problem 
of understanding the goal when observing an experimenter using a tool. In this article, our 
hypothesis will be that younger infants did not understand that the experimenter’s goal was to 
retrieve the toy when using the tool. If infants do not understand the goal, it makes sense that 
they might not be able to relate the action they have observed to that goal and thus that they 
should not be able reproduce it. 
At first this hypothesis might seem surprising, since the ability to understand goals has 
been shown to arise very early in infants. 
In  particular,  evidence  from  violation-of-expectation  studies,  using  looking  time 
measures, suggests that from 6 months on, infants perceive actions in terms of the intended 
goal of the agent (Csibra, 2008; Kamewari, Masaharu, Takayuki, Hiroshi, & Kazuo, 2005; 
Southgate, Johnson, & Csibra, 2008; Woodward, 1998; Woodward, 1999). For instance, in 
Csibra’s study, infants  are  familiarized with a  box moving by itself  from a location A to 
another location B. Infants thus attribute the goal  of reaching location B to the box. The 
infants then see the box move with either an obstacle present in its path or not. Infants are 
surprised if the box makes a detour to reach location B when no obstacle is present.  The 
authors conclude that infants perceive actions in terms of their goals. 
Imitation  studies  have  also  provided  evidence  that  infants  possess  the  ability  to 
interpret  an  action  as  goal-directed  (e.g.  Carpenter,  Call,  &  Tomasello,  2005;  Gergely, 
Bekkering, & Kiràly, 2002). Using a failed-attempt condition, Meltzoff (1995) showed 18-
month-old infants an experimenter who was trying but failing to separate a dumbbell-shaped 
object into two halves. These infants performed the experimenter’s intended target action as 
often as those who saw a full demonstration of the target action. Bellagamba and Tomasello 
(1999) replicated these results with 12-month-old infants. Another imitation study showed 
that  infants  are  able  to  differentiate  between  intended  actions  and  accidental  actions 
(Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998). In this study, infants saw an experimenter performing 
two actions that can lead to the same goal. While performing the actions, the experimenter 
says either “There” to show that her action was intentional or “Oops” to show that her action 
was accidental. The infants reproduced twice as many intentional actions as accidental ones. 
All these studies do show that infants much younger than 18 months can understand 
that an agent performing an action intends thereby to achieve a goal. But it is important to 
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note that in some situations, when the task involved is complex, some studies show that it 
becomes  necessary  for  the  experimenter  to  explicitly  indicate  his  or  her  goal  before 
performing the demonstration in order for the infant to be able to benefit from it. Thus, for 
example, Carpenter et al. (2002) showed two-year-old infants an experimenter performing a 
target action in order to open the door of a box. Before the demonstration, the experimenter 
either provided information about her intention to open the box, or gave no information at all, 
or gave other information irrelevant to the goal of the action. The infants opened the door of 
the box more often in the condition where they received information about the intention of the 
experimenter  before  seeing  the  demonstration.  Another  similar  experiment  (Southgate, 
Chevallier, & Csibra, 2009) showed that when information about the goal of the action is 
provided before demonstration, infants no longer imitate the means used by the experimenter, 
but use their own means to attain the same goal, thus imitating the goal but not the action 
itself.  
We see therefore that whereas very young infants are able to understand goals, in the 
case of complex tasks they may fail to do so. Tool use would appear to be a complex task for 
two reasons: (1) it is a means-end action that infants only begin to perform spontaneously and 
successfully at the end of the second year of life (Keen, 2011), which is relatively late in  
comparison to other means-end actions, for which success occurs around 12 months (Brown, 
1990; Esseily, Nadel, & Fagard, 2010; Willatts, 1999) and (2) because the means and the end 
are spatially separated. Infants have to simultaneously pay attention to both tool and object, 
and to relate them to each other, whereas in other means-end actions, the two objects involved 
are generally spatially connected, as in pulling a string to turn on a light or to produce music. 
In  conclusion,  these  observations  make  our  initial  hypothesis  about  tool  use 
conceivable: one of the reasons infants do not learn tool use by observation before 18 months 
of  age  may  be  that,  tool  use  being  a  complex  task,  they  are  unable  to  understand  the 
demonstrator's goal.
In the present paper, we study the effect of providing intention cues to infants before 
providing them with a demonstration of a tool-use action. We hypothesized that when such 
intention  cues  are  provided  infants  will  be  able  to  improve  their  performance  through 
observation of the demonstration. However, because of the difficulty of the task, we do not  
expect infants to succeed at  retrieving the toy using the rake in a perfect manner.  We do 
however  expect  infants  to  at  least  show  some  understanding  of  tool  use  by  making  a 
connection between the tool and the toy.
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We presented  16-month-old  infants  with  a  tool-use  task  that  we knew they could 
successfully accomplish without demonstration around the end of the second year, and at 18 
months with demonstration (O’Regan, Rat-Fischer, & Fagard, 2011; Rat-Fischer, O’Regan & 
Fagard, in press). The task consisted in using a rake-like object to retrieve an out-of-reach toy. 
There were five groups of infants: A spontaneous group, a classic demonstration group, a 
prior intention group and two other groups controlling for stimulus and local enhancement. 
Our  hypothesis  was  that  infants  would  produce  the  target  action  or  at  least  show 
comprehension of the connection between the tool and the toy only in the prior intention 
group, and that infants’ performance would be similar across the other four groups.
2. Method 
2.1.Participants 
Seventy infants (mean age = 16 months, 7 days; range = 16 months to 16 months, 14 
days; 34 girls) participated in this study. Six additional infants (three females and three males) 
were dropped from the study because of technical problems (N = 3) or infants’ fussiness (N = 
3).  The  infants  were  recruited  from  a  list  of  local  families  who  expressed  interest  in 
participating in studies of infant development. Parental consent was granted before observing 
the infants. 
2.2. Materials 
Materials included a toy and a tool. The toy consisted of a small yellow car 3 cm long, 
2  cm  high  and  2  cm  wide.  The  car  could  be  easily  rolled  along  the  table,  so  that  the 
experimenter could roll it away from her and then retrieve it with the tool. If the infants did 
not want to play with the car, we replaced it with another attractive toy of the same size that  
could easily move on the table. The tool was specially constructed for this experiment and 
consisted of a rake-like T-shaped object made of white cardboard. The handle was 20 cm long 
and the head 20 cm wide. The rake was visually quite plain, so that it  would not distract 
infants from trying to retrieve the car. 
2.3. Procedure
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Testing took place in the university babylab. Infants were seated on the parent’s lap in 
front  of a table.  Parents were asked to remain  quiet  during the whole experiment  and to 
maintain  the  infant  on  their  lap.  Once  infants  were  judged  to  be  accustomed  to  their 
surroundings,  testing began.  All  sessions  were  videotaped.  The general  procedure  was as 
follows (see Table 1 for a summary): 
Phase 1 (familiarization) was the same for all conditions:
Experimenter 1 (E1) gave the car to the infant for 30 seconds, during which period the 
infant was free to manipulate it. The experimenter then took the car back and gave the infant 
the rake for  30 seconds of manipulation.  This prior  familiarization with the experimental 
materials was necessary so that the novelty of the objects would not lead infants to focus only 
on one or the other of the objects instead of connecting them together.
Phase 2 (demonstration) differed between conditions.
In the spontaneous condition, infants did not have phase 2, they were tested directly in 
phase 3 (see description of phase 3 below). 
In the  classic demonstration  condition,  E1 gave the toy to experimenter 2 (E2) and 
placed the rake near E2’s hand, with the handle oriented toward E2. E2 played with the toy for 
a few seconds and then rolled it along the table in front of her until it was out of her reach. E2 
took the rake with her right hand and used it to bring the toy closer. She then reached with her 
left hand for the toy, grasped it, and gave it to E1. The demonstration was repeated twice. 
After the second demonstration, E2 gave the toy to E1 for the test to start (see details in phase 
3). Thus, in this condition, the infant saw the full demonstration of how to retrieve the toy 
using the tool, but not the experimenter’s intention prior to the demonstration. 
In the prior intention condition, E1 gave the toy to E2 and placed the rake near E2’s 
hand, with the handle oriented toward E2. E2 played with the toy for a few seconds and then 
rolled it along the table in front of her until it was out of her reach. E2 then stretched her arm 
and hand out toward the toy, obviously trying to grasp it, and said “I can't get it” (”Je n’y 
arrive pas”). E2 then used the tool to retrieve the toy. The whole sequence was repeated twice. 
After the second demonstration,  E2 gave the toy to E1 for the test  to start.  Thus, in this 
condition,  before performing the demonstration,  the  experimenter  explicitly  expressed her 
intention to retrieve the toy.
In the  hand enhancement  condition,  E1 gave the toy to E2 and placed the rake near 
E2’s hand, with the handle oriented toward E2. E2 played with the toy for a few seconds, put 
it on the table near her and then stretched out her hand toward the location (now empty) where 
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normally the toy was located during the demonstration, as if reaching for something, and said 
“I can't get it” (“je n’y arrive pas”). E2 then grasped the toy, rolled it away from her, and used 
the  tool  to  retrieve  it  as  in  the  other  demonstration conditions.  The whole  sequence  was 
repeated twice. After the second demonstration, E2 gave the toy to E1 for the test to start. This  
condition was used to control for the possibility that in case of infant’s success in the prior 
intention condition, the success might have simply been due to attention being attracted by the 
movement of the hand itself  (twice as frequent  in this condition compared with the prior 
intention condition). Indeed, a recent study (Paulus, Hinnius, Vissers,  & Bekkering, 2011) 
suggested that infants’ imitation is driven not by elaborate reasoning but by simple motor 
matching or “motor resonance”. 
In the stimulus enhancement condition, E1 gave the toy to E2 and placed the rake near 
E2’s hand, with the handle oriented toward E2. E2 played with the toy for a few seconds and 
then rolled it away from herself on the table until it was out of her reach. E1 then made the car  
move by itself (on its own) for few seconds by manipulating a magnet under the table out of 
sight  of  the  infant.  E2  then  performed  the  demonstration  as  in  the  other  demonstration 
conditions. The whole sequence was repeated twice. After the second demonstration, E2 gave 
the toy to E1 for the test to start. This condition was used to control for the possibility that in  
case of infants’ success in the prior intention condition, the success was due simply to their 
attention being attracted to the toy rather than to understanding of the experimenter’s intention  
prior to the demonstrated action. 
Infants were randomly assigned to one of the five groups. 
Phase 3 (test) was the same for all conditions: 
E1 placed the toy in front and out of reach of the infant, at a distance of approximately 
70 cm from the infant. E1 then placed the rake near the infant’s hand. Thus, from the infant’s 
point of view, the toy was behind the rake. E1 said “Look at the yellow car, do you want to 
play  with  it?  How can you get  it?”  (“regarde  la  voiture  la  jaune,  veux  tu  jouer  avec  la 
voiture?”) The test lasted until the infants retrieved the car. If the infant failed to retrieve the 
toy, the test ended 60 seconds after a period starting when the infant first touched the rake or 
stretched his or her hand out toward the toy. If, within this test period, the infant became 
discouraged after having tried to retrieve the toy and failed, E1 encouraged the infant once by 
touching the car and saying “Go ahead, how can you get that car?” (“vas y, comment peux tu 
faire?”). If the infant threw the rake away, E1 would place the rake near the infant a second 
and final time and another 60-second test  period was recorded.  If  the infant successfully 
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retrieved the toy using the rake, the same toy was placed again in the same location for a new 
trial to make sure that the success was repeated, which was the case for all the infants who 
succeeded at retrieving the toy. Parents were asked to restrain their infants whenever they 
tried to crawl onto the table to get the toy. 
E1 was seated in front of the infant on the opposite side of the table, whereas E2 was 
seated to the right of the infant and to the left of E1. E1 always looked at E2 during the 
demonstration to encourage the infant to do the same.
Insert table 1 about here
Analysis
 
For each test, infants’ success at retrieving the toy was coded. Because full success 
was rare, a score from 0 to 4 was attributed for each action according to whether the infant did  
or did not manipulate the objects, did or did not manipulate only the toy or only the rake; 
whether they made a connection between the toy and the rake without necessarily retrieving 
the toy; and whether they ultimately retrieved the toy using the rake (see below). The score 
was determined as follows: 
Score = 0 : No try
Grasped tool, got rid of it, lost interest (tool grasped here without being the focus of  
attention); Looked at toy, looked at tool, looked at adult, did not do anything; Refused to play.
Score = 1: Interested mainly in toy or tool, did not use tool in connection with toy
Pointed to toy and refused or ignored tool; Pointed to toy, then grasped tool (either 
spontaneously or encouraged by the experimenter), pointed again toward toy with other hand; 
Grasped tool, got rid of it  (threw it  away, placed it  on the table), and pointed to the toy; 
Pointed to toy, then grasped tool and played with it (put into mouth or rubbed, swiped, hit on 
table); Grasped tool, interested in tool only (put into mouth or rubbed, swiped, hit on table); 
Grasped tool, swiped table with it and swept toy away by accident; Grasped tool, played with 
it and then rejected it, possibly interested in toy again.
Score = 2: Interested in tool in connection with toy 
Pointed to toy, then grasped tool (spontaneously or encouraged by the experimenter) 
and touched or pushed toy with it; Grasped tool directly, touched or pushed toy with tool.
Score = 3: Interested in tool for retrieval: trial and error, difficult or partial success
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Grasped tool, moved tool, tried to bring back toy, failure;  Grasped tool after being 
encouraged (after pointing first to toy or not), moved tool and retrieved toy with it; Grasped 
tool (after first pointing to toy or not), awkward movements to bring toy to hand, success; 
Grasped tool (after pointing first to toy or not), retrieved toy after several attempts.
Score = 4: Interested in tool for retrieval: Intentional mature success 
Grasped tool directly, moved tool behind the toy to retrieve it, success. 
For these scores, we analysed during the 60-second test period (1) the score of the first 
action, (2) the score of the highest action and (3) the mean score of all the actions (the mean 
number of actions per infant was 2.9 (SD = 1.5)).
Given  the  relatively  small  number  of  infants  within  each  group  (n=14),  we  then 
categorized these scores into two categories to look at the distribution of the scores. The first 
category included scores 0 and 1 (no connection between the tool and the toy). The second 
category included scores 2,  3 and 4 (connection between the tool and the toy).  For these 
categories,  we analysed during the 60-second test  period (1)  the  distribution  for  the first 
action, and (2) the distribution for the highest action.
 In  addition,  in  order  to  help  visualize  what  the  infants  actually  did,  we  coded 
alternative strategies infants used in addition to using the tool or instead of using the tool. One 
alternative strategy infants often used was pointing. Pointing was designated each time the 
infant stretched its hand toward the toy either with its index finger or with its whole hand 
opened. During the 60-second test period, two measures were analysed: (1) the total number 
of infants who pointed at least once in each condition and (2) the mean number of pointings 
per infant for each condition (some infants pointed more than once). Other behaviours were 
coded but not included in the analyses because not frequently observed, such as when infants 
asked their parents for help (observed in 4 out of 70 infants) or when they tried to climb onto 
the table (2 instances). 
We calculated the effect-size statistics for the F tests using Cohen’s d.
The infants’ behaviors were coded from the videotapes. Videos of 25 infants (35%) 
were coded independently by a second observer to assess inter-observer reliability. Reliability 
between the two observers was found to be 100%. 
3. Results 
Mean Scores  
Figure 1 presents the score of the first action, the highest scored action and the mean 
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score of all actions as a function of experimental condition. An ANOVA with condition as 
independent variable conducted separately on the score of the first action, the highest scored 
action and the mean score of all actions produced within the 60-second test period showed a 
significant effect of condition on all measures: for the score of the first action F (4, 63) = 
12.24; p < .0001, the score of the highest scored action F (4, 63) = 4.9; p < .01 and the mean 
score of all  actions F (4,  63) = 3.3;  p < .0001. A post-hoc LSD test  showed that  for all 
measures, there was no significant difference between the spontaneous condition, the classic 
demonstration condition and the two control conditions (hand and stimulus). The effect was 
due  to  the  difference  between the  prior  intention group and all  of  the  other  groups.  The 
Cohen’s d indicates that the effect is large for the first action (0.77), the highest scored action 
(0.75)  and  the  mean  action  (0.68).  Infants  used  the  rake  in  connection  with  the  toy 
significantly more often in the prior intention condition than in all three other conditions. 
We then compared the score of the first action and the mean score of all actions and 
the score of the first action and the score of the highest scored action in each condition, to 
check whether infants’ actions (scores) improved over the session. A t-test conducted for each 
condition, separately comparing the score of the first action and the mean score showed no 
significant  difference  for  any  of  the  conditions.  A t-test  conducted  for  each  condition 
separately comparing the score of the first action and the score of the highest scored action 
shows a significant effect only in the stimulus enhancement condition (t (13) = -2.5; p < .05). 
Thus, only infants in the stimulus enhancement condition improved their performance over 
the session. 
Insert figure 1 about here
Distribution of scores 
Table 2 presents the distribution of the first and highest scored actions for each of the 
two scoring categories for each condition. For the first action the prior intention group is the 
only one where there are many more infants who obtained scores in category 2 than scores in 
category 1. In all the other groups, more infants obtained scores in category 1 than in category 
2. A chi-square test was performed to contrast how many infants had scores of 2, 3 and 4 
versus scores of 0 and 1 (category 1 versus category 2) by condition. The contrast of these 
categories was significant only for the prior intention group, 2 (4, N = 70) = 34.8, p < .001. 
For the highest scored action, the prior intention group is again the only one where 
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there are many more infants who obtained scores in category 2 than scores in category 1. 
However, in the stimulus enhancement group, infants were equally distributed between both 
categories and in all other groups, infants mostly obtained scores in category 1. A chi-square 
test was performed to contrast how many infants had scores of 2, 3 and 4 versus scores of 0 
and 1 (category 1 versus category 2) by condition. The contrast was significant for the prior 
intention group  2  (4,  N = 70) = 23.8,  p < .001 and marginally significant for the stimulus 
enhancement group 2 (3, N = 56) = 9.01, p = .05.
Thus,  the  results  show  that  only  infants  in  the  prior  intention  group  obtained 
significantly more scores in category 2 than in category 1 showing some understanding of tool  
use  whereas  all  other  groups  obtained  the  reverse  (except  for  the  stimulus  enhancement 
condition  in  the  highest  scored action  where  the scores  were equally  distributed  between 
categories).   
Insert table 2 about here
Qualitative analysis 
Table 3 presents the total number of infants who pointed in each condition as well as 
the mean number of pointings per infant in each condition. Regarding the total number of 
infants  who pointed,  one  can see  that  there  were  fewer  infants  who pointed  in  the  prior 
intention condition  compared to  all  other  conditions.  A chi-square  test  on the  number  of 
infants  who  pointed  at  least  once  was  performed  to  examine  the  differences  between 
conditions. The test shows a significant difference between conditions only when the prior 
intention condition is included in the analysis 2  (4, N = 70) = 18.1, p < .01. The chi-square 
test is no longer significant if the prior intention group is excluded and any other group is 
included. 
Regarding the mean number of pointings per infant, in the prior intention group the mean 
number  of  pointings  per  infant  is  the  lowest  compared  to  all  other  groups.  An ANOVA 
conducted on the mean number of pointings with Condition as independent variable showed a 
significant effect on condition F (4, 65) = 4.6; p < .01. A post-hoc LSD test showed that for 
both measures, there was no significant difference between the spontaneous condition, the 
classic demonstration condition and the two enhancement conditions (hand and stimulus). The 
significance was due to the difference between the prior intention condition and all of the 
other conditions. The Cohen’s  d  (0.9) indicates that the effect is large. Thus, not only did 
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fewer  infants  point  in  the  prior  intention  condition  but  also  those  who  pointed  did  so 
significantly less than infants in other conditions.
Insert table 3 about here
4. Discussion
In  this  study,  we  investigated  whether  understanding  the  experimenter’s  intention 
enables 16-month-olds to use observation to learn a tool-use task which infants are known to 
succeed at spontaneously around the end of the second year of life. Infants were assigned 
either  to  a  spontaneous  condition  (no  demonstration)  or  to  one  of  four  demonstration 
conditions. The infants in all of the demonstration conditions saw an adult demonstrating how 
to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach toy. What differed across conditions was what infants 
saw before  the  demonstration.  The  results  showed  that  infants  who  were  presented  with 
information about the adult’s intention before the demonstration made a connection between 
the tool and the toy significantly more frequently than those who were not presented with 
such information.  Infants  did  equally  poorly  in  all  demonstration conditions  in  which  no 
information  was  provided  about  the  adult’s  intentions  (whether  either  they  received  no 
information before the demonstration or saw an action that was uninformative with regard to 
the adult's goal), thus ruling out a possible alternative explanation of the results based on 
differences in attention. It is important to note that even though infants in the groups with no 
information about the adult’s intentions saw a full demonstration of the target action, they 
were as unsuccessful as infants who saw no demonstration at all in the spontaneous group. In 
addition, infants who made the connection between the tool and the toy in the prior intention 
group did so as their first action directly after observation: there was no significant difference 
between  infants’ first  action  and  their  behavior  across  the  60-second  test  period.  More 
generally, apart from a few infants in one condition (stimulus enhancement), most infants did 
not improve their performance over the session and the first action reflected well their overall 
performance. 
It is worth noting that even when the infants were provided with information about 
intentions before demonstration, learning was not perfect. Only two infants from the intention 
group successfully retrieved the toy by using the rake almost  immediately and thus were 
attributed the highest score. The other infants of the intention group used the tool to push the 
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toy away from them, swiped the tool laterally on the table to make the toy fall off the side of 
the table, or banged on the toy with the rake. It may be that infants were exploring other 
aspects of the connection between the tool and the rake. 
Another hypothesis why learning was not perfect is that infants may understand the 
experimenter’s  intention  but  less  well  how  to  use  the  tool.  Tool  use  is  a  complex  task 
requiring several steps: infants have to put the tool behind the toy and then simultaneously 
apply two forces to the tool, one vertical toward the table and the other horizontal toward 
themselves.  When  faced  with  this  complex  problem,  infants  might  simply  decide  to  do 
something with the rake that is more commensurate with their motor capacities, e.g. swiping 
or banging. 
Even though  full  success  was  observed  in  only  two  infants  in  the  prior  intention 
condition, it was never observed in the other groups. In addition, connections between the 
rake and the toy were almost exclusively observed in the prior intention condition and not in 
the  other  conditions.  Thus,  we  may  conclude  that  understanding  prior  intention  enabled 
infants to increase their performance significantly, showing at least some understanding of 
new tool affordances at 16 months of age. These results do not imply that this is the only case 
in which infants show understanding of a tool’s affordances. There are a few examples in the 
literature showing that infants younger than 16 months can understand tool affordances but 
these examples mainly concern familiar tools such as the spoon (Connolly & Dalgeish, 1989; 
McCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 2001). However spoon use and rake use differ for at least two 
reasons. First they differ regarding their novelty: infants have observed others using a spoon 
before using it  themselves,  whereas infants probably never saw a rake before the testing. 
Second, spoon use can be considered as self-directed actions whereas in this experiment the 
tool has first to be directed away from the self. Self-directed actions have been shown to be 
easier to plan and execute compared to other-directed actions (McCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 
2001;  Claxton,  McCarthy,  &  Keen,  2009).  Thus,  for  both  these  reasons,  infants  may 
understand the spoon affordances much earlier than those of a novel tool such as the rake used  
in our study. 
Thus,  it  appears  that  16-month-old  infants  can  benefit  from  being  shown  the 
demonstrator’s  intention  prior  to  the  demonstration  to  improve  their  performance  when 
learning how to use a novel tool to retrieve an object. These results are in accordance with 
another study showing that even 14-month-old infants were more likely to imitate a novel 
tool-use action (using a magnetic ball to retrieve a small box placed inside a bigger box), 
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when they were shown a failed attempt prior to the demonstration of the target action, thus 
revealing the adult’s intention (Kiràly, 2009).
Why  do  16-month-old  infants  need  explicit  demonstration  of  intention  before  the 
demonstration of the target action whereas 18-month-olds do not? Indeed, existing data (Chen 
& Siegler,  2000;  O’Regan  et  al.,  2011;  Rat-Fischer  et  al.,  in  press)  as  well  as  ongoing 
experiments  in  our  laboratory  show  that  some  18-month-old  infants  are  able  to  use 
observation  to  learn  a  novel  tool  use  without  an  explicit  demonstration  of  intention.  18-
month-olds might be capable of picking up the main goal of the experimenter while observing 
the adult’s actions without considering each of the different steps leading to the goal. Thus, it 
seems that 16 to 18 months constitute a critical period for tool use understanding.
One idea of what might be happening at 16 months is suggested by the theory of goal-
directed  imitation  (GOADI)  (Bekkering,  Wohlschlager,  &  Gattis,  2000).  Infants  might 
represent each of the action steps leading to the main goal as a goal itself. Given that tool use 
involves  multiple  steps,  the  representation  of  the  main  goal  might  be  difficult  to  extract 
without a hint. Showing the experimenter’s intention beforehand may help the infants orient 
their attention to the main goal of the task. We thus postulate that what might be developing at 
18 months is  the ability to  extract  the main goal  online when observing an experimenter 
performing the action even when the means involves multiple step actions.
An alternative explanation of the difference in performance between the prior intention  
condition and the other conditions could be that in the prior intention condition, the adult 
shows the infants a failed attempt by stretching her arm toward the toy and not being able to 
retrieve it. Thus the fact that the adult’s action looked like the mistake most of the infants 
made in the spontaneous condition may have helped the infants learn what they should not do 
rather than what they should do. This alternative explanation can also account for the lower 
frequency of pointing behaviour in the prior intention group. Indeed, the qualitative analysis 
showing that  infants  in  the  prior  intention  group use  fewer  alternative  strategies  such as 
pointing toward the toy may suggest that  because infants  in  the prior  intention condition 
observed the experimenter reach for the toy without success, they avoided using the pointing 
strategy themselves and thus paid more attention to other more efficient strategies such as 
using the rake.  This possibility  might also apply to other studies using failed attempts to 
reveal the intention behind the use of a novel tool (Kiràly, 2009). 
In  conclusion,  this  is  the  first  study  to  show that  16-month-olds  only  learn  from 
demonstration  of  a  complex  tool-use  task  when  the  intention  of  the  experimenter  is 
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emphasized. This raises the question of whether studies investigating observational learning 
of tool use might be underestimating infants’ true capacities. 
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Table 1
 Summary of the five experimental conditions. 
Spontaneous Classic 
Demonstration
Prior Intention Hand 
Enhancement
Stimulus 
Enhancement 
Phase 
1
Familiarization
Phase 
2 
 
Demonstration of 
the target action 
(x2)
Experimenter 
stretches her 
hand toward the 
toy. 
Demonstration 
of target action 
(x2)
Experimenter 
stretches her 
hand in front 
of her with no 
toy present. 
Demonstration 
of target action 
(x2)
Toy moves on its 
own 
Demonstration of 
target action (x2)
Phase 
3
60-second test period
Table 2
Distribution of the first and highest scored action for each of the two scoring categories as a 
function of condition (in red, significant differences). 
First action Highest action
Category 1 Category 2 Category 1 Category 2 
Spontaneous 14 0 14 0
Classic Demonstration 13 1 10 4
Prior Intention 2 12 2 12
Hand Enhancement 12 2 11 3
Stimulus Enhance-
ment 11 3 7 7
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Table 3
Total number of infants who pointed and mean number of pointing per infant as a function of 
condition (in red, significant differences).  
N Mean (SD)
Spontaneous (N = 14) 13 1.4 (0.1)
Classic Demonstration (N = 14) 13 1.3 (0.1)
Prior Intention (N = 14) 5 0.4 (0.1)
Hand Enhancement (N = 14) 12 1.1 (0.1)
Stimulus Enhancement (N = 14) 11 0.9 (0.1)
Captions: 
Figure 1. The score of the first action, highest action and the mean score of all actions as a  
function of condition. The maximum score each infant can have is 4.
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Despite  growing  interest  in  the  development  of  tool  use,  very  few  studies  have 
investigated how this ability is acquired in infancy. The aim of the work presented in this 
thesis was to study the cognitive, perceptual and motor bases of the acquisition of tool use in 
infants. To this end, we studied infants' spontaneous use of a tool during the second year of 
life.  Our task was the use of a rake-like tool to retrieve an out-of-reach attractive object.  
Given the importance of social learning during the second year of life, we also explored the 
development of the learning of tool use by observation. Finally, we investigated the extent to 
which perceptual factors influence infants' performance in means-end tasks such as the tool 
and the multiple-string tasks.
In Chapter 1, I defined what was meant by tool use behaviours, based on the existing 
literature on tool use in human and non human animals. In Chapter 2, I briefly reviewed the 
literature on the early development of infants' manual interactions with objects, and described 
the experimental literature on tool use activities in infants, such as self-feeding with spoons 
and object retrieval with rigid straight tools (such as sticks, rakes and hooks).
In the experimental part, I presented three main studies. The aim of the first study was 
to  investigate infants'  tool use behaviours at  different ages during the second year of life 
(Chapter  3).  We  designed  the  tool  task  used  in  this  study  on  the  basis  of  a  precursor 
longitudinal study, using five conditions differing by the spatial relationship between the tool 
and the toy. In addition, we investigated whether infants who failed in some conditions would 
succeed after demonstration. We analysed infants' planning abilities on the basis of the hand 
they chose to grasp the rake given the respective positions of the rake and toy. On the basis of 
the results of this first study, we further investigated several issues that we hypothesized could 
have an impact on the development of tool use, such as the perceptual and social aspects of 
tool use learning, as described below.
The second study we conducted was driven by a noteworthy observation from the first 
cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, namely the facility with which young infants solved 
the task when the object was attached to the tool (Chapter 4). Our explanation for this finding 
was that infants have acquired the notion of composite object before the end of the first year 
of life.  A preliminary experiment conducted in our lab showed that 8-month-old infants can 
use the notion of connectedness to indirectly act on an out-of-reach part of a composite object 
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by directly acting on its reachable part. Starting at 8 months of age, infants looked at the out-
of-reach part of a composite object before and while grasping the handle part of the object. In 
addition, they often looked surprised when the object did not come along with the handle. 
Other  studies  from the  literature  have  shown that  around 12 months  of  age,  infants  can 
retrieve an out-of-reach object by pulling on the reachable part of a string connected to the 
object. However, we were surprised to observe that when presented with a choice of strings, 
only one which is connected to the object, infants did not use the notion of connectedness to 
choose the correct string, but instead pulled strings at random. Because spatial configuration 
influences infants'  performance in the tool tasks,  we sought to explore this issue with the 
string  task.  Thus,  in  the  second  experimental  study  conducted  during  this  thesis,  we 
investigated why most infants did not use connectedness information to solve a multiple-
string task at 16, 18 and 20 months of age.
The third study presented in this manuscript concerns infants' capacity to learn a tool 
use action by observation (Chapter 5). Infants are known to learn new actions by observation 
starting the end of the first year of life. We thus wondered why infants fail to learn to use a  
tool by observation before the age of 18 months and later. Chapter 5 presents a study on 
infants'  observational  learning at  16 months  of  age,  and particularly  the  effect  of  adding 
information about the demonstrator's intention before the demonstration on learning.
One of the most important results from the systematic examination of infants' use of a 
rake-like tool to retrieve an out-of-reach toy was their difficulty using the tool when the toy 
was not attached to it until late in the second year of life. Young infants were actually able to 
use the tool in a situation where the toy was not attached to the tool, but only when the object 
stood in the trajectory of the rake (conditions C2 and C3, Chapter 3). However, we argue that 
such early successes were not based on a functional understanding of the tool, as the infants 
were unable to figure out what to do with the rake when the object was not placed directly in 
the trajectory between the rake's initial position and the infant (conditions C4 and C5). An 
observation that supports this view was the fact that the mean success rate in the conditions 
where  the  toy  lay in  the  tool's  trajectory  did  not  surpass  50% before  18  months  of  age, 
meaning that even in such “apparently easier” conditions success was not systematic. More 
importantly, before 18 months of age, when infants failed to retrieve the toy with the tool on 
their first attempt, they almost never tried to replace the tool behind the toy in the same trial.  
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Thus, contrary to what has been claimed in the literature (e.g., Bates et al., 1980), we argue 
that the spatial relationship between the tool and the toy is not the essential factor influencing 
infants' understanding of tools. In our view, the presence of a gap is essential  for gaining 
insight  about  infants'  understanding  of  tools,  because  in  such  conditions,  infants  cannot 
succeed by chance. For this reason, the discussion that follows will focus only on conditions 
with a gap.
Two main questions arise from the preceding conclusions. The first  question is the 
following: Why do infants fail to spontaneously solve the tool problem before 18 months of 
age (longitudinal study, Chapter 3, Appendices 2 and 3) and sometimes even later (cross-
sectional  study,  Chapter  3)?  The  second  question  concerns  the  relatively  late  stage  in 
development  at  which  infants  begin  to  benefit  from demonstrations  of  a  tool  use  action,  
compared to other means-end actions: Why are such demonstrations ineffective before 18 
months of age, or even later for some infants? I try, in the following paragraphs, to provide  
some elements of discussion on these two questions, in light of the two additional studies we 
presented in Chapter 4 and 5, along with some preliminary results from recent studies by our 
team and some recent findings from different fields of research.
Why do infants fail  to solve the tool problem before at least  18 months of  age? In other  
words: what makes the tool problem so difficult to solve?
One  important  factor  explored  in  the  present  work  was  infants'  action  planning 
abilities. Action planning is a crucial mechanism in executive control, along with other skills 
such as inhibitory control and goal setting (see Stoet & Snyder, 2012, for a short review of the 
role of executive control in tool use). Planning skills consist in the capacity to determine a 
series  of  steps  necessary  to  reach  a  goal,  along  with  the  memory  and  dynamic  error 
monitoring capacities. In the tool task, infants had to (1) set the goal of retrieving the toy, (2) 
grasp the tool, and (3) perform a movement allowing them to successfully retrieve the toy—
that is, placing the rake behind the toy and bring it across the surface of the table toward 
themselves. In the second paper, presented in Chapter 3, we investigated infants' planning 
strategies in phase 2 (grasping the tool), as we observed that hand choice for grasping strongly 
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influenced the movement that the infants performed with the tool, and thus influenced the 
outcome. Our results showed that, when grasping the tool, 16-month-old infants were more 
influenced by their hand preference than older infants, who were better at anticipating the 
most successful strategies and choosing the hand that would allow them to perform an easy 
raking movement to retrieve the toy. This result suggests that the ability to perform a tool use 
action such as the rake task requires advanced planning abilities which might not be mature 
before the second half of the second year of life. Tool use is a complex action in the sense that 
it is composed of several phases or segments (Claxton, Keen & McCarty, 2003). As stressed 
by Cox and Smitsman (2006a), such multi-step actions require planning at a more advanced 
level than simple actions involving only one phase (e.g., grasping an object). One example of 
planning a multi-step action comes from the study of Claxton, Keen and McCarty (2003), 
who tested the ability of 10.5-month-old infants to prepare an action (phase 1 – grasping a 
ball), as a function of the required precision (phase 2 – either throwing the ball or inserting it  
into a tube). They observed that the 10.5-month olds took more time to grasp an object in a  
task context requiring high precision (inserting the ball into the tube) than in a task context 
with low precision requirements (throwing the ball).  The only studies thus far  on infants' 
planning abilities in multi-step tasks involving the use of tools before the end of the second 
year of life have investigated spoon use (McCarty et al., 1999; 2001). These studies found that  
infants begin to manage to adjust their grip adequately before grasping the spoon at 19 months 
of age. Thus, even when it comes to a familiar tool action such as self-feeding with a spoon, 
for which infants have the opportunity both to observe others practising in everyday life and 
to practice themselves for some time, it seems that efficient planning develops rather late in 
the second year of life. In our tool use task, infants started to efficiently plan their grasping 
independently  of  their  hand-preference  at  approximately  the  same  age.  Thus,  infants' 
difficulties using tools might be partly caused by limitations in their capacity to plan complex 
tasks involving the use of tools.
As mentioned above, another important mechanism involved in executive functions is 
the  inhibitory  control  of  prepotent  motor  responses.  In  our  study on  the  multiple-strings 
problem (Chapter 4), we showed that most 16- to 20-month-old infants who failed at the task 
had difficulty  inhibiting their  grasping response  with  the  preferred  right  hand toward  the 
nearest string. Thus, although inhibitory motor control is known to develop between 8 and 12 
months of age in simple tasks, such as object retrieval and detour reaching (Diamond, 1991), 
it is possible that infants' inhibitory control skills are not strong enough before the end of the 
138
Chapter 6. General discussion and future directions
second year of life to allow them to inhibit prepotent behaviours in more complex tasks such 
as the multiple-strings task. What about inhibitory motor control in the tool task? This issue 
was  not  explicitly  discussed  in  the  papers  presented  in  Chapter  3.  However,  the  cross-
sectional study did not provide some behavioural elements. One way to investigate infants' 
inhibition skills in the tool task is to look at their very first behaviour when presented with the 
out-of-reach toy and the tool. As mentioned above, the first behaviour that infants have to 
perform when using a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach object is to grasp the tool. However, the 
desire for the object might elicit another, spontaneous behaviour, which is a pointing gesture 
toward the toy. In the cross-sectional study, we quantified all pointing gestures toward the toy 
and, in particular, all the trials in which the pointing behaviour was the infants' first behaviour. 
A figure in Appendix 1 shows the percentage of trials in which pointing was the infants' first  
behaviour by age and spatial condition. As can be seen in the graph, the quantity of trials in 
which infants first pointed toward the object seems to have increased with the difficulty of the 
condition: the more space there was between the rake and the toy, the more infants tended to 
point first. What is interesting here is that this pointing pattern does not seem to vary with age.  
On half of the trials in condition C4 (i.e., object to the side of the rake, at about 20 cm to the  
left or right), infants first pointed toward the toy, independently of age. Even at 22 months of 
age, where infants successfully started to use the tool spontaneously, infants often grasped the 
tool only after first having pointed toward the toy. Thus, even at 22 months, when infants 
know how to use the rake,  they seem to have difficulties inhibiting the first  spontaneous 
behaviour of pointing toward the toy. This may add an argument in favour of the hypothesis 
that  inhibitory  control  might  not  be  strong  enough  to  suppress  prepotent  behaviours  in 
complex tasks such as tool use and retrieval by pulling in a multiple-string context.
To sum up, our findings highlight two executive mechanisms, planning and inhibition, 
whose immaturity may contribute to  infants'  difficulties using tools before the end of the 
second year of life. From this conclusion arises the question of whether executive functions 
are the only factors essential to the emergence of tool use, or whether other factors may also 
play a role. To answer this question, let us invert it: are advanced executive functions such as 
well-developed planning and inhibitory control skills sufficient for tool use to emerge? I will 
look here at two points from different research fields that do not support this hypothesis.
The first element comes from comparative studies in human and non-human animals. 
Vaesen (2012), in his review of the cognitive bases of human tool use, argued in favour of 
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particular,  humanique,  executive  functions,  which  other  animal  species  lack.  However, 
Patterson  and  Mann  (2012)  stressed  in  their  response  to  Vaesen's  argument,  we  lack 
comparative studies investigating analogous behaviours and,  in  particular,  studies that are 
ecologically  and  socially  adapted  to  the  tested  species.  Several  studies  have  already 
demonstrated that some species of birds and monkeys have highly developed planning and 
inhibitory  control  abilities  (e.g.,  Weiss,  Chapman,  Wark  &  Rosenbaum,  2012;  Taylor  & 
Clayton, 2012). Coming back to the tasks used in the present thesis, we had the opportunity to 
compare  infants'  ability  on  the  multiple  strings  task  with  those  of  two  monkey  species: 
baboons (Papio anubis) and macaques (Macaca mulatta;  Rat-Fischer, Meunier, O'Regan & 
Fagard,  unpublished  data).  We tested  the  ability  to  solve  the  multiple-strings  task  in  16 
baboons (11 adults and 5 juveniles aged 5 to 8 months), and 15 macaques (12 adults and 3 
subadults  aged  approximately  2  years).  Baboons  and  macaques  are  both  non-tool-using 
species (see for example Fattori et al., 2008 for a study on means-end tasks in macaques), 
unless they are extensively trained in tool use situations for several weeks (e.g., Macellini,  
Maranesi, Bonini, Simone, Rozzi, Ferrari & Fogassi, 2012; Ishibashi, Hihara, Iriki, 2000). We 
presented a series of trials, each containing between one and four strings, with only one string 
being connected to  an  out-of-reach piece  of  food.  In the  condition  with  four  strings,  we 
observed a high mean success rate in adult and subadult individuals (66.17% for the baboons; 
72.67%  for  the  adult  and  subadult  macaques),  as  well  as  in  juvenile  baboons  (66.3%). 
Interestingly, this mean percentage is higher than the 40% success that we observed at 16 
months of age in a preliminary study on 14 infants (see Chapter 5, Section 2). Contrary to  
human infants who very often bimanually retrieved two strings at the same time, the primates' 
high success rate was not due to bimanual retrieval (only 1.9% of the trials with bimanual 
retrieval in primates). I will not delve further into the results of the non-human primate study, 
as  they  are  not  the  focus  of  this  discussion.  However,  it  is  worth  noting  that  baboons 
(including juveniles) and macaques  performed better  at  the  multiple-strings  task  than did 
young infants. This study gives evidence that non-tool-using species are capable of solving 
complex problems involving planning (pulling the correct string in order to retrieve a piece of 
food) and inhibitory control abilities (identifying the correct string rather than pulling the 
strings at random). This first study suggests that executive functions are not the only factor 
involved in tool use abilities.
Another,  more  convincing  argument  against  the  hypothesis  of  the  sufficiency  of 
executive functions for the development of tool use comes from neuropsychology. Problem 
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solving has long been linked to executive/frontal functions (e.g.,  Duncan & Owen, 2000). 
However, some recent work has shown that patients with frontal lobe lesions or dysexecutive 
syndrome  are  not  impaired  in  one-step  problem-solving  skills,  whereas  they  have  great 
difficulties  performing  tasks  requiring  multi-step  planning  (e.g.,  Goldenberg,  Hartmann-
Schmid,  Sürer,  Daumüller  & Hermsdörfer,  2007).  Another  very  recent  study investigated 
problem-solving strategies in patients with left brain damage leading to apraxia of tool use 
(i.e.,  impairment of the ability to use familiar tools)  but without impairment  of executive 
functions  (Osiurak,  Jarry,  Lesourd,  Baumard  &  Le  Gall,  2013).  These  patients  had  no 
particular  difficulty  solving problems involving planning abilities,  but  had great  difficulty 
solving tool tasks involving the choice of an unfamiliar tool to use to open a box. According 
to the results of this study, factors other than planning abilities in particular, and executive 
functions in general, are responsible for the difficulties of such left-brain-damaged patients 
with using tools. The authors performed a qualitative analysis of the patients' behaviours in 
order to draw inferences about the strategies that they used when trying to solve the tool task.  
Interestingly, they often observed that patients tended to express behaviours categorized as 
“perplexity”  behaviours,  which  they  defined  as  “any  action  that  does  not  involve  the 
interaction of a tool with an object such as either 'doing nothing', or handling a tool or an 
object in isolation” (Osiurak et al., 2013, p. 2). They opposed such “perplexed” behaviours to 
trial-and-error  behaviours,  in  which  the  subjects  combine a  tool  with the target  object  in 
attempts to discover the solution. Osiurak et al. explained the patients' tendency to express 
perplexity behaviours in terms of their inability to identify the affordances of tools and other 
objects, and/or their difficulties representing the actions needed to proceed with the task. This 
last  aspect is very interesting with respect to our results on young infants, who tended to 
orient their behaviours either toward the toy (pointing and begging for the toy), or toward the 
tool (manipulating the tool in itself, discarding the tool), rather than combining the tool and 
the toy. In addition,  even when combining the tool and the toy, infants mostly seemed to 
switch the goal of retrieving the toy to another goal, which was to play with the rake itself  
(i.e., raking/banging on the table or toward the object, etc). Thus, it is possible that the infants  
encountered some difficulty to identifying the affordance of the tool (e.g., the rake part of the 
tool can be used to bring the object into reach), and/or representing the actions needed to 
proceed with the task (e.g., orienting the tool toward the object, moving the rake part of the 
tool behind the toy, etc), and/or keeping the goal of retrieving the object in mind.
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Besides  the  factors  discussed  above,  related  to  executive  functions  and  the 
identification  of  tool  affordance  and  task  operators,  another  factor  could  explain  infants' 
difficulty using tools before 18 months of age: motor limitations. Did younger infants struggle 
due to lack of motor skills? Indeed, motor components have been identified as an important 
factor in the capacity to use tools successfully, along with perceptual and representational 
components  (Greif  &  Needham,  2011).  In  our  tool  task,  several  movements  had  to  be 
performed: grasping the tool, possibly placing the tool behind the toy in some conditions (C4-
C5), and pulling the tool closer. Grasping the tool is obviously no longer a problem at 12 
months of age, as efficient and planful grasping behaviours are in place very early in the first 
year of life. We know from the observations of condition C1 that 12 and 14-month-olds can 
perform  the  required  pulling  movements  without  difficulty.  The  movement  consisting  in 
placing the tool behind the toy, it is true that it might pose a problem for infants of these ages. 
However, several observations seem to contradict the notion that this element alone explains 
the infants' failure to use the tool. First, in the longitudinal and cross-sectional studies, we 
observed that when infants obviously knew that the tool could be used to retrieve the toy, it 
took them only a few trials to overcome the motor problem (for instance by placing the tool 
further out). Secondly, in two recent studies that we conducted in our lab, but which are not 
described in the present thesis, we observed that under some visual demonstration conditions 
with this task, 18 month-olds (Esseily, Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, in prep), and even 16 
month-olds (Somogiy, Ara, Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, subm.) were able to retrieve the 
out-of-reach object with the rake very efficiently, without any kind of motor training, as will 
be described below. Finally, even if infants had difficulties performing the correct sequence of 
movements in order to retrieve the toy,  had they understood the rake's  functionality,  they 
should at least have tried to connect the tool and the toy. However, such connections between 
tool  and  toy  were  rarely  observed  before  18  months  of  age.  Thus,  on  our  view,  motor 
limitations are not sufficient to explain infants' difficulty with this tool use task.  However, it  
is possible that a load on the infants' processing capacities created by such motor difficulties  
limited their cognitive processing of the task. Examples of such motor-cognitive tradeoffs in 
problem solving have been shown in infants (Boudreau & Bushnell, 2000).
In the three preceding paragraphs, I have discussed the contributions of planning and 
inhibition, as well  as detection of tool affordance,  the representation of actions needed to 
proceed with the task,  and motor components,  which might  explain why infants  below a 
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certain age are not able to use a tool to retrieve an out-of-reach object in normal, spontaneous 
conditions. However, it is important to note that, in certain conditions, these limitations do not 
prevent  infants from learning to  use a  tool  at  such an earlier  age.  Indeed,  developmental 
processes  are  known  to  be  embedded  within  a  complex  dynamic  system  due  to  the 
multicausality  of  such  processes  (Smith  &  Thelen,  2003).  Thus,  any  change  in  the 
environment might lead to a sudden change in infants' capacity to use tools.
An example of tool use learning by infants earlier in development comes from a series 
of  studies  conducted  in  our  team  lab.  They  first  conducted  a  preliminary  longitudinal 
observation on one infant starting at 9 months of age, who was visually familiarized with the 
function of the tool between 9 and 12 months of age (i.e., his father often retrieved his glass 
with  a  rake-like  object  before  grasping  it  at  dinner,  while  the  infant  was  watching him, 
without any comment and without the infant being given the rake-like object). This infant 
showed an exceptionally early capacity to use the tool to retrieve objects as compared to the 
other infants in the longitudinal study described in Chapter 3.1. He achieved true success in 
condition where the toy and the tool were separated in space at 12 months. These results were 
then replicated in a systematic longitudinal study on 9 infants, who were regularly visually 
familiarized with the tool's functionality between the ages of 14 and 16 months (Somogiy, 
Ara, Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, subm.). Similarly, these infants performed better at the 
task of using these tools at 16 months than infants who had not been familiarized with them. 
The  main  reason for  presenting  these  preliminary  results  is  to  point  out  that  infants  can 
develop tool use behaviours before the age at which they normally display such behaviours 
when they are familiarized with them. Thus, the rate of development of planning, inhibitory 
control and other components discussed previously may be affected by shifts due to external 
factors such as repeated observations of the target action. One reason why infants do not learn 
to use a tool before the end of the second year may be the lack of opportunity to watch others 
use it. Hence, the second part of our discussion looks at observational learning in tool use.
Why do infants fail  to  learn to use a tool  to retrieve out-of-reach objects by observation  
before 18 months of age?
The second part of our discussion on infants' difficulty using tools before the end of 
their  second year  of  life  focuses on observational  learning abilities.  We have shown that 
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observing someone demonstrating the tool action improved infants' performance in a tool use 
task only starting at 18 months of age. We decided to investigate why infants begin to learn 
from demonstrations  so late  by adding some cues about  the  demonstrator's  intention.  We 
tested whether infants would be more likely to reproduce the tool action if the demonstrator 
explicitly showed her intention to retrieve the toy prior to the demonstration, by stretching her 
arm toward the toy before using the tool. The result was an improvement in infants' overall  
performance at 16 months as compared to infants who saw only a classical demonstration. It 
is worth noting that these infants rarely reproduced the tool action perfectly. Out of the 14 
infants tested, only two used the tool perfectly to retrieve the toy, while most other infants 
either pushed the toy away with the rake, banged on the toy with the rake, or swiped the rake 
on the table until the toy fell from the table. Though infants seemingly understood the why of 
the experimenter's intention in using the rake, they may not have been clear as how to use the 
rake.  Possibly  the  infants  needed  some  training  after  demonstration  before  they  could 
efficiently reproduce this tool action. This was the first time that we observed most 16-month-
olds making the connection between the toy and the rake at 16 months, even if they did not 
perfectly  succeed. In another recent study on the observational learning of tool use at  18 
months,  we  even  observed  some  perfectly  successful  instances  of  tool  use  after  a 
demonstration.  In  this  study,  we  compared  a  group  of  infants  who  saw  a  classical  
demonstration  of  the  tool  action  with  a  group of  infants  who observed the  experimenter 
retrieving the toy with the tool and who then, rather than playing with it, grasped it and let it 
fall to the floor, while saying “oops” (incongruous demonstration group). A comparison of the 
classical  demonstration  group  with  the  incongruous  demonstration  group  revealed  no 
significant differences in performance between the groups. However, we observed that some 
infants in the incongruous demonstration group found the situation very funny and laughed 
during  the  demonstration.  A comparison  of  the  performance  of  infants  who  laughed and 
infants who did not laugh within this group revealed a great difference in success rates, with 
approximately 30% success in the non-laughing group and 100% success in the laughing 
group. With the results of this study, we show that even without training, the 18-month-old 
infants in the laughing group were able to reproduce the tool action with a perfect motion, that 
is, carefully placing the rake-part of the tool behind the toy and pulling it closer in a straight-
line  movement  (Esseily,  Rat-Fischer,  O'Regan  &  Fagard,  in  prep).  We  have  several 
hypotheses to explain why laughing infants performed better than non-laughing infants, which 
will not be developed here. Control groups and further analyses will be needed to assess what 
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behavioural differences between the two groups during and after the demonstration might 
explain the difference in performance (e.g., attentional differences, communicative differences  
toward the adults, etc). The main point we raise with this study is that even without prior  
training,  18-month-old infants were able to reproduce the action with perfect movements. 
Such skilful performances were surprising, as the successful performances we observed in the 
studies presented in Chapter 3, either spontaneously or after demonstration, were often very 
clumsy even at 22 months of age. Lack of training may thus not suffice to explain why infants 
around 16-18 months have difficulty faithfully reproducing this demonstrated tool action. It 
would  be  interesting  to  investigate  whether  this  “laughing  effect”  can  be  observed  at  a 
younger age in the tool task and other complex tasks. 
A final issue in this discussion of the learning of tool use by demonstration concerns the need 
for pedagogical cues. We have discussed above that when infants observe two demonstrations 
of the tool action with the demonstrator explicitly showing her intention improved 16-month 
olds' performance. However, the study by Somogyi et al. (submitted) discussed above suggest 
that the observation of an action performed without pedagogy, where the demonstrators had to 
use the tool in a natural context without providing any pedagogical cues, also has an effect on 
infants' performance. This situation resembles to the first experience that infants have with the 
spoon,  where  they  have  many  opportunities  to  observe  people  using  it,  before  using  it 
themselves. Thus we argue that in everyday life, repeated observations of an action performed 
in a natural context is important for infants to learn this action. One possibility to explain that 
infants learn so late in development to use tools to retrieve out-of-reach objects, is that they 
rarely observe others performing such actions in their everyday life.
How does tool use emerge in infancy? Developmental perspectives on the emergence of tool  
use
So  far,  we  have  tried  to  explain  what  factors  might  be  responsible  for  infants'  
difficulties using tools either spontaneously or by observation before the age of 18 months. 
We suggested that before a certain stage in development,  infants' executive functions, their 
motor abilities and possibly their abilities to keep the main goal in mind, to perceive the tool's 
affordances and/or to represent the actions needed to solve the problem are limited. When 
seeing  a  demonstration  of  the  target  action,  young  infants  need  some  additional 
clues  about  the  demonstrator's  intention  in  order  to  successfully  learn  to  solve  the  tool 
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problem  by  observation.  Additionally,  according  to  the  results  of  the  longitudinal  study 
described above on infants' visual familiarization with the tool's function, it seems that infants 
can learn to solve the problem without the need for experience manipulating rake-like objects, 
and  without  the  presence  of  pedagogical  cues  during  the  demonstration,  if  this  visual 
familiarization is provided repeatedly and during a sufficient amount of time.
In the debate on the emergence of tool  use in infancy, as described in Chapter  2, 
Section 2.3, here is a temptation to conclude that this ability tends to emerge in an abrupt and 
discontinuous  fashion,  as  the  cognitive  perspective  suggests.  However,  from  a  dynamic 
systems point of view, it could be argued that this apparently abrupt change is the result of a 
myriad of tiny changes in parameters both within the infants themselves (e.g., increases in 
manipulatory skills) and in the environment (e.g., the opportunities to watch tool use). This is 
why any deviation from infants' normal experience may trigger an earlier emergence of tool 
use (for instance, repeatedly seeing an adult using a rake to grasp faraway objects).
Even  though the  longitudinal  study exploring  visual  versus  manual  familiarization 
with the tool suggest that manual familiarization with the tool is not useful to learn how to use 
it, we do not contend that personal manipulation of objects is not important in infant’s tool use  
development. In particular, infants may progressively gather knowledge from their everyday 
experience with objects and from observing their caregivers’ use of objects during their two 
first years of life, a process that is difficult to evaluate quantitatively or even qualitatively. We 
know from the developmental literature that object play and practice is essential for infants' 
discovery of the properties of objects and how they can be manipulated (e.g., Baumgartner & 
Oakes, 2013: Björklund, 2011). Such behaviours can later serve as substrates or precursors for 
later  tool  use  behaviours  (Lockman,  2000).  For  example,  early  object  banging  has  been 
reported to serve as a precursor of later percussive behaviours in tool use actions such as 
hammering (Kahrs, Jung & Lockman, 2012). Another example of behaviours described as 
precursors to functional tool use is object-object combinations (Kenward et al., 2011; Hayashi 
& Matsuzawa, 2003; Torigoe,  1985;  Vauclair & Bard, 1983). For example,  a longitudinal 
study  on  object  manipulation  in  three  infant  chimpanzees  showed that  the  first  tool  use 
behaviours  appeared  at  approximately  1  year  and  9  months  of  age,  four  months  after  a 
dramatic increase in object-object combinatory behaviours (Hayashi & Matsuzawa, 2003). 
New Caledonian  crows  also  show an  increasing  tendency  to  combine  objects  before  the 
period when they begin to use tools to reach for food (Kenward et al., 2011).
It is worth noting that non-tool-using species also manipulate and combine objects. 
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For instance,  common ravens (Corvus corax),  which do not  routinely use tools,  spend as 
much time in manipulating objects during their early development as New Caledonian crows 
(Kenward et al., 2011). However, this comparative study showed a significant difference in 
the  persistence  of  combinatory  behaviours,  which  significantly  decreased  and  almost 
disappeared across development in common ravens, whereas they significantly increased in 
the tool-using crows. This increase in combinatory behaviours was not directly correlated 
with food extraction (functional tool use), as it began several weeks before the first use of 
twigs as a tool to reach inaccessible food. Thus, in tool-using crows, the emergence of tool 
use involves an inherited internal motivation to combine objects without any external reward. 
For non-tool-using birds,  combinatory behaviours might be present first  as an exploratory 
behaviour, and then be replaced during development by other, more functional behaviours 
(e.g., food caching).
Considering the importance of object-combinatory behaviours, one possible direction 
for continuing this work on tool use in infants would be to examine longitudinally human 
infants'  propensity  to  perform  such  behaviours.  In  the  same  line,  tool  use  might  be 
hypothesized to emerge earlier in the development of infants who perform more combinatory 
behaviours  with  objects.  Thus,  a  second  possible  way  to  investigate  the  importance  of 
combinatory behaviours in the emergence of tool use would be to evaluate the role of repeated 
demonstrations  of  combinatory  behaviours.  We  hypothesize  that  early  familiarization  to 
various types of combinations by another individual will increase the infants' propensity to 
combine objects, which should in turn lead to an earlier emergence of tool use.
In conclusion, the present work examined the question of the emergence of infants' use 
of a tool to retrieve out-of-reach objects. In it I described the developmental steps in tool use 
learning during the second year of life and proposed some basic mechanisms that are likely to 
influence infants' capacity to use tools, such as inhibitory, planning and observational learning 
mechanisms. This is pioneering work in the sense that until now the developmental trajectory 
of tool use learning in infants had not been clearly defined. However, there is still much work 
left to do in this field, in particular to better understand the mechanisms responsible for the 
emergence of tool use. Longitudinal studies, which are more appropriate than cross-sectional 
studies to gain insight on how complex behaviours such as tool use develop in infancy, are of 
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particular  importance  (Keen,  2011).  One  challenge  for  developmental  psychologists 
investigating the emergence of tool use is to work in close collaboration with developmental 
roboticists. Developmental roboticists have recently been seeking to design artificial systems 
autonomously  develop  tool  use  abilities  (see  for  example  the  pioneering  thesis  work  of 
Alexander  Stoytchev,  2007,  and  the  survey  on  the  ontogeny  of  tool  use  for  cognitive 
developmental roboticists of Frank Guerin et al., 2013). Findings on development may offer 
insights  into  how robots  can  learn  such  complex  abilities  with  minimal  inputs  from the 
programmers.  In  return,  developmental  robotics  can  use  artificial  systems  to  test  the 
hypothetical learning mechanisms extracted from experimental work with infants in order to 
verify their coherence.
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 Appendix 1 – Pointing gestures in the tool task
Fig A1. Proportion (%) of trials in which the pointing gesture toward the toy was the first action of 
the trial, as a function of condition and age (data from the study in paper 1 « The Emergence of Tool 
Use During the Second Year of Life », Rat-Fischer, O'Regan & Fagard, 2012).
161
Appendices
 Appendix 2 – Comment le bébé accède-t-il à la notion d'outil ? 
(Enfance, 2012)
162
Comment le bébé accède-t-il à la notion d'outil ?
Enfance n°1/2012, pp. 73-84
Jacqueline Fagard*, Lauriane Rat-Fischer* & Kevin O’Regan*
*Laboratoire Psychologie de la Perception, UMR 8158, 
jacqueline.fagard@parisdescartes.fr (auteur correspondant)
jkevin.oregan@gmail.com
lratfischer@gmail.com
Mots clés : utilisation de l’outil ; comportement moyen-but ; développement précoce ; mécanismes
Appendix 2 – Comment le bébé accède-t-il à la notion d'outil ? (Enfance, 2012)
Résumé
L’utilisation  d’un  outil  permet  de  dépasser  les  limites  de  son  propre  corps  pour  interagir  avec  
l’environnement. Après avoir appris à contrôler sa main pour prendre des objets, le bébé découvre peu  
à peu qu’un objet peut permettre d’agir sur un autre objet. Dans cet article nous nous intéressons à la 
fonction  particulière  de  l’outil  qui  permet  de  rapprocher  un  objet  présenté  hors  de  portée.  Nous 
passons d’abord en revue les comportements  précurseurs de cette habileté,  comme l’utilisation de 
moyens intermédiaires pour atteindre un but secondaire (means-end), ainsi que les premières études 
consacrées à l’utilisation d’outil pour rapprocher un objet. Dans un deuxième temps nous posons la 
question  des  mécanismes  sous-jacents  à  la  découverte  de  cette  utilisation  de  l’outil  à  partir  des 
résultats d’une étude où nous avons suivi quatre bébés pendant près d’un an à partir de 12 mois en leur  
présentant un jouet hors de portée et un râteau à portée de main. Nos résultats montrent que les bébés 
mettent plusieurs séances avant de comprendre l’utilité du râteau, séances pendant lesquelles soit ils 
explorent le râteau, soit ils quémandent le jouet, soit ils associent le râteau et le jouet mais pas pour  
essayer de rapprocher le jouet. Ce n’est que vers 18 mois, relativement soudainement, que les bébés 
ont semblé comprendre que le râteau pouvait leur permettre de rapprocher le jouet. Au vu des résultats, 
nous concluons que les mécanismes « essai-erreur » et apprentissage par observation nécessitent un 
certain niveau d’intuition de la solution pour être efficaces, mais que l’intuition elle-même nécessite  
une  longue  phase  d’exploration  qui  permet  dans  un  premier  temps  à  la  fois  d’améliorer  la 
manipulation du râteau (qui devient un prolongement de la main ?) et d’en découvrir les affordances.
Abstract
Tools  allow one  to  overcome the limits  of  one's  body in interacting  with  the  environment.  After 
learning to control their hands to grasp objects, babies gradually discover that one object can be used 
to act on other objects. In this article we shall discuss specifically the use of those tools that allow far-
off objects to be brought into range. We shall first describe studies of behaviours that are precursors to  
this skill, in particular means-end behaviours that require invoking an intermediate means to attain a 
final end. We shall then describe the existing studies of the use of a tool to bring an object closer. In 
the second part of the article we ask what the mechanisms are that might underlie the discovery of this  
kind of tool use. We shall appeal to results of a study in which we followed four infants starting at age  
12 months for about a year, and in which they had to attain an out-of-reach toy with a rake. Our results 
show that the infants needed several months before understanding the use of the rake. During this 
period they explored the rake, begged for the toy, played with toy and rake together but without trying 
to bring the toy closer.  Only around age 18 months did the infants,  somewhat suddenly, come to  
understand that the rake could be used to attain the toy. We conclude that in order to be helpful, trial  
and error, as well as observational learning, require the child to have a degree of intuition concerning  
the solution. This intuition itself requires a long period of exploration which may contribute both to  
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improving the child's ability to manipulate the rake (perhaps becoming an extension of the hand) and  
to improving the child's knowledge of the rake's affordances.
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Introduction
Utiliser un outil pour agir sur un objet permet de dépasser les limites de son corps (longueur, force ou 
mode de fonctionnement des organes préhensiles, par exemple) pour interagir plus efficacement avec 
son environnement. Malgré quelques études pionnières comme celle de Piaget (1936), ce n’est que très 
récemment qu’on s’intéresse à l’émergence de l’utilisation de l’outil au cours des premières années de 
la vie. Ceci est d’autant plus étonnant que l’utilisation de l’outil a longtemps été considérée comme un  
marqueur  fondamental  de  l’évolution  en  général  (van  Schaik,  Deaner,  &  Merrill,  1999)  et  de  
l’intelligence  humaine  en  particulier  (Wynn,  1985).  Notons  qu’après  avoir  longtemps  cru  qu’il 
s’agissait d’une habileté propre à l’homme, on sait maintenant que de nombreuses espèces animales 
utilisent  des  outils  et  parfois  les  façonnent,  primates  non humains  mais  aussi  oiseaux,  éléphants, 
poissons, etc. (voir Seed & Byrne, 2010). Dans cet article nous ferons une revue des études existantes 
sur l’utilisation de l’outil chez le bébé humain, incluant les nôtres, afin de donner quelques jalons sur  
l’émergence  de  cette  capacité  au  cours  des  deux  premières  années  de  vie,  puis  nous  tenterons 
d’extraire quelques principes permettant d’évaluer les mécanismes sous-jacents à ce développement.
 Qu’entend-t-on par outil ?
Si on définit l’utilisation de l’outil comme la capacité d’utiliser un objet pour agir sur un autre objet,  
faut-il que les deux objets soient indépendants pour que l’un soit considéré comme un « outil » servant 
à modifier l’autre ? On pourrait ainsi considérer que l’utilisation d’un outil spatialement indépendant 
de  l’objet  sur  lequel  il  agit n’est  que l’extrême  d’un  continuum  qui  commencerait  dès  que  le 
bébé attrape  un  objet  par  un  bout quand c’est  l’autre  bout  qui  l’intéresse,  le  hochet  par 
exemple. L’utilisation  d’un  objet  pour  explorer  l’environnement  pourrait  également  être 
considéré comme un  précurseur  de  l’utilisation  d’outil  (Lockman,  2000).  Parmi  d'autres 
comportements qui pourraient impliquer une notion d'outil, on pourrait énumérer : se servir d’un objet 
pour rapprocher un deuxième objet posé dessus, tirer une ficelle au bout de laquelle est attaché un 
objet, appuyer sur un endroit précis d’un objet pour obtenir un effet se produisant à l’autre bout de 
l’objet  ou  ailleurs.  Si ces  comportements,  plus  généralement  appelés  « moyen-but  »,  ont  été 
amplement étudiés chez le bébé, comme nous le verrons, ils ne sont pas considérés comme de vraies 
conduites d’utilisation d’outil. Dans cet article nous nous centrerons principalement sur l’émergence 
de l’utilisation de l’outil au sens restreint d’un objet indépendant servant à agir sur un autre objet, et  
plus particulièrement servant à mettre à portée de main un objet hors de portée. Nous commencerons 
néanmoins par un bref rappel des conduites « moyen-but » servant à rapprocher un objet
 Premières conduites moyen-but pour rapprocher un objet hors de portée
On définit  comme « moyen-but » un comportement qui implique l’exécution délibérée et planifiée 
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d’une  séquence  d’actions  pour  arriver  à  un  but  dans  une  situation  où  un  obstacle  empêche  la 
réalisation du but (Willatts,  1999). Pour y arriver, le bébé doit mettre de côté un but inatteignable 
immédiatement et exécuter une action intermédiaire. Par exemple, lorsqu’un bébé a très envie d’un 
objet  sur  un support,  avant  d’avoir  accès  aux comportements  « moyen-but »,  il  tend la main vers 
l’objet pour l’obtenir. Le stade « moyen-but » consiste à regarder la scène, à percevoir que l’objet est 
posé sur un support, à tirer le support pour s’emparer de l’objet dès qu’il est suffisamment rapproché.  
Les  conduites  moyen-but  représentent  le  cinquième  stade  piagétien,  et  dans  la  terminologie 
piagétienne, à ce stade l’enfant ne se contente plus d’appliquer des schèmes d’action primaires comme 
prendre, secouer, frotter mais il devient capable d’inventer des schèmes nouveaux pour répondre à son 
projet. Comme pour les stades précédents, le nouveau schème peut être découvert par hasard, lors de 
l’expérimentation  active  de  l’enfant  avec  l’objet :  pour  reprendre  notre  exemple,  à  un  stade 
intermédiaire le bébé va renoncer à prendre l’objet hors de portée, prendre le support qui est le seul  
objet disponible, tirer dessus souvent pour le mettre à la bouche et s’apercevoir que cela fait venir  
l’objet. Piaget donne ainsi de nombreux exemples de tels comportements chez ses enfants, vers la fin 
de la première année (9-12 mois) (Piaget, 1936). 
Ce comportement a été étudié systématiquement sur un plus grand nombre de bébés par plusieurs 
auteurs (Bates, Thal, Fenson, Whitesell, & Oakes, 1989; Willatts, 1999). Willatts a ainsi comparé le 
comportement de 16 bébés vus longitudinalement à 6, 7 et 8 mois. Le jouet était posé, hors de portée,  
sur un tissu placé à portée de main. En analysant les séquences temporelles entre le regard et l’action,  
l’auteur a codé le comportement selon l’intention de prendre l’objet : sans intention, avec une intention 
« partielle » (stade « transitionnel » selon Piaget), ou avec une intention claire. Les résultats montrent 
qu’à six mois le comportement est clairement transitionnel  tandis qu’à 7 mois les bébés semblent 
résoudre le problème de façon planifiée.  Un autre  comportement  “moyen-but”  noté par  Piaget  et  
fréquemment étudié depuis est celui de la ficelle. Dans ce cas, l’objet intéressant et hors de portée est 
attaché au bout d’une ficelle. L’étude de la conduite de la ficelle remonte à des travaux très anciens, les 
premières études de Gesell (1928) ayant sans doute elles-mêmes été inspirées de travaux anciens sur 
les singes et autres animaux (Thorndike, 1898 ; Köhler, 1927) mais aussi sur les bébés humains (voir 
Richardson, 1932, pour une revue de ces travaux anciens). L’étude de Richardson ainsi que quelques 
études plus récentes (Bates, Carlsonluden, & Bretherton, 1980 ; Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997) 
avaient pour but de tester le degré réel de compréhension de la notion de connectivité en comparant les 
configurations  perceptuelles  pour  lesquelles  l’enfant  réussissait  à  prendre  la  bonne  ficelle.  Le 
consensus actuel est que ce type de tâche est réussi vers la fin de la première année.
Un autre exemple de conduite « moyen-but » est donné par l’étude de Koslowski et Bruner (1972) 
dans laquelle les auteurs ont mis devant des bébés de 12 à 24 mois un levier sur lequel est accroché un 
jouet. Pour attraper le jouet les enfants doivent pousser le levier. Les auteurs considèrent ce levier  
comme un outil primitif. Les résultats montrent que le problème est résolu avec des stratégies de plus  
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en  plus  efficaces  avec  l’âge.  Les  bébés  apprennent  à  maîtriser  individuellement  les  différentes 
composantes de l’action en les exerçant pour elles-mêmes de façon variée (tirer-pousser-lever le levier, 
par exemple). Lorsqu’une composante est maîtrisée et « modularisée », c’est à dire intégrée dans une 
séquence d’actions, le bébé peut alors être attentif à l’effet de son geste sur l’objet à rapprocher et  
réussir la tâche, ce qu’il fait entre 16 et 24 mois.
Dans l’échelle de développement d’Uzgiris et Hunt (1975), les conduites du support et de la ficelle 
sont  considérées  comme  représentatives  de  l’âge  de  10  mois.  Par  contre  l’utilisation  de  l’outil 
correspond à un item typiquement réussi à partir de 18 mois. Pourquoi un tel décalage ?
 Utilisation de l’outil au cours des deux premières années
 1.1. Les premiers outils du bébé dirigés vers lui
Le premier outil au sens restreint dont le bébé apprend à se servir systématiquement est la cuillère. 
L’utilisation de la cuillère a fait l’objet d’une étude longitudinale portant sur deux groupes de bébés de 
11 et 17 mois vus tous les mois pendant une période de six mois (Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989). Les 
auteurs ont cherché à observer les progrès dans l’utilisation de la cuillère en ce qui concerne la main 
utilisée, le type de prise, la trajectoire jusqu’à la bouche. Leurs résultats montrent un changement dans 
les stratégies qui deviennent de plus en plus efficaces avec l’âge. L’utilisation de la cuillère a fait  
l’objet d’une autre étude, celle de McCarty, Clifton, & Collard (1999). Dans cette étude les auteurs ont  
donné à des bébés de 9, 14 et 19 mois une cuillère remplie de nourriture et présentée de telle sorte que 
soit le manche soit le bol de la cuillère contenant de la compote était du côté de la main préférée du  
bébé. Les résultats montrent qu’à 9 mois les bébés prennent avec leur main préférée le bout de la  
cuillère à pleine main, que ceux de 19 mois prennent le manche de la cuillère directement avec leur  
main non préférée, et que le groupe intermédiaire utilise des stratégies compliquées pour corriger leur  
prise initiale du manche de la cuillère avec la main préférée. Ces deux études mettent en évidence  
l’amélioration  avec  l’âge  de  la  planification  motrice  de  l’utilisation  de  l’outil,  et  sont  plus  une 
investigation de l’aspect moteur que de l’aspect conceptuel de l’utilisation d’outil.
Une hypothèse intéressante concernant la précocité du la capacité d'utiliser une cuillère ou une brosse  
à dent (outre la familiarité de ces outils) a été proposée par McCarty, Clifton, & Collard (2001 ; voir 
aussi Claxton, McCarty, & Keen, 2009). Ces auteurs suggèrent qu'il est plus facile de contrôler une 
action vers soi (comme utiliser une cuillère pour mettre la nourriture dans la bouche) qu’une action  
vers l'extérieur.
 1.2. L’utilisation d’outil pour rapprocher un objet placé hors de portée 
La conduite du bâton, qui consiste à rapprocher un objet  situé hors de portée à l’aide d’un bâton à 
portée de main, fût décrite en premier par Piaget (1936) sur son fils Laurent vers la fin de la première  
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année.  Les  premières  études  systématiques  de  ce  type  se  sont  focalisées  sur  le  rôle  des  facteurs 
perceptifs, plus précisément de la relation spatiale entre deux objets, pour comprendre qu’un objet peut 
servir à rapprocher l’autre (van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & van Leeuwen, 1994 ; Brown 1990 ; Bates, 
Carlsonluden, & Bretherton, 1980). Dans l’étude de Bates et al. (1980), on a présenté à 40 bébés de 10 
mois un jouet hors de portée placé à côté de différents outils (mini cerceau, crochet ou bâton). Le jouet 
était posé à différentes positions par rapport au cerceau (dedans contre ou au milieu) et au crochet (à  
l’intérieur  de sa  partie courbe ou à  côté)  et  il  était  placé à  côté  du bâton.  Dans deux conditions  
supplémentaires le jouet était posé sur un tissu ou attaché au bout d’une ficelle fine ou épaisse. Les  
résultats montrent que le pourcentage de réussite est le plus élevé lorsque l’objet et l’  « outil » sont 
connectés de façon indissociable (tissu et ficelles), un peu moins élevé lorsqu’ils sont connectés de 
façon dissociable (jouet contre l’outil), et très rarement réussi en l’absence de connexion (jouet à côté 
de l’outil). 
Dans leur étude de 1994, van Leeuwen et al. ont utilisé un crochet à portée de main et une balle hors  
de portée située à différents endroits par rapport au crochet et ils ont testé 57 enfants entre huit mois et  
3ans 8 mois. Ils concluent de leurs résultats que ce n’est pas seulement la discontinuité spatiale mais 
aussi le nombre d’étapes impliquées dans l’action qui influence la réussite.
Dans une de nos études  longitudinales  nous avons également  observé un succès  plus  précoce en 
condition  de  contiguïté  spatiale  qu’en  condition  de  non  contiguïté  mais  nos  conclusions  sont 
différentes (Fagard, Rat-Fisher, & O'Regan, soumis; O'Regan, Rat-Fisher, & Fagard, 2011). Dans cette 
étude nous avons suivi quatre bébés tous les mois entre 12 et 20 mois, en leur présentant un jouet 
attrayant hors de portée et un râteau en carton à portée de main. Le jouet était soit attaché sur le râteau,  
soit à l’intérieur du râteau, soit à distance du râteau. Notre codage spécifiait si le bébé avait réussi à  
rapprocher le jouet, mais également si le rapprochement était clairement intentionnel ou non. Lorsque 
le jouet est attaché sur le râteau le succès est immédiat dès l’âge de 12 mois et ne change pas avec 
l’âge mais lorsque le jouet est à l’intérieur et contre le râteau, le taux de succès, très élevé à 12 mois,  
diminue aux séances suivantes avant de remonter à partir de 15 mois. Le succès lorsque le jouet est à  
distance du râteau est très rare avant 18 mois. Il nous a semblé que les premières réussites dans la  
condition où l’objet est à l’intérieur du râteau surviennent non pas parce que le bébé a compris la 
fonction de l’outil mais parce que le jouet vient par contingence spatiale dès que l’enfant tire l’outil,  
qui  est l’objet le plus proche (pour cette raison nous appelons ces succès « ambigus »).  Plusieurs 
observations nous ont amenés à cette conclusion : le fait que les premiers succès à 12 mois passent 
parfois inaperçus par les bébés qui rapprochent l’objet mais ne s’en emparent pas ; que ces premiers 
succès sont suivis aux deux ou trois sessions suivantes (c.a.d. jusque vers 16-17 mois) de nombreux  
échecs au cours desquels les bébés montrent à la fois leur désir d’obtenir le jouet et leur refus d’utiliser 
l’outil, soit en jetant l’outil sur la table ou par terre après lui avoir fait contourner le jouet, soit en  
ignorant  l’outil ;  enfin  le  fait  que  lorsque  le  geste  de  tirer  l’outil  n’a  pas  permis  de  rapprocher 
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suffisamment  le jouet,  les  bébés ne font  jamais  une deuxième tentative pour  aller  replacer  l’outil 
derrière le jouet. Nous avons donc conclu que, même si la contiguïté spatiale peut favoriser au bout de 
sessions successives la compréhension de la fonctionnalité de l’outil, il ne faut pas sur-interpréter les 
premiers succès qui semblent dus à la contingence entre l’action de tirer le premier objet à portée de  
main et le rapprochement du jouet contigu plus qu’à l’action intentionnelle de rapprocher le jouet avec 
l’outil.
 2. Mécanismes sous-jacents à l’utilisation de l’outil
La plupart des études précitées ont cherché à décrire les progrès dans l’habileté manuelle à utiliser un 
outil, ou encore les facteurs influençant la réussite comme la relation spatiale entre l’outil et l’objet à 
rapprocher.  Une  question  plus  intéressante  est  celle  de  savoir  comment  se  développe  la 
compréhension de la fonctionnalité de l’outil en tant que moyen d’étendre la portée de son bras: En 
effet,  jusqu’au  milieu  de  la  deuxième  année,  le  problème  du  bébé  n’est  pas  vraiment  de  savoir 
comment utiliser l’outil pour rapprocher un objet car il ne semble même pas avoir l’idée que l’outil 
peut lui permettre de le faire. La question intéressante est donc celle posée par Piaget (1936, p. 290) : 
« Comment expliquer la transition entre essai et erreur et invention, entre schème moteur et schème 
représentatif ». Pour répondre à cette question il faut déterminer les mécanismes qui sous-tendent la 
compréhension progressive de la fonctionnalité de l’outil. 
Notre étude longitudinale déjà citée (O'Regan et al., 2011) avait ce but ; pour cela nous avons analysé 
tous les comportements observés aux séances successives chez les quatre bébés suivis de 12 à 20 mois. 
Un premier résultat notable est que les premiers succès quand le jouet est contre le râteau, succès que  
nous avons qualifiés d’« ambigus », n’ont néanmoins pas permis aux bébés d’apprendre que le râteau 
peut effectivement servir à rapprocher le jouet puisqu’ils sont suivis d’échec dans les autres conditions 
ainsi que dans la même condition aux séances suivantes. Lorsque le râteau et le jouet sont spatialement 
séparés, ce n’est que vers la 5ème ou 6ème séance (entre 17 et 20 mois) que les bébés cherchent à mettre 
en contact le râteau et le jouet avec le but évident de rapprocher le deuxième en utilisant le premier.  
Jusqu’à la 5ème séance, il semble donc que le bébé n’a pas appris de l’observation de l’effet de ses 
actions pour comprendre l’utilité du râteau. Il n’a pas appris non plus de l’observation de l’action  
réussie  de  l’autre  dans cette  situation  d’utilisation  d’outil  puisque  la  démonstration  par  un  adulte 
n’entraîne ni succès ni changement de comportement avant la séance 5 i. Nous avons conclu que ces 
deux  mécanismes  (essai-erreur  et  apprentissage  par  observation)  nécessitaient  un  certain  niveau 
d’intuition de la solution pour être efficaces. 
Comment émerge cette intuition ? Pour le comprendre nous avons analysé en détail les comportements 
7i Notons que quelques études ont montré une capacité plus précoce d’apprendre par observation à utiliser un  
outil, soit dans des conditions plus simples d’utilisation d’outil (Brown, 1990 ; Sommerville, Hildebrand, & 
Crane, 2008), soit dans un contexte pédagogique de démonstration (contact oculaire, référence au prénom, etc.)
(Sage & Baldwin, 2011).
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précédant le stade d’intuition de la fonctionnalité du râteau. Ceux-ci sont très variés : les bébés soit se 
focalisent sur l’outil (le mettent à la bouche, frottent la table avec, etc.) ou sur le jouet (tendent la main 
vers lui),  soit  connectent les deux sans chercher à rapprocher le jouet (tapent sur le jouet avec le  
râteau, par exemple). Contrairement à notre attente, nous n’avons pas observé une augmentation de ces 
comportements  de  connexion  entre  le  râteau  et  le  jouet  au  fur  et  à  mesure  des  séances  :  ces 
comportements  sont  observés  dès  12 mois et  ils  alternent  avec les  autres comportements pendant 
toutes les premières séances, de façon variée suivant les enfants. Ce n’est qu’au cours des séances 5 et 
6 (entre 17 et 20 mois) que les bébés commencent à montrer qu’ils comprennent que le râteau peut 
servir  à  rapprocher  le  jouet.  Ils  ne  le rejettent  plus  et  ont  leurs  premiers  comportements  « essai-
erreur ».  Il  est  fort  probable  que  cette  intuition  résulte  des  explorations  qui  l’ont  précédée,  la 
manipulation  du  râteau  ayant  sans  doute  permis  aux  bébés  d’augmenter  leurs  connaissances  des 
affordances non spécifiques du râteau avant d’entraîner la compréhension de l’affordance qui consiste 
à rapprocher le jouet vers soi.  On peut également penser que le bébé ayant appris à manipuler le 
râteau,  il  devient  plus  disponible  pour  imaginer  la  possibilité  d’une  nouvelle  affordance  (voir 
Schlesinger & Langer, 1999, et Sommerville,  Hildebrand & Crane, 2008, pour une discussion sur  
l’influence de l’action sur la perception). Si par exemple le râteau est ressenti comme un prolongement 
de la main, la possibilité d’aller chercher l’objet avec s’impose peut-être tout naturellement au bébé.    
En conclusion, il semble que tant que le bébé n’anticipe pas les conséquences de son action, tant qu’il  
ne tire pas le râteau POUR rapprocher un objet dont il sait qu’il est indépendant, il ne perçoit pas que 
le rapprochement du jouet  est  directement  lié à son geste  de tirer  le râteau.  De même, tant  qu’il  
n’anticipe pas l’intention de l’adulte, il ne voit pas le lien entre l’action de l’adulte et le résultat sur le  
jouet rapproché. 
Un facteur important qui permet au bébé d’approcher l’intuition de la fonctionnalité de l’objet semble 
être la variabilité des comportements spontanés, telle l’exploration du râteau, seul ou en relation avec  
le jouet mais pas pour le rapprocher. De la compréhension des affordances variées du râteau, mais sans 
doute aussi de la maîtrise croissante à manipuler le râteau, émerge assez brutalement vers l’âge de 18 
mois l’intuition que le râteau pourrait rapprocher le jouet.  Dès que le bébé possède cette intuition, il  
devient  capable  de  tirer  parti  de  ses  tentatives  partiellement  réussies  (essais-erreurs)  ou  de  la 
démonstration d’un adulte pour arriver à utiliser le râteau avec succès.
Ces  conclusions  concordent  avec  la  distinction  de  deux  composantes  dans  l’apprentissage  de 
l’utilisation de l’outil : une composante cognitive (compréhension de la fonctionnalité de l’outil) et 
une composante motrice (habileté à manier l’outil) (Greif & Needham, 2007). Au vu de nos résultats, 
on pourrait dire que la première met plusieurs séances avant d’apparaître relativement soudainement, 
suivie  des  progrès  rapides  de la deuxième au cours  des  deux dernières  séances.  Cependant,  cette 
distinction est à relativiser et il y a tout lieu de penser avec Greif & Needham (2007) que les deux 
composantes interagissent dynamiquement : par exemple, les explorations qui précèdent l’intuition de 
171
Utilisation de l’outil au cours des deux premières années
la  fonctionnalité  du  râteau  servent  sans  doute  autant  la  composante  cognitive  que  la  composante 
motrice de cette habileté. 
Enfin  on peut  poser  la  question  de  savoir  si  un  seul  mécanisme suffit  à  expliquer  ce  qui  donne 
l’impression d’un changement abrupt vers 18 mois. L’augmentation des connaissances des affordances 
de l’outil et celle de l’habileté dans le maniement du râteau peut, à un certain moment, atteindre un  
niveau  suffisant  pour  permettre  un  changement  qualitatif.  Des  exemples  de  transitions  abruptes 
correspondant  à  des changements de phases  ont  été décrits  pour certains  comportements,  la  prise  
d’objet par exemple (Wimmers, Savelsbergh, Beek, & Hopkins, 1998).  Une autre possibilité serait 
qu’un mécanisme nouveau entre en jeu soit grâce à la maturation du système nerveux, soit grâce au  
développement d’autres systèmes. Un tel mécanisme nouveau pourrait être lié à un progrès dans la 
capacité de mémoire à court-terme, ou bien à la capacité de relier deux évènements spatialement et 
temporellement séparés (Diamond, 1983) ou de visualiser un point de contact potentiel bien qu’absent 
de la scène visuelle (Brown, 1990), ou encore à une augmentation dans la capacité d’anticiper les 
conséquences de son action sur un objet. Il semble que la compréhension de la notion de causalité per 
se ne soit plus en cause aux âges étudiés (Leslie & Kibble, 1987). 
Pour savoir si la familiarisation progressive au cours de plusieurs mois lors de sessions successives  
avec leurs explorations variées suffit à lui seul expliquer le changement brutal à 18 mois, nous sommes 
en train de comparer ces résultats longitudinaux portant sur quatre bébés avec les résultats obtenus 
dans une étude transversale en cours portant sur un plus grand nombre de bébés âgés de 12 à 22 mois.
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Abstract
We describe the results of a longitudinal study on five infants from age 12 to 20 months, presented  
with an out of reach toy and a rake-like tool within reach. Five conditions of spatial relationships 
between toy and rake were tested. Outcomes and types of behavior were analyzed. The successes  
observed  around  12  months  in  the  condition  of  spatial  contiguity  between  rake  and  toy  were 
ambiguous in that they were frequently followed by sessions in which the infants clearly rejected the  
rake  in  all  conditions.  In  the condition of  spatial  separation  infants’ strategies  fluctuated between 
paying attention to the toy only, exploring the rake, and connecting rake and toy with no apparent 
attempt to bring the toy closer. Between 16 and 20 months, infants suddenly started to make visible 
efforts to bring the toy closer with the tool: at this stage, the infants became able to learn from their  
failures and to correct their action, as well as to benefit from demonstration of an adult. The pattern of  
change  in  behaviors  leading  to  tool  use  varied  between  the  five  infants.  The  possible  processes 
underlying the acquisition of tool use are discussed. 
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Tool use is the ability to use one object (the “tool”) to manipulate other objects, and hence move 
beyond the limits set on the action space by the length of one’s limbs or the type of one’s end-effector  
(Nabeshima, Kuniyoshi, & Lungarella, 2006). Tool use has often been recognized as an important step 
during evolution (van Schaik, Deaner, & Merrill, 1999), and as a marker of the evolution of human 
intelligence (Wynn, 1985). Its importance as a milestone in human development has also long been 
recognised (Piaget, 1952) and is still emphasised (“a royal road to the study of problem solving,”  
(Keen, 2011, p. 2). And more recently, understanding the basis of tool use has come to be seen as  
fundamental for robotics (Nabeshima et al., 2006). 
Curiously, the development of tool use in human infants has received relatively little interest until 
recently (see Keen, 2011, for a recent review). In addition, most of the existing studies have been 
concerned more with describing stages of skill development or factors that induce success, than with  
suggesting  precise  learning  mechanisms.  Furthermore,  very  few  of  these  studies  have  been 
longitudinal. 
One possible exception is Piaget.  Piaget first  described “la conduite du bâton” (stick behavior) in 
1953. He noticed that his children started to use a stick to move faraway objects by the end of the first  
year. Piaget had noted that his son Laurent discovered the use of the stick “almost without trial and  
error” (Piaget, 1952, p.290). The question asked by Piaget in 1952 was “how to explain the transition 
from trial and error to invention, from motor scheme to representative scheme.” Another exception is  
Bruner, who observed how children progress from one level of organization to the next when using a 
primitive form of tool, a lever with fixed fulcrum (Koslowski & Bruner, 1972). From their study of 12-
to-14, 14-to-16, and 16-to-23-month-old children learning to use the lever to obtain a toy attached to 
the  end  of  the  lever,  Koslowski  and  Bruner  extracted  some  principles  to  explain  how the  child 
progresses from one level of organization to the next. For them, the transition seems to consist of the 
child concentrating on the two individual components of the task (how the rotation of the lever affects 
the  position  of  the  goal,  and how the child  can effect  a  rotation  of  the  lever).  Once each  of  the 
components has been modularized and is less attention-demanding, the child becomes able to attend 
simultaneously to the movement of both the lever’s goal end and its hand end. This allows them to  
finally envision the solution to the problem.   
A few cross-sectional studies have investigated what factors contributed to the difficulty to use a tool 
to get an out-of-reach object. They all stress that difficulty in tool use increases with an increasing 
spatial gap between the tool and the object to be acted upon (Bates, Carlsonluden, & Bretherton, 1980; 
van Leeuwen, Smitsman, & van Leeuwen, 1994), or more generally with an increasing number of  
steps needed to achieve the required result (Smitsman & Cox, 2008). In their 1980 study, Bates et al. 
compared 40 10-month-old infants retrieving an out-of-reach toy placed either on a cloth, at the end of 
a string, or at different positions near three kinds of tool likely to help the children retrieve it (hoop,  
crook or stick). The conditions where toy and tool are physically linked (“unbreakable contact”) were 
176
Appendix 3 – The emergence of tool use: a longitudinal study in human infants
most  successful,  followed  by  the  conditions  in  which  there  was  breakable  contact  (toy  placed 
against/inside the hoop or the curved part of the crook). The conditions with no contact (toy beside the 
crook or the stick) were the least successful. The authors concluded that at 10 months problem solving 
is easier when the link between the tool and the toy is suggested by the spatial array. Van Leeuwen et  
al. suggested that the role of spatial contact between tool and toy in helping the infants solving the 
problem was partly linked to the number of mental transformations that the infants must perform to 
imagine the solution (“number of elements to be integrated,” p.189).
In another study (McCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 1999) the focus was on progress in planning action 
with a more or less familiar tool, a spoon. Nine-, 14-, and 19-month-old children were given a spoon  
presented in such a way that the bowl part was on the side of the preferred hand. Only the 19-month-
olds anticipated the problem and directly grasped the handle with the ipsilateral non-preferred hand, 
whereas younger infants used their ipsilateral (preferred) hand to grasp the bowl part of the spoon or  
the handle part with an awkward movement.  
Manual skill  improvement in the use of a spoon was also the focus of another, longitudinal study  
(Connolly & Dalgleish, 1989). In it, Connolly and Dalgleish observed two groups of infants, ages 11 
and 17 months, at monthly intervals over a 6-month period. However, Connolly and Dalgleish were 
more interested in changes in the shape of the movement leading to expertise (hand use, grip pattern,  
spoon trajectory) than in the underlying mechanisms leading to an understanding of the use of the  
spoon to retrieve the food. 
In conclusion from this brief  review of the literature,  we can conclude that  spatial proximity and 
number of transformations are important factors, and that planning of action improves with practice.  
However, we still lack an understanding of the cognitive mechanisms that underlie the acquisition of 
tool  use  ability  in the course  of  the  second year.  In  particular,  we  cannot as  yet  answer Piaget’s 
question  as  to  whether  tool  use  appears  through  sudden  insight  or  emerges  gradually  through 
progressive familiarization with tool affordances.  According to Lockman (2000), tool use emerges 
from a long period of object manipulation that familiarizes infants with the use of an object to interact  
with other objects. On this view, the progressive discovery of the various affordances of an object 
allows infants to later ascertain which affordance of an object will solve their problem. This ecological  
view contrasts with the more radical view that tool use results from a sudden insight (Köhler, 1927). 
To explore the mechanisms underlying the acquisition of tool use more precisely, and in particular to  
ascertain whether this acquisition occurs gradually or through sudden insight, clearly a longitudinal 
study is called for. We decided to take a small number of infants and study their evolution from ages 
12 to 20 months on a regular basis, carefully analyzing their behavior longitudinally as they learned to 
use  a  rake-like  tool  to  obtain  an  out-of-reach  toy.  The  questions  we  posed  were:  why  is  spatial  
proximity an important factor? What will allow infants to understand the affordance of the rake in  
conditions of no spatial contact: observation of their success in easier conditions of spatial contact?  
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Exploration of the rake? Trial and error? Observation of a demonstration? Sudden insight? 
Regularly following a small number of infants during the months preceding the acquisition of a skill 
has in the past proven to be a good way to gather useful information on mechanisms underlying skill  
acquisition (Thelen et al., 1993). It is also one way to look at individual trajectories as well as common 
patterns. 
Methods
We constructed a T-shaped rake-like tool made out of white cardboard with a 20-cm-long handle. We 
used a selection of small toys that we had previously determined to be interesting to children in a day-
care nursery. Infants were comfortably seated at a testing table during the whole session. They were 
either on the parent’s lap or, at older ages, in a high chair. By using a white rake, we ensured that the  
rake was not very attractive per se, as compared to the visually highly salient toys that we used so as to 
attract the attention and trigger the desire of the infants.
Five infants (two girls and three boys) were observed regularly in five conditions of tool use: toy on 
top of rake, attached to it (C1), toy inside/against the rake (C2), toy inside the rake but not against it 
(C3), toy to the side of the rake (C4), and rake handed to the infant (C5) (see Figure 1). The toy was 
always just out of arm's reach.
Insert Figure 1 about here
All infants were brought in for familiarization with the experimental room and the experimenters at 11  
months. Testing started when the infants were 12 months old. They were tested about every month 
until they could use the rake with success (16 months for one infant, 18 months for three of the infants, 
20 months for the fourth). Mean age was 12 months in session 1 (S1), 13 months 1 day at S2, 14 
months 4 days at S3, 15 months 6 days at S4, 17 months 1 day at S5, and 18 months 8 days at S6. Four 
infants took part in 6 sessions. Infant 2 (I2) was seen at 11 months but missed sessions 1 and 2 for  
family reasons; we kept him in the study for two reasons: first because of the small number of infants; 
second, because we thought it interesting to compare his performance on his first session with that of  
the other infants of the same age but who had had two practice sessions). Infant 5 succeeded at session  
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4 (16 months) and was seen again at 20 months for checking the stability of performance. Condition 
C1 was only tested once at the beginning of each session since it does not represent a challenge for  
infants at the ages tested here. Results from this condition are briefly mentioned at the beginning of the 
result section but not included in later analyses. The other conditions were tested several times per 
session. Since this study was exploratory,  we decided to test the infants for as long as they were  
willing to participate, rather than to have exactly the same number of trials per infant. We checked that  
the difference in number of trials between infants was not related to a difference in age of success. At 
the beginning of each session, the order of presentation was from C1 to C5, but when an infant was  
willing to continue, conditions C2, C4 and C5 were retested in random order. After the first failure on 
C4 and C5, a demonstration was provided by one of the adults present in the room, either a parent or  
an experimenter. A demonstration consisted in two or three repetitions of showing the infant, while he 
or  she was looking,  how to bring the object  toward  himself  or  herself.  The demonstrator  always 
showed how to use the rake from the infant’s perspective. The rake was then either put back in front of  
the infant (C4) or handed directly to the infant (C5). There were 389 trials in all, and between 1 and 3 
demonstrations per session. A trial was terminated if the infant did not try to obtain the toy within one  
minute, or after failure in retrieving the toy. After getting the toy, the infants were allowed to play with 
it for about one minute. 
 1. Coding of behaviors
We first coded elementary behaviors in each condition of each trial for each of the five infants for the  
362 trials of conditions C2 to C5. These elementary behaviors involved looking (infant looks at toy, at 
rake, at adult, or elsewhere); pointing toward toy (with bare hand or with rake); grasping the rake  
(after touching it by chance, spontaneously, encouraged by the experimenter, or put in the baby’s hand 
by the experimenter), moving the rake (rakes it or lifts it from the table with inside or outside lateral  
movements, or with a straight movement toward himself; makes a detour around the object or not); 
refusing  the  rake  (refuses  it  when  handed  by  experimenter,  places  it  on  table,  throws  it  away); 
manipulating the rake per se (puts rake into mouth, bimanually explores rake) or on the table (swipes 
table, rubs table, hits table); manipulating the rake in connection with the toy with no clear intention to 
bring it back (hits toy or pushes toy with rake); interacting with the adult,  clearly asking for help  
(gives rake to adult, takes the adult’s hand and places it on rake); and manipulating the rake with clear  
intention to bring the object back (brings object to hand with rake; with wrong movements, peculiar 
but effective movements, or direct movements; prepares the second hand while raking the toy with the 
first hand). These elements of behavior occurred together in several ways during trials, leading to a  
count of 26 whole-trial behaviors among all 362 trials (see Table 1). The whole-trial behaviors are  
grouped into categories as a function of the level of performance they reflect and these categories give 
a raw score. The notation NT (No Try) means that the child did not try either to retrieve the toy or to  
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explore the rake. The notation T indicates that the child was interested in the toy and R that s/he was 
interested in the rake but in neither case was the child interested in their interaction. The notation T+R 
indicates that the child was interested in the interaction between rake and toy without showing a clear  
intention to retrieve the toy. The notation S1 indicates that the child has shown clear understanding of  
the rake as a possible tool to retrieve the toy but doesn’t yet know how to use the rake. The notation S2 
means that the child knows how to retrieve the toy with the rake.
Insert Table 1 about here
Whole-trial behaviors: 
No try (NT)
1. Grasps rake, gets rid of it, stops being interested (rake is grasped here without being the focus of  
attention)
2. Looks at toy, looks at rake, looks at adult, doesn’t do anything
3. Refusal
T: Begging for toy and not using rake after its grasping leads to failure
4. Points to toy and refuses or ignores the rake  
5. Points to toy, then grasps rake (either spontaneously or encouraged by the experimenter), points 
again toward toy with other hand
6. Grasps rake, the toy does not come, does not try again with the rake, may then point to toy with  
bare hand
7. Grasps rake, gets rid of it (throws it away, places it on the table), and points to the toy  
8. Looks at toy, pulls rake while looking at toy, stops action with rake when sees that toy does not 
come, points to toy 
R: Exploring rake but not using it in connection with the toy 
9. Points to toy, then grasps rake and plays with it (puts into mouth or rubs, swipes, hits, etc. on 
table)
10. Grasps rake, interested in rake only (puts into mouth  or rubs, swipes, hits, etc. on table)
11. Grasps rake, swipes table with it and sweeps toy away by accident
12. Grasps rake,  plays with it and then rejects it, may be interested in toy again
T+R: Using rake in connection with toy but not for retrieval
13. Points to toy, then grasps rake (spontaneously or encouraged by the experimenter) and touches or 
pushes toy with it
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14. Grasps rake, touches or pushes object with rake
15. Grasps rake (after pointing first to toy or not), points to toy with rake
S1:  Using  rake  for  Retrieval:  trial  and  error,  difficult  or  partial  success,  or  only  after 
demonstration
16. Grasps rake, moves rake, tries to bring back toy, partial success
17. Grasps  rake  (after  pointing  first  to  toy  or  not),  retrieves  or  tries  to  retrieve  toy  after  
demonstration
18. Grasps rake after being encouraged (after pointing first to toy or not), moves rake and retrieves 
toy with it
19. Grasps rake (after pointing first to toy or not), awkward movements to bring toy to hand, success
20. Grasps rake (after pointing first to toy or not), retrieves toy after several attempts
S2: Using rake for retrieval: Intentional mature success
21. Grasps rake, moves rake to retrieve toy, success 
Ambiguous cases (not interpretable, thus no score)
22. Points to toy, hand on rake more or less by chance, grasps rake, rakes with it, toy comes by  
contingency (at C2 or C3)
23. Points to toy then grasps rake encouraged by experimenter and brings the toy to hand possibly by 
contingency (at C2 or C3)
24. Points to toy, grasps rake spontaneously, retrieves toy possibly by contingency (at C2 or C3)
25. Grasps rake spontaneously, retrieves toy possibly by contingency (at C2 or C3)
26. Grasps rake (spontaneously or encouraged by the experimenter) and gives rake to adult or grabs 
adult’s hand
(S1 and S2 were coded for C4 and C5 only, when the rake had first to be displaced laterally to be 
used.)
Table 1: Different strategies observed during a whole trial (in a few trials two strategies, more seldom 
three, occurred in succession)
Notice  that  in  our  classification,  the  last  category  of  behaviors,  which  we  call  "A"  for  
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"Ambiguous" (behaviors 22 to 26), has a special status. Behaviors 22 to 25 occurred essentially in 
conditions C2 and C3 where it was possible for the child to succeed without any understanding of the 
functionality of the rake, as we will see below. This is because, due to the physical position of the toy 
inside the rake, simple pulling the rake would automatically bring the toy into reach. Success in this  
condition could thus be due to the contingency between rake and toy, and not necessarily indicative of 
understanding of the rake: hence our coding of it as "Ambiguous.”
Finally, there was also another behavior that we could not interpret and that we have included 
in the “ambiguous” category: sometimes the infant simply grasped the rake and gave it to the adult.  
She may have done so because she wanted the adult’s help and had understood that the rake was the 
key element, or because she wanted to get rid of the rake. This behavior was observed only eight times  
in all, in three of the infants.
 2. Data analyses
Each infant received a score for each trial, depending on the category it fits in: 0 (No Try), 1 
(interested only either in the toy, or in the tool, T or R), 2 (using the rake in connection with the toy,  
not for retrieval, T+T), 3 (using the rake for retrieval but with difficult or partial success or only after 
demonstration, S1), or 4 (intentional spontaneous mature success, S2). This last score concerned only 
C4 and C5 where success was never ambiguous. 
For some statistical test we pooled C2 and C3, the two conditions without spatial gap, and C4 
and C5, the two conditions with spatial gap.
Results
1/ Retrieval of the toy as a function of condition and session
Before considering the detailed behaviors as classified in our detailed coding scheme, we present in  
this first section an analysis simply of overall success at retrieving the toy. 
The results for overall success bear on 389 trials: 27 for C1, 89 for C2, 60 for C3, 118 for C4, and 95  
for C5, in all. Most of the time the infants were interested by the task. They sometimes expressed  
frustration at not being able to get the toy, but they rarely refused a trial. NT (No Try) was coded for  
31 trials (7.9 %). NT never occurred in C1. For the four other conditions the percentage of NT did not 
change with condition (p=.52). 
Toy attached to the rake (C1)
When the toy was attached to the rake (C1), the infants grasped the rake without hesitation and then  
detached the toy from the rake (see Figure 2a). They almost never first reached or pointed toward the  
toy in this condition (see below results on pointing as first behavior and Figure 2b). This shows that  
visual information sufficed for them to understand that the toy was connected to the rake. Success was 
always 100% success, starting on the first trial.
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a                                                               b 
Insert Figure 2 about here
Figure 2: In condition C1 (a) all infants grasped immediately the tool to retrieve the toy; in the other  
conditions pointing with bare hand toward the toy (b) was frequent 
Toy inside the rake (C2 and C3)
The rate of toy retrieval was high as of the first session, particularly for C2, as can be seen in Figure 3 
which represents the mean percentage of success in which the toy was retrieved successfully. Rates of 
success  for  C2 and C3 did not  differ  significantly.  In  C2,  in  the  first  session  infants  most  often 
immediately grasped the rake to make a raking movement leading to successful retrieval. When the  
toy was not against the rake (C3), these successful retrievals represented only 39% of trials. 
Insert Figure 3 about here
Figure 3: Percentage of success as a function of condition and session
The  rate  of  toy  retrieval  in  C2  showed  a  U-shaped  form.  After  the  first  session  and  the  rather 
stereotyped behavior seen in it (the majority of observed strategies were A25), infants demonstrated 
various behaviors in C2, as we shall see below. An ANOVA on the frequency of object retrieval in C2 
as a function of session showed a significant effect (F(5,15) = 4.3, p<.02). An LSD post-hoc test 
indicated that the percentage of retrieval was almost significantly higher at the first compared to the 
third session (p=.06). The percentage of retrieval was significantly lower at sessions 2, 3, 4 than at  
sessions 4 and 5. Percentage of success in C3 showed an increase across sessions but no statistics were  
calculated on C3 alone because of missing data. 
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Toy to the side of the rake (C4 and C5)
All infants younger than about 16 months failed to retrieve the toy when it was not inside the rake,  
except two infants who succeeded once in the third session but did not repeat it. Successes in C4 and 
C5 showed a rather sudden increase between sessions 5 and 6 (see Figure 3). In session 6, all four 
children succeeded in C4 and C5, although they still did not succeed on all trials, as can be seen in  
Figure 3. An ANOVA on the frequency of object retrieval in C4 and C5 combined (percentage of “S1” 
+ “S2”) as a function of session showed a significant effect (F(5,15) = 15.9, p<.001). A LSD post-hoc 
test indicated that the percentage of retrieval was significantly different in session 6 as compared with  
all the other sessions, which did not differ significantly from each other. Interestingly, the infant 2 who 
missed sessions 1 and 2, and is compared with the other for age (that is, he is included in session 3 at  
age 14 months as if it was his third session even though it is his first session) is well in the mean of all  
infants: the two other boys succeeded slightly earlier but the two girls succeeded slightly later.
Comparison between conditions
In term of success, an ANOVA on the frequency of retrieval as a function of condition and session was 
calculated.  For  this  calculation we  used  the mean frequency of  success  at  C2 and C3,  the mean 
frequency of success at C4 and C5 and compared both of them to success at C1. Results show a  
significant main effect of condition (F(2,30) = 94.2, p<.0001), a significant main effect of session 
(F(5,30) = 11.2, p<.001), and a significant condition x session interaction (F(10,30) = 6.5, p<.0001). A 
LSD post-hoc test shows that the condition effect is due to a difference between all conditions, C1 
being better than C2-C3, itself  better  than C4-C5. For the session effect,  it is due to a difference  
between sessions 1, 2, 3, 4 on one side and 5 and 6 on the other side. The first four sessions do not  
differ significantly from each other. The difference between sessions 5 and 6 almost reach significance 
(p=.05). A LSD post-hoc analysis on the condition x session interaction indicates that condition 1 is 
better than conditions 2-3 at the first 4 sessions only, and better than conditions 4-5 at all sessions, and  
that conditions 2-3 are significantly better than conditions 4-5 at all sessions. 
Another analysis that  we did on all  conditions before moving to the more qualitative  analyses of  
strategies concerns reaching toward / pointing to the toy as a first behavior. Infants frequently pointed 
to the toy before grasping the rake. As already mentioned, they almost never did it in condition C1 
when the toy was attached on the rake. Pointing as a first behavior increased with task difficulty. An 
ANOVA on the percentage of reaching/pointing as a function of condition (C5 excluded, since in this 
condition the rake was handed directly to the infant) indicated a significant effect of condition on 
reaching/pointing (F(3,12) = 12.8, p<.001). An LSD post-hoc test indicated that the percentage of  
reaching/pointing was significantly lower in C1 than in all other conditions, and lower in C3 than in 
C4 (see Figure 4).
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Insert Figure 4 about here
Figure 4: Frequency of pointing as a first behavior as a function of condition
In conclusion, retrieval of the toy was always successful when the toy was attached to the rake as of 12 
months of age (C1), often successful when the toy was inside and against the rake when infants were  
12 and 13 months old (C2) but less so on the next two sessions, and not successful at all when the toy  
was to the side of the rake until 16-20 months of age depending on the infants (C4-C6). Thus, early  
successes in C2 did not help much in allowing the infants to understand how to use the tool, since 
these early successes were followed by many failures in C2 and by almost total failure in C4 and C5.  
In order to get cues to understand the U-curve shape observed in C2 and the relatively sudden onset of  
success  observed in  C4 and C5,  and  to  answer  our  other  questions  (why is  spatial  proximity an 
important factor? What helps infants understand the affordance of the rake in conditions of no spatial 
contact: Exploration of the rake? Trial and error? Observation of a demonstration? Sudden insight?), 
we shall undertake a finer analysis of behaviors as a function of condition and session. This is the 
purpose of the following section.
2/ Finer analysis of behaviors as a function of condition and session: what do these behaviors tell 
us about infants’ understanding of the rake’s functionality?
2.a/ Toy inside the rake (C2)
In the following paragraphs we shall analyse more finely the behaviors observed in condition C2 in 
order  to  try  to  understand  the  origin  of  the  U-shaped  curve  in  retrieval  rate  observed  over  the  
successive sessions.
As mentioned above, in session 1 the most frequent behavior was elementary behavior A25 (60% as a  
mean for all infants), in which the child almost immediately grasps the rake and pulls it. Because the  
toy is spatially inside the tool, the toy generally comes along with the rake, and the child is able to 
retrieve  it.  This  stereotyped direct  pulling of  the rake  observed in  session  1  for C2 decreases  in  
frequency in sessions 2 (46.7%) and 3 (23.3%), being replaced by more varied behaviors in the next  
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three sessions. By then, infants often pointed to the toy before pulling the rake (behaviors A23 and 
A24) or they started to rake the toy but the object was not brought near enough to be retrieved, they 
did not use a further raking movement to retrieve the toy and instead pointed to the toy with bare hand  
(behaviors 5 to 7). Another frequent behaviour was grasping the rake and playing with it (behaviors 13 
to  15).  More  generally  at  this  stage  infants  frequently  took  an  interest  only  in  the  toy 
(reaching/pointing to the toy while ignoring the rake or after discarding it), or the rake (exploring the 
rake in itself, putting it into the mouth, rubbing, sweeping or hitting the table with it) (see Figure 5).  
Connecting rake and toy not for retrieval (touching or hitting it), was not often observed, except for 
one infant who used it as of the first session. 
Insert Figure 5 
Figure  5:  Percentage  of  categories  of  behavior  as  a  function  of  session  at  C2 (NT=Refusal;  T=  
interested in toy only; R= interested in rake only; T+R= interested in connection between rake and toy 
but not for retrieval; Retrieval= toy retrieved)
We interpret all these behaviors typical of the few sessions following the first one as showing that the  
high rate of toy retrieval observed in the 1st session did not reflect a real understanding of the rake’s 
functionality. There were three main reasons why we consider the first successes at C2 as ambiguous 
and not reflecting a clear understanding of the affordance of the rake: the first is that the rate of toy  
retrieval decreased marginally significantly from session 1 to 3. The second reason is that when the 
infants started to rake the toy but failed to bring it closely enough to grasp it, they never tried a second  
time to pull the toy with the rake: instead, they discarded the rake and pointed toward the toy with the  
bare hand. The third reason is that in several cases during the second to fourth session the infants did  
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not pull the rake on the table but grasped it and lifted it over or around the toy before pointing toward  
the toy with the bare hand (see Video 1). In order to understand the origin of this pattern of behaviors, 
we may suppose the following. Infants may have grasped the rake as their first action either because it  
was the closest object or because they believed the toy to be attached to it as in C1 (and it may have 
taken them some time to realize that this was not the case). In any case, the simple pulling of the rake  
was enough to bring the toy closer most of the time. When, in the following sessions, rather than  
pulling the rake directly, infants moved the rake around the toy and then pointed to the toy, begging for 
it with their bare hands after getting rid of the rake, they may have been showing their interest in the 
toy but also that they, at this stage, knew that the rake and the toy were not connected. They also  
clearly showed that they did not know that the rake could be used to bring an unconnected object  
closer. Ultimately however, by sessions 5 and 6, the rate of successful retrieval in C2 went up again,  
probably corresponding to a true understanding of the rake’s affordance.
It is worth noting that there were interindividual differences in the way new behaviors replaced the  
systematic pulling of the rake in the first sessions. Infant 1 was more interested in the toy than in the 
rake and behavior “T” replaced “A” at the following sessions. Infant 2 frequently explored the rake by  
itself on the third session (his first session). Infant 3 was very interested in exploring the rake from the 
beginning,  either  in  connection  with  the  toy  or  alone.  For  him,  behavior  “T+R”  were  frequent 
especially at sessions 2-4. Infant 4 was the infant whose ambiguous successes in C2 decreased the  
least after the first sessions. For her, behaviors “T” and “R” were frequent in sessions 3 and 4. Infant 5 
showed the lowest rate of ambiguous success at the first session and either pointed to the toy (T) or 
was interested in exploring the rake from the beginning (R).
In conclusion, observation of behavior in condition C2 across sessions indicates that after the early 
successes of the first sessions, infants’ behavior changed in sessions 2 to 4. Instead of immediately 
pulling the rake, they either pointed to the toy, sometimes after discarding the rake, or they grasped the  
rake and explored it. Thus, in those sessions, infants tended to pay attention either to the toy or to the 
rake but they seldom connected the two objects and when they did, it was not to retrieve the toy. These 
switches between different strategies across sessions are comparable to the overlapping wave patterns 
described by Chen & Siegler (2000) in their microgenetic study of tool use at 18-35 months of age. 
If, as we suggest, the early successes in toy retrieval in condition C2 were only due to the physical  
contingency between rake and toy, rather than to a true understanding of the rake’s functionality, this 
may explain why there was no rapid transfer from “successes” in C2 to C4 and C5. We will next 
analyze behaviors in conditions C4-C5 in order to elucidate how children understood how to use the 
rake when the toy was clearly separated from the tool.
b/ Toy not near the rake (C4 and C5)
We have seen that despite all their experience of success (expected or not) when the toy was 
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inside the rake, it took the infants several sessions and many trials to understand how to use the rake to  
retrieve the toy when it was clearly independent from the rake (in C4 and C5). In particular, it took the 
infants 30 to 40 trials in all in C4 and C5 (mean: 28.4 trials) across 4 to 6 sessions (mean: 5) to 
succeed, and they were aged 16 to 20 months (mean 17.8 months) when they reached this stage. If the 
infants did not learn much from their own “unexpected” success in C2, then how did they learn to use  
the  rake  in  conditions  C4  and  C5?  By  exploring  the  rake?  By  trial  and  error?   By  watching  a 
demonstration by an adult? In the following section we explore these alternatives by checking which 
behaviors preceded success in C4 and C5.
Exploring the rake alone and in connection with the toy
In this section we ask whether exploring the affordances of the rake over successive sessions allowed  
the child to accumulate enough knowledge to finally make the link between rake and tool, and thereby 
accomplish the task.
First  of  all,  exploring the rake in itself  (“R”) was very frequent over the successive sessions (see 
Figure 6). It was the second most frequent behavior (20.5%, all sessions considered) after behavior 
“T” (36.4%). Connecting the rake with the toy (T+T) was less frequent (16.4%). Note that the ‘T+T” 
behaviors of the first sessions seemed not to be directed toward retrieving the toy (see Video 2), and 
were very different from behavior 16 observed in the last sessions where infants clearly connected the  
rake with the toy to try to retrieve it even though they failed. Hitting the toy with the rake seemed to be 
a game  per se in the first  sessions, and infants who used this strategy did not even grasp the toy 
systematically when it happened to come within reach after they hit it.
Insert Figure 6 
Figure 6: Distribution of the five categories of behavior at C4-C5 as a function of session
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A second point is the following: individual patterns showed that all five infants fluctuated between the 
different strategies across sessions (see Figure 7).  Sometimes they mostly pointed toward the toy,  
sometimes they mostly explored the rake, and at other times they mostly connected rake with toy.  
Doing statistics on the evolution of the different strategies across sessions would be misleading as it is 
clear that the five infants switched in different ways between pointing to the toy, exploring the rake, 
and connecting the rake with the toy (T+T) during sessions preceding success.  What is common 
across infants is the large amount of fluctuation and the lack of a clear, single tendency: we might have 
expected, for instance, to observe an increase in the connection between rake and toy in the session  
preceding success, but this was not the case.
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Insert Figure 7 
Figure 7: Individual distribution of the five categories of behavior at C4-C5 as a function of session
Thus, we found little evidence that gradual accumulation of knowledge about rake affordances leads to 
the ability to make the connection between rake and toy. There was frequent rake behavior but it did 
not gradually increase; nor was rake + toy behavior systematically preceded by frequent rake behavior. 
Learning from trial and error
While the infants appeared not to have learned from their unexpected successes in C2 during the first 
session,  we  wondered  if  they  learned  from  their  errors.  In  other  words,  did  they  correct  their  
movements after trying unsuccessfully to grasp the toy with the rake? There is some indication of this, 
since behavior S1, which reflects awkward or partly successful attempts to use the rake to obtain the 
toy (trial and errors), was much more frequent (39.7% of all behaviors) in the first successful session  
(session  with  more  than  one  isolated  success)  than  S2 (12.7%).  This  was  particularly  true  if  we 
consider the first half of this session, with 22.2% of behaviors classified as S1 versus 1.6% as S2. In 
the second half of this session, S1 decreased to 17.5% whereas S2 increased to 11.1% (see Video 3).
Learning from demonstration by an adult 
Another mechanism to learn how to use a rake might be to observe others doing it. This would be a  
more economical method than trial and error. As mentioned above, in all sessions, after the first failure 
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in C4 and C5, infants received a demonstration from either the parent or one of the experimenters  
(usually  two  demonstrations  in  a  row).  Infants  clearly  did  not  learn  much  from  the  adult’s  
demonstration until late in the study. With only one exception (infant 1, session 3), none of the infants 
succeeded in retrieving the toy with the rake in C4 or C5 right after a demonstration before the sixth  
session. In addition, infant 1 did not repeat her success before the sixth session, either before or after 
demonstration. To check whether the behavior had been influenced by the demonstration despite not  
sufficing to lead to retrieval of the toy, we compared the level of performance, indexed by the obtained  
score, on the trials preceding and following demonstration for C4 and C5 considered together (see 
Figure 8). It can be seen that the score on trials just following demonstration did not differ greatly  
from  the  score  of  the  trials  preceding  a  demonstration  until  the  last  session.  An  ANOVA was 
performed on the score as a function of condition (x 2, before and after the demonstration), and of  
session (x 4, we choose to start at session 3 to be able to include infant 2) with repeated measures. It 
showed no main effect of condition, a significant main effect of session (F(3,12) = 31.3, p<.001) and a 
condition x session interaction (F(3,12)=7.5, p<.01). A post-hoc LSD test indicated that on the last 
session  the  score  after  demonstration  differed  significantly  from  the  score  after  demonstration 
(p<.0001).  Thus,  infants  started  to  benefit  from demonstration  relatively  late,  and  not  before  18 
months.
Insert Figure 8 about here
Figure 8: Score on trial before and after demonstration at C4-C5
In sum, when the toy was not inside the rake, infants started to use the rake to retrieve the toy between 
16 and 20 months of age. Before that, they either explored the rake per se or focused on the toy, or to a 
lesser  extent  made some connection between rake  and toy.  When success  first  appeared,  it  often 
occurred after corrections of awkward attempts to use the tool or after demonstration by an adult. But 
neither of these behaviors was observed during the first  sessions.  It  could be that  the capacity  to  
correct  inadequate  motor  planning  (trial  and  error  strategy),  and  the  capacity  to  benefit  from  a 
demonstration  (observational  learning)  require  that  the  infant  already  have  some  intuition  of  the 
solution.
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Discussion
In this study, we analyzed the behavior of four infants presented with a rake within reach and with an  
out-of-reach toy in different positions relative to the rake. We set up the experiment so that the rake  
was not very attractive per se, as opposed to the toy that we chose to be very salient visually so as to  
attract the attention and trigger the desire of the infants. Our goal was to finely describe behaviors so  
as to disclose some of the mechanisms leading to the discovery of the affordance of a rake to bring an  
object to hand. In particular we wanted to answer the following questions: why is spatial proximity an 
important factor in determining success in retrieving the toy? What will help infants understand the 
affordance  of  the  rake  in  conditions  of  no  spatial  contact:  observation  of  their  success  in  easier  
conditions  of  spatial  contact?  Exploration  of  the  rake?  Trial  and  error?  Observation  of  a 
demonstration? Sudden insight? Before trying to answer these questions, let us summarize our main 
results and present a few conclusions that can be retained from them.
Globally, we observed the expected hierarchy of success, with systematic success when the toy was 
attached to the rake (C1), and earlier success (12-13 months) when the toy was inside the rake (C2-C3) 
than  when  it  was  outside  (C4-C5).  This  pattern  fits  with  previous  findings  showing  that  spatial 
proximity helps young infants succeed in tool-use (Bates et al., 1980; van Leeuwen et al., 1994). 
However, finer analysis of the behaviors led us to interpret with caution 12-13 month old's successes  
with the toy close to the rake. In the sessions immediately following their first successful sessions, that  
is, at ages 14-16 months, the same infants often failed in condition C2, with success returning only in  
the  very  last  sessions.  We  observed  this  U-shaped  pattern  in  all  three  infants  who  started  the 
experiment at 12 months of age. In the unsuccessful sessions at the bottom of the "U", many of the  
infants' behaviors indicated that they wanted the toy but did not know that the rake was the solution:  
for example they might actively discard the rake or ignore it before or while reaching/pointing to the 
toy. Furthermore, at the bottom of the U-shape, the number of different behaviors displayed by the 
infants was much larger than in the first and last sessions. We interpret these facts as showing that  
success at 12-13 months in C2 may be due, not to infants understanding that a rake can bring an out-
of-reach object to hand, but instead simply to the physical rake-toy contingency, in other words to the  
task setup itself. U-shape has often been observed during development (Mounoud, 1993; Rakinson & 
Yermolayeva,  2011;  Voulomanos,  2011)  and  is  generally  interpreted  as  being  caused  by  new 
knowledge temporarily disorganizing behavior before being integrated into a new organization. In our 
case the new knowledge could be that the two objects are separated in C2, which keeps the child from 
using the rake as a tool until s/he understands or at least suspects that it might be useful. 
A first  conclusion we can thus draw from behavior in C2 is that even in this condition of spatial 
contiguity, children probably do not understand the notion of a rake at the beginning of their second 
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year. Sampling a variety of different behaviors when they do not succeed may be one mechanism  
infants use to try to solve the problem at hand.
A second conclusion concerns learning from early successes. It seems that infants did not learn from  
their early successes in condition C2, since they failed in the following sessions and in the other  
conditions.  It  may  be  hypothesized  that  so  long as  infants  pull  the  tool  without  the  intention  of  
retrieving what they see as an independent toy, they do not make the connection between their action 
and its result on the toy. In other words, understanding the causal relationship between the raking 
movement  and the effect  on the toy may require  a  minimum of  intention while  raking;  only the  
intention to obtain the toy with the rake may direct the attention to its effect sufficiently to anticipate a 
result and to see what actually happens. This could also be interpreted in the light of Brown’s assertion 
that transfer depends on the deep structural principles that the child possesses (Brown, 1990).
Let us now recall the results for the conditions with spatial gap (C4-C5). Learning to use the rake in 
these  conditions  was  a  protracted  process.  In  the  first  four  or  five  sessions,  infants  often 
reached/pointed to the toy, with the next most frequent behavior consisting in exploring the tool. There 
was a lot of alternation between the different strategies during the first sessions. First successes did not  
occur  before  the  last  two  sessions  and  they  were  often  obtained  with  awkward  or  ineffectual  
movements, soon corrected during the trial or on the next one. Some of these first successes occurred 
after  demonstration,  whereas  demonstration  almost  never  led  to  success  in  the  first  sessions. 
Considering C4 and C5 together, the rate of success increased rather abruptly between the 5 th and 6th 
sessions. 
Several  conclusions may be drawn from this: (1) Alternating attention between toy and rake may  
reflect  attentional  limits,  infants being able  to attend either  to the rake or  the tool  but  less  often 
connecting both; (2) Exploring the rake and connecting it to the toy, even when this is not for retrieval,  
may help the infant acquire knowledge of various affordances of the rake; it may also help increase 
manual dexterity in using the rake, which may thus increasingly become felt as an extension of the 
hand; (3) The understanding of the specific affordance of the rake to bring the toy within reach comes 
after a large number of these explorations; (4) When the infant finally understands that the rake can be 
useful, s/he uses both trial and error and observational learning, and becomes able to retrieve the toy  
with the rake after only a few unsuccessful or partly successful trials. 
We now come to the five questions raised in the introduction.
Why is  spatial  proximity an important  factor? One main reason why spatial  proximity/perceptual 
continuity facilitate tool use is that success may occur early through simple contingency. By saying 
this  however,  we  do  not  imply  that  perceptual  continuity  does  not  contribute  to  providing  some 
intuition  of  the  solution.  We mean  that  early  successes  may  be  misleading  and  that  even  in  the 
condition of perceptual continuity infants do not understand the tool’s usefulness before the middle of 
the second year.
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What can help infants understand the affordance of the rake in conditions of no spatial contact: (a)  
Observation of  their  success  under the easier  conditions of  spatial  contact?  There was clearly  no 
transfer from the early success in C2 to C4 and C5. As mentioned above, this could be interpreted as 
reflecting the fact that before infants have the intention to retrieve the toy with the rake, they do not  
“see” the consequence of their own behavior or relate the effect to the cause and thus cannot repeat it;  
(b)  Exploration  of  the  rake?  Exploration  of  the  rake  does  indeed  start  in  the  first  session.  This 
progressive familiarization with the rake may have had a role in building the basis for tool use. This 
would fit with the ecological view that object exploration on surfaces or on other objects forms the 
basis of tool use (Lockman, 2000). However, we did not observe an increase in the exploration of the 
rake alone preceding first successes, as one might have expected. Rather, there was a switch between 
different  strategies  across  sessions.  This  fits  with  the  notion  of  the  overlapping  wave  patterns  
described by Chen & Siegler (2000) in their microgenetic study of tool use at 18-35 months of age. It  
is also congruent with the notion that variability plays an important role in motor development (Fagard 
& Lockman, 2005; Piek, 2002; Thelen, 1995); (c) Trial and error? There seems to be a change in the 
capacity to correct inefficient movements that results in the toy being brought closer around 17-18 
months: before that age, a trial resulting in partial success is not followed by corrections. In contrast,  
by the last two sessions, trial and error seems to be an efficient strategy leading to full success; (d) 
Observation of a demonstration? As for trial and error, observational learning of tool use occurred 
rather  late.  One  may  wonder  why  it  takes  so  long  for  the  infants  to  benefit  from  the  adult’s  
demonstration. Many studies have shown that infants below 15 months can imitate simple actions, that 
they can reproduce three-step actions (Elsner, 2007), and learn means-end tasks from observation as of 
the beginning of the second year (Provasi, Dubon, & Bloch, 2001; see Elsner, 2007 for a review). Why 
then was it the case that in our study, the trial after adult’s demonstration did not differ from the trial  
before until the sixth session (mean age: 18.5 months)? Our results bear on too few children to draw 
conclusions  on  this  point.  However,  in  the  case  of  a  new complex  manual  skill,  the  absence  of 
observational  learning before late in the second year is congruent  with a previous result  (Esseily, 
Nadel,  & Fagard,  2010).  An additional  point  is  that  we  might  have  obtained  more success  after 
demonstration had we included more of what Sage and Baldwin (2011) calls “pedagogical cues” in our 
demonstration. Sage has shown that with pedagogical cues during demonstration 11-month-old infants 
benefit from the demonstration of tool use (toy to the side of a hook), whereas they do not so benefit  
from demonstration without such cues. (e) Sudden insight? The fact that infants needed very few trials 
before full success once they started to try to use the tool to bring the toy to hand fits with Piaget’s 
observation that his son discovered the use of the stick “almost without trial and error” (Piaget, 1952, 
p.290). 
Our study was an exploratory study aimed at examining the processes by which a few infants seen 
repeatedly during their second year come to understand the functionality of a tool. As opposed to the  
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few existing studies on tool use in infants, this study did not investigate change in manual skill at 
using  a  tool  per  se (Connelly  &  Dalgleish,  1989),  anticipatory  prehension  of  the  tool’s  handle 
(McCarty et  al.,  1999), or the capacity to transfer  tool learning and to choose the best-fitted tool  
among several  (Brown,  1990).  Our  goal  was  to  advance  the understanding of  the  role  of  spatial 
separation  in  tool  use  and  examine  when  and  how  the  infants  really  start  to  understand  the 
functionality of a tool to bring an out-of-reach object closer. 
It  is  often  said  that  there  are  two  approaches  to  the  study  of  tool  use:  one  conceptual  and  one  
sensorimotor (Greif & Needham, 2011). In the conceptual approach, the accent is put on children’s  
acquisition of the notion that the tool’s affordances include the possibility of causing the effect that 
they want (toy being brought closer).  In this approach,  the authors argue that  since the notion of 
causality seems to be acquired by a few months of age (Baillargeon, Kotovsky, & Needham, 1995; 
Leslie & Keeble, 1987), what the infant lacks is the motor skill itself. In the sensorimotor approach,  
the accent is put  on the spontaneous exploration of the tool,  from which the understanding of its  
affordance  may  gradually  emerge  (Lockman,  2000).  On  this  view,  the  conceptual  understanding 
follows the manual capacity (Schlesinger & Langer, 1999). 
These two components—manual and conceptual—may be distinguished in our task: the infants must  
understand the usefulness of the tool to bring the toy closer, and they must learn how to move the tool  
skillfully. It appears from our results that learning the conceptual aspect of the problem (knowing that  
the tool may serve to retrieve the toy) and learning the motor skill part (knowing how to use the rake  
to retrieve the toy) are two different processes with different time courses, since as soon as a trial and 
error  strategy  is  observed,  success  arises  fairly  quickly.  Thus,  the  specific  sensorimotor  process 
consisting in trying to use the tool intentionally to retrieve the toy is not protracted. However, in the  
long process that precedes and during which the affordance of the tool in bringing the toy closer is  
slowly built, unspecific sensorimotor processes take place, during which several affordances of the 
tool may be discovered (hitting, displacing, etc.). This continuous exploration of the tool alone or in 
relation to the toy does not lead to success until the specific affordance of the tool in bringing the  
object closer is understood, but it allows rapid success once the conceptual aspect is acquired; on the  
other hand, the conceptual aspect may need many types of exploration to emerge. One possibility is  
that such exploration of the tool, by increasing the child's dexterity in manipulating the tool (which  
may thus become more of an extension of the hand) and thereby releaving some of the attentional load  
associated with manual control, makes the infant readier to imagine a new affordance such as bringing 
the toy closer. In sum then, we would like to argue that development should not be viewed as a single  
process (be it concept or skill) that develops linearly one stage after another, but as a process involving 
reciprocal facilitation between conceptual understanding and skill  learning (see Greif & Needham, 
2011, for a similar view).
Further  investigation  is  needed  to  determine  whether  the  accumulation  of  skills  derived  from 
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successive episodes of exploration alone explains the relative suddenness of success. This would be 
compatible  with  some  older  studies  (Richardson,  1932;  Piaget,  1952)  indicating  that  only  when 
conceptual understanding and manual dexterity with the rake has reached a certain level, that infants  
are suddenly able to intuit the solution and make use of feedback (trial and error) and/or observation of 
a model to guide their own action. An alternative (or an additional consideration) might be that other  
mechanisms (e.g. increase in short-term memory, attentional capacity, inhibition) might come into play 
suddenly due to maturation of the central nervous system or to progress in other domains of behavior. 
A cross-sectional study bearing on a greater number of infants and further longitudinal investigations 
done  with  more frequent  testing  of  infants  near  the  critical  transition  period  are  on their  way to 
elucidate this question. 
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Captions
Table 1: Different strategies observed during a whole trial (in a few trials two strategies, or 
more rarely three, occurred in succession)
Figure 1: Rake and toys in the different conditions of testing from C1 to C4 (C5 is not shown: 
the toy is placed too far to be reached and the rake is handed directly to the infant)
Figure 2: (a) Grasping the rake directly (C1), (b) Reaching/pointing toward the toy (C4)  
Figure 3: Reaching/pointing toward the object as a first movement as a function of condition
Figure 4: Retrieval of the toy as a function of session and condition 
Figure 5: Percentage of the different categories of behavior in C2 as a function of session (Toy 
retrieval corresponds to A in the first sessions and more often to S toward the last sessions)
Figure 6 a, b, c, d: Individual profiles in C2 (“Toy Ret” corresponds to “A” during the first 
sessions)
Figure 7a, b, c, d: Individual profiles in C4-C5 (Ambiguous behavior no. 26, “Grasps rake 
spontaneously and gives it to adult,” is not represented on the figures because of its rarity; 
thus the total percentage of behaviors may sometimes differ from 100%)
Figure 8: Mean score (all infants, all trials) as a function of session and demonstration in C4 and C5
Videos
Video 1: Infant 1, 15 months, C2: Discarding the tool 
Video 2:Infant 3, 12 months, C4: Hitting the toy with the rake
Video 3:Infant 1, 18 months, C5: Trial and error and observational learning before first full  
success
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Bases cognitives, perceptuelles et motrices de l’utilisation d’outils 
chez le très jeune enfant
Introduction (Chapitres 1 et 2)
L'utilisation  d'outils  est  définie  comme  la  capacité  d'agir  sur  un  objet  par 
l'intermédiaire d'un  autre objet. On sait que cette capacité se met en place chez l'enfant vers la  
fin de la deuxième année de vie. Malgré un intérêt grandissant pour l'étude de l'apprentissage 
de l'utilisation d'outils, les étapes ainsi que les mécanismes sous-jacents de cet apprentissage 
restent très peu connus. Dans ce travail de thèse, nous avons cherché à savoir à partir de quel 
âge, dans quelles conditions et grâce à quels mécanismes le jeune enfant apprend à utiliser un 
outil pour rapprocher un objet hors de portée.
Le premier chapitre de la thèse porte sur les diverses définitions de l'utilisation d'outils 
qui ont été proposées dans la littérature. La définition la plus courante, tant pour les études sur 
l'animal  non-humain que sur les bébés humains,  est  celle  de Beck (1980, p.10) décrivant 
l'outil comme « l'emploi externe d'un objet détaché de l'environnement de façon à modifier 
avec efficacité la forme, la position ou l'état d'un autre objet, d'un autre organisme, ou de 
l'utilisateur lui même, lorsque l'utilisateur tient ou transporte l'outil pendant ou juste avant de 
l'utiliser,  et  qu'il  est  responsable  de  l'orientation  correcte  et  efficace  de  l'outil ».  Afin  de 
pouvoir comparer nos données avec celle de la majorité des études de la littérature, c'est donc 
d'après cette définition que nous avons considéré l'utilisation d'outils chez le très jeune bébé.
Dans un deuxième temps, nous décrivons au sein du premier chapitre les principales 
utilisations d'outils que l'on retrouve dans la littérature sur l'homme et l'animal non humain. 
Ces utilisations peuvent être classées selon six catégories : 1) l'extension de la portée (par 
exemple pour atteindre un objet hors d'atteinte), 2) l'amplification de la force mécanique (par 
exemple  l'utilisation  d'un  marteau  pour  casser  quelque  chose),  3)  l'amplification  des 
comportements d'agression ou antagonistes (par exemple l'utilisation d'armes), 4) la collection 
et le transport de liquides ou de petits objets (par exemple un récipient pour contenir de l'eau, 
cuillère pour contenir des aliments liquides), 5) l'entretien du corps (par exemple utiliser un 
objet pour se laver), et enfin 6) la  protection d'une partie du corps (par exemple utiliser un 
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bâton pour explorer à travers des flammes). Parmi ces différentes fonctions, celle que nous 
avons choisi d'étudier tout au long de ce travail de thèse est la fonction d’extension de la 
portée, plus particulièrement celle qui consiste à rapprocher avec un râteau un objet attrayant 
hors de portée.
Le second chapitre porte sur le développement de l'utilisation d'outils pendant les deux 
premières  années  de  la  vie.  Dans  une  première  partie  nous  commençons  par  une  brève 
description des étapes du développement des bébés, et plus particulièrement de leurs habiletés 
manuelles depuis la naissance jusqu'à l'apparition de l'utilisation d'outils. Dès la naissance, les 
bébés  commencent  à  explorer  leur  nouvel  environnement  à  partir  d'un  répertoire  moteur 
comprenant principalement trois catégories de comportements. Ces catégories correspondent 
aux comportements innés, qui sont des comportements déclenchés par des stimuli externes, 
aux mouvements  spontanés  qui  ont  lieu  en l'absence  de  stimulus  particulier,  ainsi  qu'aux 
boucles  sensorimotrices,  permettant  au  bébé  d'ajuster  ses  mouvements  en  fonction  des 
feedbacks qu'ils reçoivent de l'environnement. Dès l'âge de deux mois, les bébés commencent 
à élaborer des mouvements volontaires en direction des objets. Ces mouvements s'affinent au 
cours du développement, aussi  bien en terme de contrôle moteur de la trajectoire,  que de 
vitesse  de  la  main  ou  d'adaptation  à  la  gravité  par  exemple.  Ces  gestes  de  préhension 
volontaire permettent à l'enfant une première exploration des objets, qui s'affinera au cours de 
la première année de vie au fur et à mesure que les gestes de préhension progressent et que le 
rôle  de  chacune  des  deux  mains  se  différencie.  Les  enfants  peuvent  alors  découvrir  les 
propriétés  des  objets  en  eux-mêmes  et  dans  l'environnement,  ainsi  que  les  possibilités 
d'actions avec ces objets (également appelé « affordance » des objets, Gibson, 1966). C'est sur 
la  base  de  ces  nouvelles  connaissances  sur  le  monde  physique  extérieur  que  les  enfants 
pourront acquérir des notions plus complexes telles que celle du concept d'outil.
La seconde partie de ce second chapitre porte sur la description des études qui ont été 
réalisées sur l'utilisation d'outils chez le très jeune enfant, principalement entre 12 et 36 mois. 
Dans un premier temps, nous décrivons le développement de l'utilisation de la cuillère entre 
12 et 19 mois. Cependant, nous mettons l'accent sur le fait que la cuillère est un outil un peu  
particulier, dans le sens où l'enfant a eu de multiples occasions de se familiariser avec son 
utilisation en observant d'autres personnes s'en servir dans la vie de tous les jours, ainsi qu'en 
ayant lui même l'occasion de l'utiliser. Malgré ces différences, il est intéressant de rappeler 
brièvement le développement de l'utilisation de la cuillère dans le sens où c'est généralement 
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le premier outil que les enfants apprennent à utiliser. En particulier, nous décrivons les études 
de  McCarty  et  al.  (1999,  2001)  sur  le  développement  de  la  planification  du  geste  de 
préhension de la cuillère, en fonction de l'orientation de la cuillère vers la main préférée ou la 
main  non-préférée.  Ces  études  ont  permis  de  mettre  en  évidence  que  l'enfant  ne  planifie 
pleinement le geste d'utilisation de la cuillère qu'à partir de l'âge de 19 mois. Concernant les  
recherches  sur  l'utilisation  de  l'outil  pour  rapprocher  un  objet  hors  de  portée,  à  notre 
connaissance, très peu d'études ont été réalisées sur la planification du geste. Cox & Smitsman 
(2006a) par exemple, mettent en évidence que les enfants ne planifie la préhension de l'outil,  
et de l'action avec l'outil, qu'à partir de l'âge de trois ans. D'après cette étude, avant cet âge là 
les enfants sont plus influencés par leur latéralité manuelle lorsqu'il s'agit de prendre l'outil, 
même si l'utilisation de la main préférée rend l'action plus difficile que si l'enfant avait utilisé 
l'autre main.
Dans  une  troisième  partie,  nous  décrivons  cinq  principaux  aspects  qui  ont  été 
particulièrement  étudiés  pour  l'utilisation  de  l'outil  chez  le  jeune  enfant :  1)  les  facteurs 
perceptuels (tels que la couleur, la forme de l'outil, etc) et la relation spatiale entre l'objet et 
l'outil, 2) la capacité de transférer sa connaissance d'un outil à une autre situation d'utilisation 
d'outil  (par exemple,  choisir un outil  fonctionnel parmi un choix d'outils dont un seul est 
fonctionnel), 3) la capacité de planifier une action d'utilisation d'outils, comme déjà évoqué 
dans le paragraphe précédent, 4) l'effet de la familiarité avec un outil, qui peut rendre moins 
flexible l'utilisation du même outil dans un contexte inhabituel,  et enfin 5) l'apprentissage de 
l'utilisation d'outils par observation. 
Deux des aspects précédemment cités ont particulièrement retenu notre attention dans 
ce  travail  de  thèse :  les  relations  spatiales  entre  objet  et  outils  et  l'apprentissage  par 
observation. Les études portant sur le premier aspect ont mis en évidence que les enfants ont 
plus  de  difficultés  à  utiliser  un  outil  lorsque  celui-ci  est  séparé  spatialement  de  l'objet  à 
rapprocher, que lorsque l'objet est placé contre l'outil, directement dans la trajectoire entre 
l'outil et l'enfant (Bates et al., 1980 ; van Leeuwen et al., 1994). D'après Brown (1990), cette 
difficulté vient du fait que les enfants doivent « anticiper mentalement » la position de l'outil 
par rapport à l'objet pour pouvoir l'utiliser, ce qui est difficile avant la fin de la deuxième 
année  de  la  vie.  Cependant,  ces  études  ne  permettent  pas  de  mettre  en  évidence  les 
mécanismes impliqués dans la difficulté d'utiliser un outil lorsque l'objet n'est pas proche de 
l'outil.  Le  second  aspect  sur  lequel  nous  nous  sommes  penchés  est  l'apprentissage  par 
observation. On sait que tout au long de son développement, le bébé interagit avec le monde 
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extérieur dans un contexte social très riche, et qu'il commence à imiter de nombreuses actions 
très tôt au cours du développement. Dès 12 mois par exemple, l'enfant est capable d'imiter des 
actions pour atteindre un but précis, par exemple ouvrir une boîte afin de récupérer un objet 
qui est à l'intérieur. En ce qui concerne l'apprentissage par observation de l'utilisation d'outils, 
une  seul  étude  à  notre  connaissance  s'est  focalisée  sur  l'effet  de  la  démonstration  sur  la 
performance des enfants dans une tâche d'utilisation d'outils (Fattori et al., 2008). Cette étude 
a  montré que dès  15 mois,  certains enfants pouvaient  apprendre à utiliser un râteau pour 
rapprocher un jouet hors de portée après observation de cette action par un expérimentateur. 
Cependant,  le  taux  de  réussite  après  observation  ne  dépassait  pas  les  30%,  ce  qui  reste 
relativement faible. De plus, cette étude portait sur des actions différentes à chaque groupe 
d'âge testé (entre 8 et 18 mois), ce qui ne permet pas de savoir à partir de quel âge et dans 
quelles conditions de démonstration l'enfant est  capable d'apprendre à utiliser un outil par 
observation.
Dans cette revue de littérature de ce chapitre introductif, nous avons mis en évidence 
le  peu  d'études  sur le  développement  de  l'utilisation d'outils  chez le  très jeune enfant,  et  
l'absence  de  connaissances  sur  les  mécanismes  impliqués  dans  cet  apprentissage.  En 
particulier,  aucune  étude  n'a  été  réalisée  de  façon  systématique  tout  au  long  du 
développement, afin de bien situer les étapes et les mécanismes du développement de cette 
habileté. Dans ce travail de thèse, les études que nous avons menées avaient pour but de 
compléter ce manque dans la littérature en apportant une description plus systématique de cet 
apprentissage  sur  les  deux  premières  années  de  la  vie.  Trois  aspects  ont  été  plus 
particulièrement  ciblés  au  sein  de  ces  études :  l'utilisation  d'outils  spontanée  au  cours  du 
développement,  les  pré-requis  de  l'utilisation  d'outils,  et  le  rôle  de  l'apprentissage  par 
observation dans l'acquisition de cette capacité. Le but principal de ce travail de thèse est ainsi 
de  mieux  comprendre  comment  l'utilisation  d'outils  émerge  chez  le  jeune  enfant,  et  de 
proposer des mécanismes potentiellement impliqués dans cet apprentissage.
Etapes principales de l'utilisation d'outils (Chapitre 3)
Dans ce chapitre, nous présentons une étude longitudinale sur cinq enfants observés 
régulièrement durant la deuxième année, ainsi qu'une étude transversale sur 60 enfants vus par 
groupes  d'âges  sur  la  même  période  du  développement.  La  tâche  d'utilisation  d'outils 
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consistait à ramener vers soi un objet attrayant à l'aide d'un râteau en carton. Ces deux études 
ont un protocole commun basé d'une part sur différentes conditions de relation spatiales entre 
l'outil et l'objet dans un ordre de difficultés croissantes (voir Fig. 1), et d'autre part sur la 
démonstration d'une condition par un adulte lorsque celle-ci n'est pas réussie spontanément 
par l'enfant. 
Fig 1. Conditions de relation spatiales entre l'outil et l'objet (de C1 à C5) présentées dans les  
études longitudinale et transversale.
L'étude préliminaire longitudinale a été initiée par J. Fagard et J.K. O'Regan avant le 
début de ce travail de thèse (voir Annexes 2 et 3 pour les articles issus de cette recherche). Le 
protocole de cette étude étant très semblable à l'étude principale de ce chapitre, et le codage 
ayant été élaboré en collaboration pour les deux expériences, nous la décrivons brièvement 
dans une première partie de ce chapitre. Le codage est basé sur 26 comportements observés 
chez les enfants lorsqu'un objet attrayant est placé devant eux, sur une table, en présence d'un 
outil  placé  dans  différentes  conditions  spatiales,  comme  présenté  en  figure  1.  Ces 
comportements sont répartis en cinq principales classes de comportements, nous permettant 
d'attribuer  aux enfants  un score pour  chaque essai,  moyenné ensuite  par  condition  et  par 
enfant. Ainsi, un score de 0 est attribué en l'absence d'intérêt pour la tâche, un score de 1 
lorsque l'enfant est  uniquement  attiré par l'objet,  un score de 2 lorsque l'enfant s'intéresse 
principalement au râteau sans le mettre en lien avec l'objet, un score de 3 lorsque l'enfant met 
en lien l'outil et l'objet sans intention particulière de rapprocher l'objet, un score de 4 lorsque 
l'enfant  tente  d'utiliser  l'outil  pour  rapprocher  l'objet  suivi,  éventuellement,  d'une  réussite 
maladroite, et enfin un score de 5 est attribué pour une réussite immédiate. Cette échelle de 
réussite permet d'évaluer de façon plus précise la performance de l'enfant que sur une simple 
dichotomie entre succès et échec. Elle sera réutilisée par la suite pour toute les études sur 
l'utilisation d'outils chez l'enfant menées au sein de notre équipe. 
Les résultats de cette étude longitudinale sur cinq enfants ont montré principalement 
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que les premiers succès spontanés apparaissent dès 12 mois lorsque le jouet est initialement 
placé contre le râteau ou dans sa trajectoire. Lorsque le jouet est placé à distance du râteau sur 
la table, les premières réussites spontanées n'apparaissent qu'à partir de 18 mois. De même 
lorsqu'un  adulte  fait  la  démonstration  de  cette  condition,  l'enfant  n'est  sensible  à  la 
démonstration qu'à partir de 18 mois. 
La seconde étude, qui a donné lieu aux deux publications présentées dans ce chapitre, 
a été réalisée sur 60 enfants de 14, 16, 18, 20 et 22 mois (12 enfants par âge). Cette étude a  
permis notamment de tester de façon plus systématique et contrôlée, ainsi que sur un plus 
grand  nombre  d'enfants,  les  conditions  d'utilisation  d'outils  observées  lors  de  l'étude 
longitudinale. Nous avons ainsi pu confirmer que les premiers succès pour les conditions où 
l'objet est contre le râteau, dans la trajectoire entre l'enfant et le râteau, apparaissent dès le 
plus  jeune  âge  testé.  Au  contraire,  dans  les  conditions  où  l'objet  et  l'outil  était  séparés  
spatialement, aucun succès spontané n'était observé avant 18 à 22 mois. De même, dans ces 
conditions  de  relations  spatiales,  les  enfants  n'ont  été  sensibles  à  la  demonstration  de 
l'utilisation d'outils par un adulte qu'à partir de l'âge de 18 mois. Ces résultats sont présentés 
dans  le  premier  article  de  la  thèse,  et  discutés  en  termes  de  changement  au  cours  du 
développement dans les capacités attentionnelles des enfants. Ainsi, avant 18 mois, les enfants 
pourraient avoir du mal à centrer leur attention sur plusieurs éléments d'une même tâche au 
même moment. Dans la continuité de cette étude, une analyse plus fine des données nous a 
permis de mettre  en évidence  l'âge  à  partir  duquel  les enfants  planifient  leur action  pour 
utiliser un outil. Ces résultats sont présentés dans le deuxième article de la thèse. Nous avons 
ainsi montré qu'avant 18 mois, les enfants sont principalement influencés par leur préférence 
pour la main droite lorsqu'ils prennent le râteau. Au contraire, les enfants plus âgés ont plutôt 
tendance à varier la main utilisée en fonction de la position du jouet par rapport au râteau. Ces 
résultats mettent en évidence une meilleure anticipation de l'action et de son résultat chez les 
enfants en phase d'acquisition de la capacité à utiliser un outil.
Étapes développementales prélables à l'utilisation d'outils (Chapitre 4)
Une observation  faite  lors  de  ces  premières  études  transversale  et  longitudinale  a 
retenu notre attention. En effet, lorsque le jouet était fixé directement sur le râteau, tous les 
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enfants étaient capables de le récupérer dès 12-14 mois. Cela suggère que l'enfant a acquis dès 
12 mois la notion d'objet composite, c'est-à-dire qu'il sait que deux parties d'un objet qui sont 
connectées dans l'espace forment un seul et même objet. Lors d'une étude complémentaire, 
nous avons cherché à savoir à partir de quel âge et dans quelles conditions l'enfant acquiert et 
utilise cette connaissance. Dans cette étude sur 38 enfants de 6 à 10 mois, en collaboration 
avec  C.  Florean  (stagiaire  pré-doctorale,  Bologna,  Italie),  nous  avons  pu  déterminer  que 
l'enfant acquiert la notion d'objet composite entre 8 et 10 mois. En effet, nous avons observé 
un changement significatif de la connaissance de la notion de connexion entre objets entre 6 et  
8 mois. À partir de 8 mois, on observe une anticipation visuelle vers la partie distale d'un 
objet composite lors de la prise de sa partie proche, montrant que l'enfant comprend qu'il peut 
agir sur la partie proche d'un objet composite pour atteindre la partie hors de portée de cet  
objet. Les résultats de cette étude sont brièvement présentés au début de ce chapitre, et font 
actuellement l'objet d'un article en cours de préparation, non inclus dans cette thèse.
D'après l'étude sur les objets composites, dès 8 mois l'enfant utilise donc la notion de 
connexion lorsqu'il interagit avec des objets composites. De même, on sait  que dès 10-12 
mois, lorsqu'un objet hors de portée est attaché à l'extrémité d'une ficelle à portée de sa main, 
un enfant tire sur la ficelle avant de chercher à prendre l'objet. Pourtant, lorsque dans une 
étude pilote nous avons présenté à des enfants de 16 mois un choix de plusieurs ficelles dont 
une seule était connectée à l'objet, les enfants ne choisissaient pas systématiquement la ficelle 
connectée. Nous avons cherché à savoir pourquoi même à 16 mois, l'enfant n'utilise pas cette 
notion de connexion entre objets pour résoudre cette tâche. Pour cela, nous avons réalisé une 
étude  comparant  les performances  des  enfants  à  cette  tâche  (condition  action)  avec leurs 
comportements visuels vis-à-vis de la scène lorsqu'un adulte résolvait  la tâche devant eux 
(condition vision, voir l'illustration des deux conditions Fig. 2). Cette étude est présentée dans 
l'article 3 de cette thèse.
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Fig 2. Conditions action (a) et vision (b) de la tâche expérimentale des multiples ficelles. Une 
seule ficelle est connectée à un objet attrayant hors de portée.
En fonction des performances des enfants pour les quatre essais de la condition action 
(un  essai  par  position  possible  pour  la  ficelle  connectée),  les  enfants  étaient  répartis  en 
groupes  de  performance.  Ces  groupes  étaient  comparés  sur  leurs  stratégies  visuelles  en 
condition  vision,  à  l'aide  d'un  appareil  de  mesure  de  suivi  du  regard  ('eyetracker').  Plus 
particulièrement, il s'agissait de voir si les enfants qui réussissaient systématiquement la tâche 
en condition action, étaient capables de visuellement anticiper la ficelle qui devait être tirée 
pour que l'objet puisse être rapproché, c'est à dire la ficelle connectée. Deux hypothèses sont 
possibles pour les enfants qui ne réussissaient pas à identifier la ficelle connectée en condition 
action. La première hypothèse serait que les enfants perçoivent quelle ficelle est connectée, ce 
qui se traduirait par une stratégie visuelle comparable à celles des enfants qui réussissent en 
action, mais ne peuvent pas utiliser cette information lorsqu'ils doivent agir eux-mêmes sur 
cette tâche complexe nécessitant d'inhiber le comportement de tirer n'importe quelle ficelle au 
hasard. Selon la deuxième hypothèse, si d'autres facteurs que l'inhibition interviennent dans la 
difficulté  des  enfants  à  résoudre  cette  tâche,  nous  devrions  observer  des  comportements 
visuels différents entre les enfants qui réussissent systématiquement, comparés aux enfants 
qui échouent.
Une  première  comparaison  des  différents  groupes  de  performance  en  action  nous 
permettent de suggérer que les enfants qui échouent à choisir la bonne ficelle pour attraper 
l'objet pourraient avoir du mal à inhiber le geste spontané de prendre la ficelle la plus proche 
de  leur  main  préférée.  En  effet,  ce  biais  n'est  observé  que  dans  le  groupe  d'enfants  qui 
échouent,  tandis  que le  groupe le  plus  fort  des  enfants  qui  réussissent  à  chaque essai  ne 
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présente pas un tel  biais. Cela suggère donc,  en lien avec la  première hypothèse,  que les 
difficultés  de  certains  enfants  à  résoudre  cette  tâche  sont  duse  à  une capacité  plus  faible 
d'inhiber une action chez ces enfants que chez les enfants qui réussissent la tâche. Si seule  
cette  différence  dans  le  niveau  d'inhibition  entre  les  enfants  des  différents  groupes  de 
performance  est  en  jeu,  dans  ce  cas  nous  devrions  observer  des  stratégies  visuelles 
comparables dans tous les groupes, lorsque les enfants n'ont pas à agir eux-mêmes sur le 
dispositif, et où donc ce facteur d'inhibition n'interviendrait que dans une moindre mesure.
Cependant la comparaison des groupes de performance en condition vision montrent 
que  seuls  les  enfants  qui  réussissent  à  choisir  la  bonne  ficelle,  sont  également  capables 
d'anticiper visuellement quelle ficelle doit être tirée. Ce résultat rejoint celui d'autres études 
récentes montrant que la capacité d'un individu d'anticiper visuellement une action réalisée 
par un autre agent n'est en place que lorsque l'individu est capable de réaliser cette tâche lui-
même (correspondant à la « direct matching hypothesis » formulée par Rizzolatti & Fadiga, 
2005).  Ce résultat  suggère  que si  la  performance des  enfants à résoudre cette  tâche eux-
mêmes peut être influencée par leur capacité à inhiber une action spontanée telle que la saisie 
de la ficelle la plus proche de la main préférée, il semble que ce facteur ne soit pas le seul à 
l'origine de la difficulté des enfants à résoudre cette tâche.
Pour en revenir à nos résultats sur la difficulté des enfants à utiliser un outil avant la 
fin de la deuxième année de la vie, il  est possible que la capacité d'inhibition de certains  
gestes soit également un facteur entrant en jeu dans cette tâche. Par exemple, pour résoudre la 
tâche de l'outil, les enfants doivent inhiber le geste spontané de pointer vers l'objet, afin de 
prendre l'outil pour rapprocher l'objet. Une analyse approfondie des gestes de pointage dans 
l'étude transversale  de l'article  présenté au  chapitre  3  semble  montrer  que  le  pourcentage 
d'essais pour lesquels le premier geste est un geste de pointage vers l'objet est semblable à 
tous les âges, même à 22 mois lorsque l'enfant arrive spontanément  à utiliser l'outil  pour 
rapprocher l'objet. Notamment, en condition où l'objet et l'outil sont séparés spatialement, en 
moyenne un essai  sur  deux est  débuté par un geste  de pointage vers l'objet,  et  ce  même 
lorsque l'enfant a résolu la tâche d'utilisation d'outil à l'essai précédent. Ceci pourrait donc 
aller dans le sens de l'hypothèse selon laquelle le niveau d'inhibition de l'enfant ne serait pas 
encore  complètement  développé  à  cet  âge  là,  pouvant  rendre  difficile  l'acquisition  de 
l'utilisation d'outils.
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Apprentissage par observation (Chapitre 5)
Enfin,  nous avons cherché à savoir  pourquoi les enfants n'ont pas appris à utiliser 
l'outil  par observation avant  l'âge de 18 mois dans  nos études.  Ce résultat  est  surprenant 
puisqu'un enfant est capable d'imiter des actions complexes bien avant cet âge. Une hypothèse 
possible est que les enfants, ne comprenant pas l’intention de l’expérimentateur, n’ont pas 
perçu le rôle de l’outil par manque d’anticipation de l’action de l’adulte. Nous avons donc 
mené une étude sur des enfants de 16 mois, présentée dans l'article 4, afin de vérifier si l'ajout 
d'éléments montrant l'intention du démonstrateur avant la démonstration aidait les enfants à 
apprendre plus tôt au cours du développement à utiliser un outil par observation. En effet, on 
sait que très tôt, le bébé est capable d'identifier l'intention d'un agent en train de réaliser une 
action (voir Woodward, Sommerville, Gerson, Henderson and Buresh, 2009, pour une revue 
détaillée de la littérature). On sait  également que dès 14 mois,  les enfants ont tendance à 
imiter plus un geste qui a été réalisé intentionnellement, que si ce même geste a été réalisé 
accidentellement (Carpenter, Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998). Nous avons donc testé 70 enfants de 
16 mois dans différentes conditions de démonstrations de l'utilisation d'outils (14 enfants par 
groupe). Le premier groupe était testé sur sa capacité à résoudre cette tâche  spontanément, 
sans  démonstration  particulière.  Le  deuxième  groupe  était  testé  après  avoir  observé  une 
démonstration classique, impliquant la prise de l'outil pour ensuite rapprocher l'objet, comme 
cela  avait  été  fait  dans  les  études  du  chapitre  3.  Le  troisième  groupe  observait  une 
démonstration précédée d'un pointage vers l'objet pour le démonstrateur, pour signifier son 
intention d'attraper l'objet, tout en indiquant que l'objet est hors de portée. Ensuite seulement 
le  démonstrateur montrait  comment utiliser  l'outil.  Enfin, les deux derniers groupes testés 
étaient  des  groupes  contrôles  afin  de  vérifier  que  si  un  effet  était  observé  pour  la 
démonstration avec intention, cela était bien lié à la compréhension de l'intention, et non à un 
simple rehaussement de l'attention de l'enfant vers l'objet ou vers la scène en général. Les 
résultats montrent en effet que seuls les enfants à qui le démonstrateur a signifié son intention 
d'obtenir l'objet avant la démonstration améliorent leur performance après la démonstration.
Discussion (Chapitre 6)
Dans les différentes études présentées dans le cadre de ce travail de thèse, nous avons 
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pu dans un premier temps mettre en évidence les différentes étapes de l'utilisation d'un outil 
pour rapprocher un objet hors de portée chez le très jeune enfant. Nous avons d'abord mis en 
évidence que dès 12-14 mois, les enfants peuvent résoudre la tâche lorsque l'objet est situé 
dans la trajectoire directe entre l'outil (un râteau) et l'enfant. Par ailleurs, lorsque l'objet est 
situé en dehors de la trajectoire de l'outil, les enfants ne réussissent pas à utiliser l'outil pour 
rapprocher  l'objet  avant  l'âge  de 18 mois  au plus  tôt,  que ce  soit  spontanément  ou après 
observation. Ces résultats sont cohérents avec ce qui a été trouvé dans la littérature concernant 
la  difficulté  des  enfants  à  résoudre des  tâches  comparables  dès  que  l'outil  et  l'objet  sont 
séparés (e.g. Bates et al, 1980 ; van Leeuwen et al., 1994). Bates et al. (1980) avaient conclu 
que les enfants étaient capables d'utiliser un outil (tels qu'un rateau, un bâton ou un crochet)  
dès le début de la deuxième année, et que la difficulté liée à la présence d'un espace entre 
l'outil et l'objet était liée à une difficulté d'imaginer mentalement le lien entre l'outil et l'objet.  
Cependant, certaines de nos observations dans les études longitudinale et transversale nous 
amènent  à  penser  que  même  lorsque  les  enfants  réussissent  dans  les  conditions  les  plus 
simples de relation spatiales entre outil et objet, ils ne comprennent pas la notion d'outil pour 
rapprocher un objet hors de leur portée. Par exemple, nous avons pu observer que lorsque 
l'objet était posé dans la trajectoire du râteau, et que l'enfant soulevait le râteau au lieu de 
ratisser, ne  permettant donc pas de rapprocher l'objet, l'enfant se débarrassait généralement 
rapidement  du râteau,  devenu 'inutile',  et  pointait  vers l'objet  sans chercher à le  réutiliser. 
Selon notre interprétation, les conditions où l'objet et l'outil sont dans la même trajectoire ne 
permettent pas de montrer que l'enfant a compris la fonction de l'outil, puisque l'enfant peut 
rapprocher l'objet par hasard simplement en tirant sur le manche du râteau, permettant ainsi 
d'entraîner l'objet  vers soi par 'contingence spatiale'.  Ainsi,  nous déduisons que seules  les 
conditions dans lesquelles l'objet et l'outil sont séparés dans l'espace permettent d'évaluer si 
l'enfant a compris la notion d'outil.
Dans  un  deuxième  temps,  nous  discutons  des  mécanismes  susceptibles  d'être 
impliqués dans l'émergence de la capacité à utiliser un outil tel qu'un râteau ou un bâton pour 
rapprocher un objet hors de portée chez le jeune enfant. A partir des différentes études que 
nous avons menées dans ce travail de thèse, plusieurs facteurs semblent être impliqués dans la 
difficulté à utiliser un outil.
Le premier facteur concerne ce que l'on appelle les fonctions exécutives, permettant à 
l'enfant d'agir de façon flexible et adaptée au contexte qui lui est présenté. Notamment, la 
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planification de l'action et l'inhibition de gestes spontanés sont deux composantes majeures 
des  fonctions  exécutives.  L'utilisation  d'outil  est  une action complexe  qui  nécessite  d'être 
décomposée en plusieurs phases : 1) identifier le but, c'est à dire d'attraper l'objet, 2) pouvoir 
mettre ce but de côté momentanément afin de 3) prendre l'outil, 4) de diriger l'outil vers l'objet  
et de le placer dans des conditions permettant ensuite de rapprocher efficacement l'objet. Dans 
le  second  article  présenté  dans  le  chapitre  3,  nous  nous  sommes  plus  particulièrement 
intéressé aux phases 3 et 4, puisque nous avons pu mettre en évidence que selon le côté de 
l'objet par rapport au râteau, le mouvement pour rapprocher l'objet était très souvent influencé 
par la main qui prenait le râteau. De même, nous avons déjà évoqué, dans un paragraphe 
précédent, la possibilité que le niveau d'inhibition des comportements spontanés tels que le 
pointage vers l'objet était également susceptible d'influencer la performance des bébés dans la 
tâche d'utilisation d'outils.
Un autre facteur qui pourrait être à l'origine de la difficulté des enfants à utiliser l'outil 
est d'origine motrice. En effet, l'utilisation du râteau n'étant pas une action familière, il est 
possible que les enfants aient du mal à placer le râteau au bon endroit et faire le bon geste de 
ratissage.  Cependant,  il  est  important  de  noter  que  de  façon générale  avant  18 mois,  les 
enfants connectaient très peu l'objet et le râteau. De plus, s'ils les connectaient, les enfants les 
plus jeunes faisaient rarement de nouvelles tentatives après avoir essayé une première fois 
d'utiliser le râteau. Ainsi, de notre point de vue, les limitations motrices ne sont pas un facteur  
suffisant pour expliquer les difficultés des enfants à utiliser un outil. Il est possible cependant 
que la difficulté motrice de la tâche induise un traitement partagé entre les processus cognitifs 
et  moteurs,  ce  qui  pourrait  impliquer  une  baisse  du  traitement  cognitif  de  la  tâche  chez 
l'enfant.
Le dernier  facteur que nous évoquons dans cette  discussion est  l'apprentissage par 
observation de l'utilisation d'outils. Nous avons pu montrer que l'enfant n'apprend à utiliser un 
outil par observation qu'à partir de l'âge de 18 mois. Nous avons également mis en évidence 
que cet apprentissage est possible avant 18 mois si on ajoute lors de la démonstration des 
informations permettant de mieux identifier l'intention du démonstrateur. On sait que l'enfant 
évolue dans un milieu social qui joue un rôle très important dans l'apprentissage, comme celui 
de  l'utilisation  de  la  cuillère  par  exemple.  Ainsi,  il  est  possible  que  si  l'enfant  était  plus 
souvent  exposé,  dans  la  vie  de  tous  les  jours,  à  d'autres  personnes  réalisant  ce  type 
d'utilisation  d'outil  pour  rapprocher  des  objets  hors  de  portée,  ce  comportement  se 
développerait peut-être plus tôt chez le jeune enfant. Et en effet, c'est ce que suggèrent les 
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résultats d'une étude réalisée en dehors du cadre de cette thèse (Somogyi, Ara, Rat-Fischer, 
O'Regan & Fagard, soumis), pendant laquelle des enfants de 14 mois ont été régulièrement 
familiarisés avec un adulte utilisant un râteau dans des contextes de la vie courante, pendant 6 
semaines. Dès l'âge de 16 mois, ces enfants avaient de meilleures performances dans la tâche 
d'utilisation d'outil que les enfants qui n'avaient pas eu de familiarisation, ou des enfants qui 
n'avaient  eu  qu'une  familiarisation  manuelle  avec  le  râteau,  mais  sans  démonstration 
particulière de son utilisation. 
En  conclusion  de  ce  travail  de  thèse,  nous  avons  tenté  de  comprendre  quand  et 
comment la capacité d'utiliser un outil pour rapprocher un objet émerge chez le bébé. Nous 
avons décrit les étapes développementales de cet apprentissage durant la seconde année de 
vie. Nous avons proposé des mécanismes de bases susceptibles d'influencer la performance 
des  enfants,  tels  que  des  mécanismes  d'inhibition,  de  planification  de  l'action  et 
d'apprentissage par observation. Ce travail de thèse est innovateur dans le sens où, avant cela, 
la trajectoire développementale de l'apprentissage de cette capacité n'était pas claire. Dans la 
continuité de cette thèse, de nombreuses recherches restent à mener pour mieux comprendre 
les mécanismes responsables  de l'émergence de l'utilisation d'outil.  En particulier,  il  nous 
semble important de mener des études longitudinales, permettant de suivre les mêmes enfants 
sur une période de temps donnée,  afin  d'avoir  une meilleure vision de la  façon dont  des 
comportements complexes tels que l'utilisation d'outils se développe au cours de l'enfance. Par  
ailleurs, l'un des challenges actuels pour les psychologues développementalistes est de réaliser 
ces recherches en collaboration avec des roboticiens du développement. Depuis récemment, la 
robotique  développementale  a  tenté  de  mettre  en  place  des  systèmes  artificiels  qui 
développent de façon autonomes des habiletés telles que l'utilisation d'outils (voir par exemple 
la thèse de Stoytchev, 2007). Une étroite collaboration entre ces deux domaines de recherche 
permettrait  d'une  part  d'essayer  de  comprendre  comment  de  telles  habiletés  peuvent  être 
apprises par des robots qui n'ont pas été entièrement programmés à l'avance. En contrepartie, 
la robotique développementale pourrait tester,  sur des systèmes artificiels,  les mécanismes 
identifiés par les études expérimentales sur le développement de l'enfant, afin de vérifier la 
validité de ces mécanismes.
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